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Abstract
Despite being one of the oldest topics in the history of western philosophy, the nature of 
rationality is still a substantial source of disagreement, especially when it comes to its 
normativity. Current theories of rationality are either not exhaustive enough or do not 
sufficiently account for the normativity of rational requirements. In this thesis, I am interested 
in whether there is plausible ground for developing an initial account of rationality as an 
intellectual virtue in a way that is both more exhaustive than other theories on offer and that 
provides a strong account of the normativity of rationality. I argue for a tripartite account of 
rationality as an intellectual virtue, based on the most plausible elements of both a general 
theory of rationality and a general theory of intellectual virtue. 
On my general account of rationality, the exercise of an agent’s rational capacity results in a 
state of mind that satisfies requirements of rationality. These requirements supervene on the 
mind, generally have wide scope, and are not coextensive with that for which you have 
reasons. My general account of intellectual virtue identifies three characteristics of an 
intellectual virtue, namely a weakly reliable intellectual capacity, an intellectual goal, and 
praiseworthiness. My threefold account of rationality as an intellectual virtue builds upon these 
three characteristics of intellectual virtue. It proceeds as follows. 
First, an agent is rationally virtuous only if she possesses a rational capacity to reliably satisfy 
requirements of rationality in appropriate environments and conditions. Such a capacity is a 
disposition of an agent’s character insofar as it involves some degree of volition for its 
manifestation. Second, an agent is rationally virtuous only if she exercises her rational capacity 
out of a motivation for achieving the goal of attitudinal harmony, which is the appropriate 
intellectual goal of a rational agent. I argue that this is also a novel basis for justifying 
requirements of rationality: what justifies a requirement qua requirement of rationality is that it 
is constitutive of attitudinal harmony. Third, an agent who has both this rational capacity and 
the goal of attitudinal harmony is praiseworthy for the conjunction of, first, exercising her 
capacity out of her motivation for attitudinal harmony and, second, for attaining the non-
instrumental value of attitudinal harmony that is constituted by satisfying requirements of 
rationality. As part of the latter claim, I argue for a novel account of the value of satisfying 
requirements of rationality based on the final value of attitudinal harmony. I demonstrate that 
this value gives an agent a pro tanto reason to satisfy what rationality requires of her, and 
thereby accounts for the normativity of rational requirements. 
5 
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
I am indebted to the University of Johannesburg for funding through a Global Excellence and 
Stature scholarship that made this thesis possible.  
I must foremostly express my debt of gratitude to my supervisor, Veli, for the depth of her 
generosity in encouraging, guiding, and supporting my work. Many a time she has gone 
beyond what is reasonable to expect of a supervisor in her mentorship. I regret that this thesis 
is not a sufficient reflection of how much I have developed as a philosopher under her nurturing 
guidance. Nonetheless, this work is dedicated to her.  
The helpful comments and recommendations that I received from my examiners, Guy Axtell, 
John Broome, and Clayton Littlejohn were instrumental in substantially strengthening the final 
version of the thesis. I am extremely grateful for their generous responses and suggestions. 
While I learned a great deal from their feedback, John Broome’s meticulous notes were 
especially helpful in identifying a number of corrections that needed to be made. Although I 
hope to have done justice to the attention my examiners gave the thesis, I take responsibility 
for the finished version. 
I am indebted to the members of UJ Philosophy for their countless conversations, stimulating 
challenges, suggestions, workshops, and help in many ways – Devon Bailey, Catherine Botha, 
Alex Broadbent, Chad Harris, Hennie Lötter, Nicolene Marks, Thad Metz, Veli Mitova, Zinhle 
Mncube, Asheel Singh, Ben Smart, Dimpho Takane Maponya, and Rafael Winkler. 
Much of my work in chapters 5 and 6 have benefitted greatly from valuable conversations and 
feedback that I received at conferences and workshops. I would therefore like to thank the 
participants of the 2018 and 2019 Postgraduate Philosophy Association conferences hosted 
by UP and UJ respectively, as well as the participants of the 2019 and 2020 Philosophical 
Society of Southern Africa conferences hosted by UJ and UKZN respectively. I would also like 
to thank the organisers and participants of a 2019 PhD workshop on rationality hosted by the 
philosophy department at the University of Zürich, especially Anne Meylan, Veli Mitova, 
Sebastian Schmidt, Melanie Sarzano, and Marie van Loon, and for funding from Veli Mitova 
that made it possible for me to attend this workshop. 
I am grateful for the contributions of other family, friends and colleagues, especially Ashley 
and Dee Coates, whose company and conversation I could have done with far more over the 
last year. The UJ postgraduates, too many to name, have been my partners in conferencing, 
learning, struggling, and growing for the past three years. I am truly grateful for each one. 
6 
By far the greatest help that anyone could hope for, Suné has been my most steadfast and 
constant support. She has shown me patience, forgiveness, and understanding during such a 
difficult time as doing a thesis. I wish that I could properly express my gratitude for the love 
that she shows towards me each day. 
Finally, I would like to acknowledge the source of my inspiration for this thesis, both its 
inception and development, and for whatever may come of this research, for unto thee is due 
all honour. 
7 
 
 
 
 
Table of Contents 
 
Affidavit ...................................................................................................................... 3 
Abstract ...................................................................................................................... 4 
Acknowledgements .................................................................................................... 5 
Table of Contents ....................................................................................................... 7 
 Introduction ........................................................................................... 10 
1.1. Introduction ................................................................................................. 10 
1.2. Rationality, Normativity, and Intellectual Virtue ........................................... 12 
1.3. Accounts of Rationality as a Virtue .............................................................. 19 
1.4. The Argument ............................................................................................. 24 
1.5. Method and Limits ....................................................................................... 27 
1.5.1. Method.................................................................................................. 27 
1.5.2. Occurrent and dispositional attitudes .................................................... 29 
1.5.3. Reasoning and mental events .............................................................. 31 
1.6. Conclusion .................................................................................................. 34 
 A General Account of Rationality .......................................................... 35 
2.1. Introduction ................................................................................................. 35 
2.2. Varieties of ‘Rationality’ ............................................................................... 36 
2.2.1. Plantinga’s distinctions ......................................................................... 37 
2.2.2. Mental, structural, and reified rationality ............................................... 39 
2.2.3. Rationality and epistemic justification ................................................... 44 
2.3. Requirements of Rationality ........................................................................ 47 
2.3.1. The nature of rational requirements ...................................................... 48 
2.3.2. Formulating requirements: diachronic and synchronic, process or state?
 54 
2.3.3. Argument for indifference about scope ................................................. 58 
2.4. Further Debate on Rationality ..................................................................... 66 
2.4.1. Responding correctly to reasons .......................................................... 67 
2.4.2. Rationality supervenes on the mind ...................................................... 71 
2.4.3. Normative questions ............................................................................. 73 
2.5. Conclusion .................................................................................................. 80 
8 
 
 
 
 
 A General Account of Intellectual Virtue ............................................... 81 
3.1. Introduction ................................................................................................. 81 
3.2. Virtue Epistemology .................................................................................... 83 
3.3. Reliability ..................................................................................................... 89 
3.3.1. Dispositions and capacities .................................................................. 90 
3.3.2. Weak reliability to form or abstain from forming .................................... 94 
3.3.3. Track record reliability........................................................................... 96 
3.3.4. Is reliability necessary?......................................................................... 99 
3.4. Intellectual Goal ........................................................................................ 101 
3.5. Praiseworthiness ....................................................................................... 108 
3.5.1. Problems with reliabilism .................................................................... 110 
3.5.2. Volition, value, and praiseworthiness ................................................. 113 
3.6. Conclusion ................................................................................................ 118 
 Rationality as an Intellectual Virtue ..................................................... 120 
4.1. Introduction ............................................................................................... 120 
4.2. Whose Virtue? Which Rationality? ............................................................ 121 
4.3. Reliable Rationality ................................................................................... 124 
4.3.1. The character disposition of rationality ............................................... 125 
4.3.2. Conditions and environments appropriate for rationality ..................... 129 
4.3.3. Track record of exercising mental rationality ...................................... 134 
4.4. The Goal of Rationality .............................................................................. 137 
4.5. The Praiseworthiness of Rationality .......................................................... 146 
4.6. Conclusion ................................................................................................ 149 
 The Goal of Rationality ....................................................................... 151 
5.1. Introduction ............................................................................................... 151 
5.2. Clearing Ground for the Rational Goal ...................................................... 152 
5.2.1. Rational requirements constitute structural rationality ........................ 153 
5.2.2. Epistemic norms ................................................................................. 156 
5.2.3. Intelligibility ......................................................................................... 158 
5.3. Three Unsatisfactory Contenders .............................................................. 160 
5.3.1. Expected correctness ......................................................................... 163 
5.3.2. Consistency ........................................................................................ 169 
9 
 
 
 
 
5.3.3. Coherence .......................................................................................... 170 
5.4. Harmony: The Goal of Rationality ............................................................. 176 
5.4.1. Attitudinal harmony ............................................................................. 176 
5.4.2. Grounding requirements of rationality ................................................. 180 
5.4.3. Aiming at harmony .............................................................................. 183 
5.5. Conclusion ................................................................................................ 186 
 The Normativity of Rationality ............................................................. 188 
6.1. Introduction ............................................................................................... 188 
6.2. Requirements and Reasons ...................................................................... 190 
6.2.1. Reasons ............................................................................................. 191 
6.2.2. Strictness ............................................................................................ 193 
6.2.3. Detachment ........................................................................................ 195 
6.3. The Normative Question ........................................................................... 197 
6.4. Attempts at Answering the Normative Question ........................................ 201 
6.4.1. Reasons-responsivism ....................................................................... 202 
6.4.2. Process-requirements......................................................................... 210 
6.4.3. Indirect derivative arguments .............................................................. 217 
6.5. The Normativity of Rational Requirements ................................................ 229 
6.5.1. Pro tanto reason to satisfy a rational requirement .............................. 229 
6.5.2. Final value of attitudinal harmony ....................................................... 231 
6.6. Normativity and Rationality as an Intellectual Virtue ................................. 241 
6.7. Conclusion ................................................................................................ 245 
 Conclusion .......................................................................................... 247 
7.1. Introduction ............................................................................................... 247 
7.2. Synopsis of My Argument ......................................................................... 247 
7.3. Strengthening My Account ........................................................................ 259 
7.3.1. Providing detailed treatments ............................................................. 259 
7.3.2. Resolving apparent tensions .............................................................. 262 
7.3.3. Further work ....................................................................................... 264 
7.4. Conclusion ................................................................................................ 267 
Reference List ........................................................................................................ 268 
 
10 
 
 
 
 
 Introduction 
 
1.1. Introduction 
Rationality has been a central and towering concept in Western philosophy since Plato 
and Aristotle. Over the past twenty-four centuries of its employment in philosophy, the 
term has meant various things to various thinkers, to the extent that ‘rationality’ in 
contemporary philosophy lacks a univocal meaning. This has made attempts at 
theorising and understanding what is meant by ‘rationality’ a difficult task, to say the 
least.  
There has been much interest in recent philosophy in ‘rationality’ as a property of an 
agent, specifically of the relations among her mental states, insofar as they satisfy 
certain requirements. This sense of rationality, ‘structural rationality,’ picks out a 
certain kind of achievement, and is captured in such expressions as, ‘Linda is not the 
most rational person I’ve met when it comes to politics,’ and, ‘I can’t stand talking with 
Jim – his irrationality really shows itself then.’ What constitutes the property of 
structural rationality is satisfying ‘requirements of rationality’; and irrationality is 
constituted by not satisfying all that is required of you by rationality. In order to be 
eligible for having the property of structural rationality, you would first need to have 
that capacity which enables you to have and to order your mental states in a way that 
could satisfy the requirements of rationality. That is to say, you would need to be the 
kind of being that possesses ‘mental rationality.’ I will have much more to say on these 
terms and their distinctions in the following chapter (section 2.2.2). These tentative 
definitions are sufficient for the formulation of the problem that this project addresses. 
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The most pressing concern with the requirements of structural rationality in the recent 
literature is whether these requirements are normative, that is, whether we ought, or 
have reason, to satisfy each particular requirement of rationality. Although the debate 
generated by this concern is considerable, one line of argument that has been largely 
neglected is whether the normativity of rationality can be demonstrated by conceiving 
of rationality as a kind of intellectual virtue. While conceptions of rationality as a virtue 
have been put forward by Sigrún Svavarsdóttir (2008), Kurt Sylvan (MS), and Ralph 
Wedgwood (2017), these accounts lack focussed treatments of rational normativity.1 
Since virtue theory is rich in normative concepts, conceiving of rationality as an 
intellectual virtue may well provide the tools necessary to account for rationality’s 
normativity. This is the starting point for my project. This thesis is an attempt at taking 
first steps towards a plausible account of rationality as an intellectual virtue, and at 
demonstrating that such an account can be philosophically fruitful. Although rational 
normativity is foremost the motivation for developing a conception of rationality as an 
intellectual virtue, this view of rationality has uses and applications beyond that of the 
normativity debate. 
This chapter explores these applications by way of motivating the fruitfulness of having 
an account of rationality as an intellectual virtue, and for introducing my particular 
account. I first provide some background to non-virtue accounts of rationality and 
rational requirements, concepts in intellectual virtue, and some prima facie motivations 
 
 
1 I distinguish my account from those offered by these theorists below (section 1.3). 
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for pursuing an account of rationality as an intellectual virtue (section 1.2). I also 
provide a diagnosis of why developing an account of rationality as an intellectual virtue 
has been largely overlooked. Second, I discuss the three recent accounts of rationality 
as an intellectual virtue mentioned above. I show how these accounts differ from the 
one that I develop in this thesis (section 1.3). Third (section 4), I more fully state what 
my conception of rationality as an intellectual virtue amounts to and present an 
overview of my argument and chapters (section 1.4). Finally, I set out some important 
methodological considerations for developing my conception of rationality as an 
intellectual virtue (section 1.5). 
1.2. Rationality, Normativity, and Intellectual Virtue 
What first drew my interest to rationality was encountering claims, regarded as plainly 
uncontroversial, to the effect that an agent could be rational independently of being 
moral. At the time, I understood this claim to mean that you could be rational without 
being ‘good’ or being ‘as you ought to be’. I have since come to realise that this was a 
mistake, and that you can be rationally as you ought to be and morally not as you 
ought to be, and that being in such a state still amounts to not being as you ought to 
be overall. However, if the requirements of rationality are the same as the 
requirements of morality, then you cannot be simultaneously rationally as you ought 
to be and morally not as you ought to be. I think that the requirements of rationality are 
distinct from the requirements of morality, although this is not a consensus view. 
Reasons-responsivists, for instance, of whom a prime example is Lord (2017), think 
of rationality as coextensive with, even equivalent to, what you ought to do in general. 
Rationality is just another term for normativity, and covers the domains of hedonics, 
13 
 
 
 
 
morality, prudence, and possibly even spirituality. There may be situations in which 
we might use rationality colloquially to mean any of these things. Nevertheless, I think 
that rationality is strictly distinct from other sources of normativity or normative 
requirements. 
For an intuition to this effect, consider that certain non-rational normative requirements 
(like moral requirements) might explicitly suspend or override rational requirements. 
In those cases, a non-rational normative source would require that you suspend or 
violate that which otherwise is rationally required of you. For example, apophatic 
spirituality requires that you simultaneously believe a conjunction of propositions that 
violates rationality, such as the following.  
1. God is infinite. 
2. We do not know all God’s attributes. 
3. By (1) you should believe that God is infinite. 
4. By (2) you are not justified in believing, so should not believe, that God is 
infinite.  
Therefore, apophatic spirituality urges you to both believe and not believe that God 
has the attribute of infinity. 
Even among Christians apophatic spirituality is an odd thing, perhaps precisely in 
virtue of requiring you to violate or suspend certain requirements of rationality. But this 
example merely serves to show that what rationality requires of you and what some 
other normative source requires of you can be at odds with each other, and, therefore, 
that rationality is not equivalent to, nor even coextensive with, what you ought to do in 
general. 
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Perhaps this is a strange example, but it is an actual case of suspending rationality for 
a putatively higher or stronger normative prescription. There are other possible 
scenarios that some have given to illustrate the same point, such as being required to 
believe a contradiction in order to prevent a nuclear war.2 In such a case, violating 
what rationality requires of you (not to believe a contradiction) in order to save lives is 
the more normatively satisfactory course, even if it is a blatantly irrational one. These 
examples give us prima facie reason to think that it is a wrong to conflate what you 
ought to do in general with what rationality requires of you.3 
Nevertheless, many of us would still think that what rationality requires of us is 
normative in some sense, even if not on a par with the requirements of morality or 
spirituality. John Broome (2013: 204), who has argued extensively against accounts 
of rational normativity, states that despite not having a good argument for rational 
normativity, he still holds that rationality is normative. How might we account for the 
kind of normativity that is peculiar to rationality as a distinctive source of requirements? 
As I discuss more in chapters 2 (subsection) and 6 (subsection), there is extensive 
 
 
2 This example is given by John Broome (2005: 324). 
3 Some hold that it is necessary to conflate what rationality requires of you with what you ought to do, 
such as Lord (2017). I pick up on this in chapter 6 (section 6.4.1). 
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debate on whether rationality is normative.4 Specifically, theorists have argued in 
different ways for the normativity of rational requirements.  
One way of securing normativity might be this. Virtues are fundamentally normative 
properties. Thus, if rationality turned out to be an intellectual virtue, then rationality 
would be normative. This quick argument for normativity is largely unhelpful. In what 
sense are intellectual virtues normative? Is that sense of normativity compatible with 
rationality? If so, is that sense of normativity the kind that is sought by theorists 
debating rational normativity? (I address the problem of rational normativity in chapter 
6 and argue for a virtue-inspired account of rational normativity.) Nevertheless, the 
normative wealth that the concept of virtue brings with it is worth exploring for the 
purpose of looking for solutions to the problem of rational normativity. Even if virtue 
theory turns out to be incapable of resolving the problem as it is currently debated, 
perhaps an account of rationality as an intellectual virtue might enrich our 
understanding of rational normativity in another way. 
I think that there is much prima facie appeal to exploring the sources of normativity of 
virtue theory, specifically recent work on intellectual virtue. Intellectual virtue theory, or 
virtue epistemology, has access to concepts and tools that prima facie seem well 
equipped to help us both to understand rationality and to solve some problems that 
arise from a theory of rationality. But the field of intellectual virtue theory is large. Guy 
 
 
4 See, for example, Broome (2005, 2007b, 2013), Kiesewetter (2017), Kolodny (2005), Gjelsvik (2013 
and 2015), Littlejohn (2018a), Broncano and Vega (2015), McHugh and Way (2015), and Shackel 
(2015). 
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Axtell’s (1997) overview of work in virtue epistemology shows that it was already 
massive even two decades ago. A fundamental difference among theorists is whether 
intellectual virtues should account for an agent’s responsibility in producing good 
mental states like knowledge-beliefs. Reliabilists, says Axtell, do not think so and 
instead focus on the reliability of an agent’s attitude-forming faculties, while 
responsibilists think responsibility is necessary.5 
I think that there is promise both in reliabilist and responsibilist approaches to 
intellectual virtue for exploring rational normativity. For instance, certain reliabilists 
offer conceptions of intellectual virtues as cognitive faculties that reliably produce 
valuable states such as true belief. Since rationality can plausibly be conceived of as 
a kind of cognitive faculty or disposition, perhaps what rationality disposes you to do 
is valuable (such as form certain valuable attitudes or order your attitudes in an 
appropriately valuable way). The normativity of rationality might thus be derived from 
the value of the kind of state of mind a rational capacity produces. 
Second, some responsibilist6 theorists conceive of intellectual virtue as partly 
constituted by a praiseworthy motivation to achieve intellectual goods. Although the 
literature on rationality does not appeal to a motivation that is appropriate for being 
rational, there is prima facie appeal to this idea. Rather than attributing rationality to 
an agent merely because her mental states satisfy certain requirements, it seems 
 
 
5 This is a very rough distinction. I provide an overview of approaches to intellectual virtue in chapter 3. 
6 See Zagzebski (1996: 197ff). I discuss responsibilism more in chapter 3. 
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natural that an agent is indeed rational who has been motivated in some appropriate 
way – to anticipate my claim, motivated by an appropriate rational goal – to satisfy 
requirements of rationality. Thus, the conceptual resources of intellectual virtue hold 
promise for understanding how we attribute praise to a rational agent, or otherwise 
view her mental states as valuable. 
Given that there are some prima facie reasons that motivate seeking an account of 
rationality as an intellectual virtue, why has this avenue been neglected?7 In response 
I can only offer two conjectures based on some intuitive reasons against developing 
an account of rationality as an intellectual virtue. Specifically, since virtue epistemology 
was initially presented as an alternative to traditional analyses of epistemic justification 
– often assumed to be synonymous with ‘rationality’8 – the two approaches may have 
been regarded as mutually exclusive rather than possible allies. 
Another reason for the neglect may come from the popularity of the reasons-first 
approach to normativity. On this approach, all normativity is the normativity of 
reasons.9 For an adherent to a reasons-first approach, if rationality is normative, then 
it must be normative in virtue of its relation to reasons. Reasons-responsivists take 
rationality to consist in correctly responding to reasons.10 If this view of rationality is 
 
 
7 Although some have offered accounts of rationality as an intellectual virtue, as I mention earlier, none 
of these address the issue of rational normativity in detail. 
8 I discuss this conflation of justification with rationality in chapter 2. 
9 See, for example, Raz (1999) and Scanlon (2014). 
10 I discuss this position on rationality in chapter 2, and at length in chapter 6. 
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correct, then it would seem that your rational response is necessarily normative in 
virtue of the normative reasons to which you respond. In this way, rationality appears 
to have a very close relationship to normative reasons, and so the question of its 
normativity does not seem as pertinent.  
If these conjectures are correct, they are likely not the whole story. There may be other 
factors that have diverted attention from the possibility of conceiving rationality as an 
intellectual virtue. Still, I think that these elements may be part of the story. 
Nevertheless, my account bypasses these prima facie reasons to avoid developing an 
account of rationality as an intellectual virtue. First, I dissociate rationality from 
epistemic justification in the following chapter (section 2.2.3). If rationality is not 
synonymous with epistemic justification, then intellectual virtue theory is not a 
contestant in the same field. This leaves open the question of whether rationality might 
plausibly be conceived of as an intellectual virtue. Second, I find that there are serious 
problems with conceiving of rationality as equivalent to responding correctly to reasons 
(sections 2.4.1 and 6.4.1).11 And, if rationality is not constituted by responding correctly 
to reasons, then rationality cannot help itself to the normativity of the reasons to which 
it is supposed to respond. This then opens up the question of the normativity of 
 
 
11 I do not address the commitments of the reasons-first movement or other views that may emerge 
from it, such as the commitment that normativity is reducible to reasons, or the view that epistemic 
justification is constituted by having sufficient reason for your beliefs. In fact, as I mention in chapter 6 
(6.3), my account of the normativity of rational requirements is consistent with a reasons-first approach. 
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rationality, which may just be found within an account of rationality as an intellectual 
virtue. 
1.3. Accounts of Rationality as a Virtue 
My claim that rationality can plausibly be conceived of as a kind of intellectual virtue is 
not new, although what I take this to mean is different than what others have offered. 
Furthermore, existing accounts do not offer substantial analyses and arguments for 
the normativity of rationality on the basis of its putative status as a virtue. It would be 
thus useful to clarify what distinguishes my thesis here from three other philosophically 
proximal projects offered by Ralph Wedgwood (2017), Sigrún Svavarsdóttir (2008), 
and Kurt Sylvan (MS).  
Wedgwood (2017) develops an account, according to which rationality is ‘an 
evaluative concept’ (Wedgwood, 2017: 137). For Wedgwood, the kind of evaluative 
concept expressed by ‘rationality’ is that of a kind of virtue. His account of a virtue is a 
threefold concept of goodness. A virtue denotes a disposition that is good, 
manifestations of that disposition that are good, and manifestations that are regarded 
as good independently of whether they were caused by the disposition of which they 
are characteristic. Something like memory fits this schematic. It is good to have the 
disposition to remember things, it is good to have a memory that is manifested in 
having recollections, and having recollections is good independently of whether they 
20 
 
 
 
 
are caused by your disposition to remember.12 Rationality, according to Wedgwood, 
has these parallels.  
The connection that Wedgwood draws between the threefold goodness of virtue and 
rationality as a virtue is made quite briefly and does not include an argument. 
Furthermore, Wedgwood’s evaluative concept of rationality is meant to be broad in a 
way that includes evaluations of decisions, actions, and mental states. Wedgwood’s 
only analysis of rational normativity is the way in which the term is used as a normative 
concept when making evaluations of an agent’s use of her rational capacity 
(Wedgwood, 2017: 25-26). 
Rather than an evaluative state or value, the conception of rationality that I 
characterise as an intellectual virtue is focussed on an agent’s rational capacity, its 
exercise, and the agent’s motivation in exercising it. While I ultimately argue that a 
rational agent has an intellectual virtue for which she is praiseworthy, I do not assume 
that some capacity, its exercise, or the agent who possesses it is thereby valuable or 
praiseworthy. Demonstrating that there is value in a rational state of mind, and that a 
rational agent is praiseworthy, are primary concerns in my project. 
Apart from this fundamental difference, which explains the absence in Wedgwood’s 
account of a demonstration of how rationality ‘fits’ his concept of virtue, I also have a 
 
 
12 I am not sure if it is psychologically possible to have a recollection that is caused by anything other 
than your faculty of memory, but the point is that the value of recollection is logically independent of 
having the disposition of memory. 
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different account of what constitutes rational requirements. Although this is not directly 
part of Wedgwood’s account of rationality as a virtue, I argue in chapter 5 (section 
5.3.1) against his account of rationality as expected correctness. 
The second project that approaches mine is Sigrún Svavarsdóttir’s (2008) account of 
practical rationality as a virtue. Svavarsdóttir’s approach is similar in one respect to 
Wedgwood’s insofar as she takes rationality to be an evaluative concept. Her account 
is a theory of the conditions under which an agent’s endeavours can be evaluated as 
rational. An action can be evaluated as rational only if an agent is practically rational. 
For Svavarsdóttir, to be practically rational is a virtue in the sense of being a kind of 
excellence. Practical rationality ‘is excellence in exercising one’s cognitive capacities 
in one’s practical endeavors’ (Svavarsdóttir, 2008: 3). (Svavarsdóttir (2008: 1) 
distinguishes between practical and theoretical rationality; the former is concerned 
with action and other ‘practical endeavours’ such as ‘actions, intentions, desires, and 
emotions’, while the latter is primarily concerned with beliefs.) For Svavarsdóttir (2008: 
5), there are four conditions that are best construed as constitutive of the excellence 
– and, thus, the virtue – of practical rationality. Put briefly, these conditions of 
excellence are that an agent uses her cognitive capacities appropriately, that her 
cognitive representations are ‘of a high quality’, that her cognitive activity matches up 
with her practical endeavour, and that her ‘selection and pursuit of ends’ accord with 
her cognitive activity.  
Leaving aside Svavarsdóttir’s concern with practical rationality and the fact that she 
does not develop it as a characteristically intellectual virtue, it is relevant to distinguish 
her account from mine in the following three ways. First, my account is similar to 
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Svavarsdóttir’s insofar as I also argue for a capacity to be exercised in an appropriate 
or proper way. However, Svavarsdóttir conceives of rationality as a way in which an 
agent exercises her cognitive capacities, while I conceive of rationality itself as a kind 
of capacity or disposition. Furthermore, part of the proper exercise of rationality in my 
view is that an agent is appropriately motivated by a rational goal. This is lacking in 
Svavarsdóttir’s account, although I only note this as a difference, not a critique. 
Second, given that Svavarsdóttir is concerned with developing a conception of 
rationality as an evaluative concept, that is, a concept according to which agents or 
certain of their actions or properties are excellent or virtuous, she does not provide an 
account of the normativity of (practical) rationality. In contrast, I provide an account of 
the various ways in which an agent counts as being rational, especially in terms of the 
order of her state of mind, as well as how these states are normative for an agent. 
Third, Svavarsdóttir conceives of rationality as a compound kind of excellence of an 
agent based on the four conditions of rationality, and that this excellence is what 
qualifies the concept of practical rationality as a virtue. This is a very broad notion of 
virtue and substantially different than that which I develop in chapter 3. I provide an 
analysis of intellectual virtue based on debates in intellectual virtue theory and identify 
three characteristics of intellectual virtue in general. The account of intellectual virtue 
that I develop (that I describe below in section 1.4) is a threefold concept on which I 
base my theory of rationality as a virtue. 
In contrast to Wedgwood’s and Svavarsdóttir’s evaluative conceptions of rationality, 
Kurt Sylvan develops a species of reliabilist virtue epistemology (or ‘competence virtue 
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epistemology’) that he labels as a ‘rationalist virtue epistemology’ (Sylvan, MS). 
According to a rationalist virtue epistemology, among the excellences of a rational 
agent are competences ‘to correctly respond to normative epistemic reasons’ (Sylvan, 
MS). Having a competence to respond correctly to normative epistemic reasons 
entails having a competence to form true beliefs, but not the converse. The primary 
intellectual virtue is that of a competency for responding correctly to normative 
epistemic reasons, rather than that of forming true beliefs as is the hallmark of 
traditional reliabilist virtue epistemology. Sylvan’s rationalist virtue epistemology is 
proffered as a ‘comprehensive epistemology,’ i.e., an account of, among other things, 
the conditions under which you are justified for having a belief. 
As a comprehensive epistemology, Sylvan’s theory is ultimately concerned with 
conditions of knowledge. Since my aim is to develop a plausible account of rationality 
as an intellectual virtue, my account includes elements of intellectual virtue that I take 
to be necessary primarily for being a rational agent – such as having an appropriate 
motivation – rather than for being in a state of knowledge (although such a state might 
arguably involve a motivation component, such as in Zagzebski’s (1996) virtue 
epistemology). Thus, while satisfying Sylvan’s conditions for being rational implies also 
satisfying the conditions for having knowledge, my account of rationality neither 
implies nor is directly concerned with knowledge. I discuss my views on rationality and 
epistemic justification in chapter 2 (section 2.2.3), and on rationality and epistemic 
goods such as knowledge in chapter 3 (section 3.4).  
A second difference between my work and Sylvan’s is that Sylvan’s rationalist virtue 
epistemology is markedly ‘reasons-responsivist’ with regards to its conception of 
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rationality. I have several concerns with adopting a reasons-responsivist approach as 
a comprehensive account of rationality – most prominently, regarding rationality, that 
there are requirements of rationality that are not reducible to or explicable in terms of 
reasons and, regarding normativity, that reasons-responsivism implausibly tends to 
collapse normativity and rationality.13 Therefore, in contrast to Sylvan, I adopt a 
broader conception of structural rationality and a non-reasons-responsivist stance on 
rational requirements. 
These three accounts differ both in their conceptions of what it is that constitutes 
rationality as a kind of virtue, and in the purpose for which their conceptions were 
developed. All three lack an account of a rational motivation, and none presents their 
account in order to answer the question of rationality’s normativity. I hope that my 
account is able to plausibly provide both. 
1.4. The Argument 
My primary claim is that there is a plausible account of rationality as an intellectual 
virtue that can be philosophically fruitful. (What I mean by rationality will be spelt out 
in chapter 2, which I outline shortly.) I develop my account of rationality as an 
intellectual virtue on the basis of what I take to be three general characteristics of an 
intellectual virtue, demonstrating that features of rationality (specifically, features of a 
rational agent) are plausibly described in these terms. In a sentence, my view is that 
an agent is rational only if she possesses a rational capacity to satisfy requirements 
 
 
13 I argue for these claims in chapter 6 (section 6.4.1). 
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of rationality in appropriate conditions, exercises this capacity out of a motivation for 
achieving the goal of attitudinal harmony, and is praiseworthy for doing so. Since these 
three elements are characteristic of intellectual virtues in general, rationality can be 
conceived of as an intellectual virtue. I argue for this in the following way. 
In chapter 2, I provide a general account of rationality. I distinguish between three 
semantically related senses of rationality that are the focus of this thesis: ‘mental 
rationality’ as a capacity or disposition to form well-ordered states of mind, ‘structural 
rationality’ as the property of a mind that has well-ordered attitudes, and ‘requirements 
of rationality’ as the norms of rationality constitutive of having a well-ordered state of 
mind. Since there is much disagreement over the nature of rational requirements, this 
makes up the bulk of my discussion. I argue that rational requirements are generally 
wide-scope and thus are not process-requirements, that they supervene on your mind, 
and that these requirements are norms of how your attitudes should be ordered rather 
than what you have reasons for. In developing this account of rationality, I discuss 
various other issues and concepts relevant to rationality. 
In chapter 3, I consider both responsibilist and reliabilist approaches for the 
development of my general account of intellectual virtue. I identify three general 
characteristics of paradigmatic intellectual virtues. I do not claim that these features 
are either necessary or sufficient; there may well be intellectual virtues that lack certain 
of these characteristics or that have additional features. First, I argue that intellectual 
virtues are generally characterised by a disposition of character to form attitudes in 
appropriate conditions and environments. Second, intellectually virtuous agents are 
motivated by an appropriate intellectual goal. Third, they are praiseworthy for the 
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exercise of their intellectual disposition when it is motivated by this intellectual goal in 
a way that produces valuable states. 
Building on these three characteristics of intellectual virtue, I argue in chapter 4 that 
rationality is plausibly described in terms of the following three claims. Rationality is a 
disposition of character that is properly exercised in appropriate conditions and 
environments. A rational agent is motivated by an appropriate intellectual goal. And a 
rational agent is praiseworthy for exercising her rational capacity out of a motivation 
for this goal to produce a valuable state of mind. My accounts of the second and third 
elements are not adequately developed in this chapter; I develop my view of the 
appropriate intellectual goal in chapter 5, and my view of the value of a rational state 
of mind and the normativity of rational requirements in chapter 6. 
I argue in chapter 5 that the appropriate goal by which a rational agent is motivated is 
that of attitudinal harmony. This claim maps onto the question of what justifies 
requirements as requirements of rationality. I argue against three other attempts at 
providing a ground for this justification and instead argue for attitudinal harmony as a 
satisfactory ground. I then demonstrate that an agent with an overall aim of attitudinal 
harmony will necessarily have as her immediate aim the satisfaction of particular 
requirements of rationality, even when these requirements are inaccessible to her. 
Chapter 6 completes my account of the praiseworthiness of rationality by arguing for 
the final value of having a state of mind that satisfies what rationality requires. In so 
doing, I also provide an account of the normativity of rational requirements. I first clarify 
that the most satisfactory account of the normativity of rational requirements is that 
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having a requirement gives you a pro tanto reason to do what that requirement 
prescribes. I then demonstrate the shortcomings of three attempts at providing such 
an account. I argue that the attitudinal harmony of a state of mind that satisfies the 
requirements of rationality has final value, and that this value gives the agent a pro 
tanto reason to satisfy rational requirements to which she is subject. Finally, I 
demonstrate that this account is insufficient for the praiseworthiness of a rational 
agent, and that the other two elements of rationality as an intellectual virtue are 
necessary, i.e., exercising a rational capacity out of a motivation for attitudinal 
harmony. 
In chapter 7, I provide a synopsis of my arguments and briefly gesture at additional 
work for developing my account further. 
1.5. Method and Limits 
As a final introductory step, I ought to clarify, first, my methodological considerations 
for the project, second, the kinds of attitudes that I take rationality to govern, and, third, 
my reasons for excluding an account of reasoning from my treatment of rationality. 
1.5.1. Method 
My aim is to delineate a preliminary account of how rationality can plausibly be 
conceived of as an intellectual virtue. Since the fields of both rational theory and 
intellectual virtue are broad and fraught with disagreement, my aim is to find the most 
plausible ‘fit’ for rationality into intellectual virtue. Thus, when adjudicating between 
competing views of rationality and intellectual virtue, the principle or standard on which 
I favour one conception over another will be the degree to which it most naturally 
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accounts for rationality as an intellectual virtue. In doing so, I do not side with certain 
claims or positions merely on the basis of their suitability for an account of rationality 
as an intellectual virtue. Rather, I offer reasons for why I think a suitable approach has 
merit or plausibility independently of my project. 
It may seem methodologically disingenuous – or even unfalsifiable – that I prefer those 
views and conceptions that account for rationality as an intellectual virtue. I will say 
two things in response to this. First, I think that the question of whether rationality 
plausibly can be accounted for in terms of intellectual virtue is sufficiently interesting 
to warrant finding its most natural fit in existing views of intellectual virtue. Such a 
question is not circular, since it does not presuppose that there already exists any 
account of intellectual virtue that would fit our ordinary use of ‘rationality’. It might very 
well be the case that rationality does not map onto any accounts or conceptions of 
intellectual virtue. And my answer is falsifiable, if either my characterisation of 
rationality or my conception of intellectual virtue is shown to be mistaken.  
Second, I intend (and hope) to demonstrate that favouring certain views and 
conceptions of intellectual virtue illuminates certain ordinary understandings of 
rationality. For example, if we accept that rationality is a disposition of an agent’s 
intellectual character whose proper manifestation is dependent upon an appropriate 
motivation, this illuminates how we characterise a rational person, i.e., as someone 
who has an intellectual character such that they reliably revise and maintain their 
attitudes so as to be in a well-ordered state, and who is motivated by a concern to do 
so. 
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Another objection to this method could be that there is no need to sketch such a 
general account as the most plausible account of rationality as an intellectual virtue. 
Rather than such a broad sketch of ‘best fit’, this objection points out that, since 
accounts of rationality as an intellectual virtue already exist, what is needed is a more 
in-depth study that examines the philosophical strength of current virtue accounts of 
rationality. However, my conception of rationality as an intellectual virtue is warranted 
by the lack of plausible existing ground for rational normativity and the absence of a 
virtue-theoretic approach in addressing this question. As I showed above, existing 
accounts of rationality as a virtue are either evaluative and assume some kind of value 
or normativity of rationality, as in the case of Svavarsdóttir’s and Wedgwood’s 
accounts, or they are concerned with purely epistemic issues, in the case of Sylvan’s 
account. Thus, the kind of work that I intend my theory of rationality as a virtue to do 
cannot be directly built upon existing accounts. 
1.5.2. Occurrent and dispositional attitudes  
The kinds of attitudes that I will take rationality to govern are both occurrent and 
dispositional beliefs, assuming that there is an intuitive distinction between 
dispositional beliefs and non-beliefs. 
I have many beliefs. But at any point in time, I am consciously aware of only a few 
beliefs, if any. Say that I am currently entertaining beliefs about where a good place 
would be to have a holiday in the autumn, and that I believe Clarens is one such place. 
Were you now to ask me what the first planet from the Sun is called, I would be 
disposed to say that Mercury is the first planet from the Sun. My belief that Clarens is 
a good place to holiday in Autumn is an occurrent belief. But I am disposed to have 
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many other beliefs, such as the name of Mercury, that would become occurrent under 
certain conditions, say if I were asked a certain question. The same distinction can be 
made for other attitudes, such as intentions. Under certain conditions I have the 
occurrent intention to cook oats, but that intention is now only a dispositional intention. 
There are some non-beliefs for me, those that are neither occurrent nor which I am 
disposed to hold. Beliefs about Planck’s constant are neither occurrent for me, nor are 
there reasonable conditions under which I would now be disposed to hold any beliefs 
about Planck’s constant. There are certain beliefs that are less clearly dispositional or 
simply non-beliefs. For example, if I have the occurrent belief that I had only oats for 
breakfast, do I also then have the dispositional belief that I did not have a banana for 
breakfast, and the belief that I did not have toast for breakfast, and so on? Although 
there are clearly conditions under which I would hold one of those beliefs occurrently, 
such as if I were asked if I had a banana for breakfast, it would seem strange to think 
that I have an ostensibly infinite number of dispositional beliefs from my belief about 
what only I had for breakfast. It is thus necessary to distinguish between a dispositional 
belief and a disposition to believe. 
Robert Audi (1994) provides a helpful demarcation between the two notions. 
According to Audi, a dispositional belief is a disposition of an agent to act in a way 
appropriate to the content of that belief (say, by affirming a proposition) while a 
disposition to believe is a ‘readiness to form a belief’ (Audi, 1994: 424). A dispositional 
belief that p is manifested, say, by an agent merely understanding a question that 
would cause her to affirm that p, since p is ‘presuppositionally available’ to her (Audi, 
1994: 424). For example, if I have a dispositional belief that Gaborone is the capital of 
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Botswana, I need only understand the question when I am asked whether I believe 
that Gaborone is the capitol of Botswana – since that proposition is presuppositionally 
available to me – in order to affirm it. 
In contrast, Audi says that an agent has a disposition to believe that p only when p is 
‘indirectly available’ (Audi, 1994: 424) by reflection on background beliefs that function 
as premises or grounding propositions for p. If I have a disposition to believe that I did 
not have a banana for breakfast, then when I am asked whether I believe that I did not 
have a banana for breakfast, affirming this proposition involves forming a belief 
indirectly on the basis of my prior belief that I only had oats for breakfast. 
Without explicating the details of Audi’s view, for the purpose of my project I will 
assume that there is an intuitive difference here, although my argument does not turn 
on this distinction.14 I will assume that the attitudes with which rationality is concerned 
are both an agent’s dispositional and occurrent attitudes. 
1.5.3. Reasoning and mental events 
As a final introductory word on my project, I should note two distinctions in the focus 
of my thesis, and a corresponding exclusion in each case. The first is the distinction 
between rationality and reasoning, that is, the process by which an agent reflects on 
and revises her attitudes. While related, I am not able to include considerations about 
 
 
14 Some philosophers argue that there are no occurrent attitudes like beliefs, only occurrent judgments. 
For example, see Cassam (2010). I am not concerned with debates such as this since they do not have 
a bearing on my account of rationality or the kinds of attitudes it governs. 
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reasoning in my project. This will need to be done in further work. However, I do not 
think that my account is weakened by this exclusion.  Reasoning can be conceived of 
in a number of ways. On one prominent account, reasoning is a causal process by 
which you revise your attitudes according to a rule (Broome, 2013: 246). Others may 
take it as the act of weighing reasons in deliberation. I am not committed to any 
particular stance on this. In general, I follow Steinberger’s (2016) characterisation of 
reasoning as ‘a connected, usually goal-directed activity, process by which we form, 
reinstate or revise…attitudes…through inference.’  
There are two reasons for excluding reasoning. The first is that the scope of correct or 
ideal reasoning is broader than merely satisfying the requirements of rationality. The 
process of reasoning is not only governed by what you are required (or ought) to infer, 
but also by what you are permitted to infer. Thus, you can reason correctly, i.e., reason 
according to a rule or weigh your reasons in deliberation, intentions, and other 
attitudes without bringing about any change in your structural rationality. A process of 
reasoning that does not affect an agent’s structural rationality is parallel to a process 
of reasoning that does not affect an agent’s morality. An agent may reason in 
accordance with a moral rule in order to determine what she is morally permitted to 
intend. Likewise, she may reason out a belief that is permitted but not required by 
rationality. 
A second reason for leaving aside reasoning is that such an account is not necessary 
for developing an initial account of rationality as an intellectual virtue. As such, I am 
not directly interested with causal processes that bring an agent into a state of 
rationality. Although my account could be further developed by a description of the 
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kind of ‘actions’ a rational agent would perform, my claim that rationality is an 
intellectual virtue does not depend on such a description. 
The second distinction is between mental states, mental events, and mental causes. 
Mental states are snapshots of the content of an agent’s mind; what she takes to be 
the case (beliefs), what she plans to make the case (intentions), what she realistically 
thinks will be the case (predictions), and so forth. Mental events, rather, are events 
with mental properties (Bunnin and Yu, 2004: 421), such as willing or a loss of 
consciousness. Mental events that give rise to or sustain some event or a mental state, 
are mental causes. A decision to take the umbrella is a mental cause insofar as it gives 
rise to an intention to take the umbrella, and a judgment is a mental cause insofar as 
it gives rise to a belief. 
I am generally not concerned with mental events and causes on the same basis that I 
do not engage with reasoning. Whatever the process of deliberation or reasoning is, it 
is closely tied to mental causes. At some point in an agent’s deliberation or reasoning, 
a mental event occurs, such as a decision, that gives rise to or sustains some mental 
state, such as an intention. Since I am not primarily concerned with what constitutes 
proper reasoning, I similarly am not primarily concerned with correct or proper mental 
events that sustain or give rise to mental states. I may have to refer to mental events 
such as decisions or judgments, but their exact place in what constitutes a rational 
agent is beyond my scope in this thesis.  
Although I am not primarily concerned with the process of (correct) reasoning, since 
on my account exercising one’s rational capacity is partially constitutive of the virtue 
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of rationality, and such an exercise is one of reasoning, I do provide a brief account of 
proper reasoning in chapter 4. I claim that, while such an account is mostly consistent 
with Broome’s (2013) account of proper reasoning except on two points, my account 
of rationality as an intellectual virtue is not intended as a contribution toward an 
understanding of proper reasoning. 
1.6. Conclusion 
I hope to have demonstrated that there is sufficient prima facie reason to explore an 
account of rationality as an intellectual virtue. In particular, the normative resources of 
intellectual virtue seem well positioned to account for the normativity of rationality. 
Virtue reliabilism accounts for the normativity of valuable states that an intellectual 
capacity produces, and responsibilism accounts for the praiseworthiness of an agent 
for her responsibility in intellectual achievements. This seems like a promising way to 
go. I provided a brief overview of the overarching argument of this thesis, and that I 
will pursue accounts of rationality and intellectual virtue in general that seem both 
plausible and best suited for an account of rationality as a virtue. I finally clarified that 
my account will not assume a particular stance on the occurrent or dispositional nature 
of the attitudes governed by rational requirements, nor will I engage in substantial 
discussions about the nature of reasoning or deliberation.  
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 A General Account of Rationality 
 
2.1. Introduction 
At the outset of developing a theory of rationality as an intellectual virtue, I am firstly 
interested in providing an overview of contemporary views on rationality and where 
the debates currently reside. My primary aims in this chapter are, first, to distinguish 
several meanings of ‘rationality’ and isolate the one I can conceive of as an intellectual 
virtue, and, second, to survey current issues with these notions of rationality to address 
further on in my thesis.  
I begin with distinguishing various meanings of ‘rationality’ in section 2.2 in order to 
disambiguate the term. I home in on three semantically related senses of rationality 
that are the focus of my account. Mental rationality refers to the capacity of an agent 
to order her state of mind in a certain way. Structural rationality refers to the property 
a state of mind has when its attitudes are ordered according to an agent’s exercise of 
her mental rationality. And reified rationality refers to those requirements governing 
the order of our attitudes that issue from the source of rationality. I briefly demonstrate 
that I take these senses of rationality to be separate from epistemic justification, which 
many theorists often conflate with rationality.  
Focussing on the nature of the requirements of reified rationality, I give an overview of 
the formulation of rational requirements in subsection 2.2.3. I find that these 
requirements typically have wide scope, and that certain requirements, synchronic 
requirements, govern attitudes at a single time index, while diachronic requirements 
govern attitudes over a period of time. I also consider the ‘process-requirement’ 
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formulation, of which I am suspicious but will return to more substantially in chapter 6 
(subsection 6.4.2). Lastly in section 2.3, I argue for the surprising result that scope 
considerations are irrelevant to the conditions for not violating rational requirements. I 
use this argument to highlight what I think is most important about the scope of rational 
requirements – their normative structure. 
In section 2.4 I present some further relevant issues. Some hold that what rationality 
requires is equivalent to responding to reasons. I offer several considerations for why 
I do not adopt this stance, although I offer a more substantial critique in chapter 6 
(subsection 6.4.1). I then provide some considerations for conceiving of rationality as 
supervening on the mind in subsection 2.4.2. I finally introduce the debate over 
whether requirements of rationality are normative that, again, will be relevant to my 
chapter 6. 
2.2. Varieties of ‘Rationality’ 
What is meant by ‘rationality’? We use the adjective and its negation to describe 
people, beliefs, actions, and public policies. Philosophers and theoreticians also use 
the term and its cognates technically. For instance, Immanuel Kant (1998, A299/B355) 
defines ‘reason’ as ‘the origin of certain concepts and principles, which it derives 
neither from the senses nor from the understanding.’ And for Max Weber (1946: 139) 
‘rationalisation’ is a sociological phenomenon where there exists an impulse to ‘master 
all things by calculation’. Despite its colourful history, I am less concerned with its 
technical employment and more interested in how ‘rationality’ is commonly used. But, 
given its many varied uses, it is important to first clarify the term and its different 
meanings in order to zoom in on the ones that are of interest to my account. 
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2.2.1. Plantinga’s distinctions 
A useful, though insufficient, starting point are Alvin Plantinga’s distinctions between 
five different meanings of ‘rationality’ in Warrant: The Current Debate (1993b: 132-
137): means-end rationality, Aristotelian rationality, the deliverances of reason, 
deontological rationality, and rationality as sanity. 
To begin with, ‘means-end rationality’, or what Plantinga (1993b: 132) also calls ‘Foley 
rationality’ after the work of Richard Foley (1987) on epistemic rationality, refers to 
adopting the necessary or most effective means of achieving your goal. This kind of 
rationality can be a property not only of mental states but other things, too, such as 
actions. Plantinga states that a belief can be construed as having means-end 
rationality if, upon reflection, you take it to be effective in achieving the epistemic goal 
of now having true beliefs and avoiding false beliefs. Although there may be other 
ways in which beliefs and other mental states have means-end rationality apart from 
the epistemic goal, these will not be my focus.15 
Second, Plantinga defines ‘Aristotelian rationality’ as a capacity for thought, for forming 
and holding beliefs and intentions. This is a generic kind of property of agents that 
have this capacity, and as such is not the kind of use of ‘rationality’ that is used to 
evaluate an attitude or mental state. Things like humans, gods, and hobbits have 
 
 
15 Truth need not be the only or most important epistemic goal. Thinkers such as Timothy Williamson 
(2000), for instance, take knowledge as the ultimate epistemic goal. 
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Aristotelian rationality, while rocks and desks and beliefs do not. Members of the latter 
group are not labelled as irrational, but rather are properly described as non-rational.  
‘The deliverances of reason’ is the third sense that Plantinga distinguishes. This 
meaning, he says, holds rationality as a source of a priori, or self-evident, truths. 
According to this meaning, a belief is rational if it is known by means of these 
necessary or a priori truths.  
The fourth sense is that of rationality as adherence to a set of duties or requirements 
peculiar to holding beliefs, which Plantinga calls ‘deontological rationality’. Plantinga 
especially has in mind here duties and standards to hold beliefs in proportion to 
available evidence. Deontological rationality can thus be ascribed either to beliefs 
insofar as they meet certain evidential standards, or to agents insofar as they adhere 
their beliefs to available evidence.  
Lastly, Plantinga distinguishes the sense of ‘rationality’ as being within your proper 
mind – that is, not having some disorder within your rational faculties. He refers to this 
sense as rationality as sanity or proper functioning. Plantinga notes that this meaning 
of rationality does not preclude having false beliefs or going against other ‘rational’ 
principles, such as apportioning your belief according to the evidence. For instance, 
Plantinga claims, it might be a function of ‘being within your proper mind’ to be more 
optimistic than what you have evidence to be. In this way, believing that you will survive 
a dread illness contrary to the evidence that your chances of surviving are extremely 
low might not be the result of your rational faculties misfunctioning. In fact, believing 
against the evidence in this case might be the proper function of rationality insofar as 
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‘proper function’ means having some survival utility.16 This sense of rationality is not 
applied to particular beliefs or attitudes, but rather to the state of your mental faculties, 
the nature of the deliverances of reason, and so on. 
2.2.2. Mental, structural, and reified rationality 
Plantinga’s five distinctions between different meanings of ‘rationality’ is useful, 
although not sufficient either for capturing the precise meaning of how the term is used 
in current accounts of and debates about rationality or for showing some conceptual 
connections between different meanings of the term. To demonstrate this, I focus 
especially on his second (Aristotelian rationality) and fourth (deontological rationality) 
meanings, starting with the former. 
The essential feature of Aristotelian rationality is that it is a property of a person, 
specifically a set of mental capacities. As Plantinga points out, entities with this 
property are ascribed rationality, but only insofar as they possess certain mental 
capacities and not in the sense of having a state of mind that reflects having exercised 
those capacities. Entities without this property are considered non-rational rather than 
irrational. For ease of reference, and following Broome’s (forthcoming) term, I refer to 
this use of rationality as the ‘mental sense’. It is important to note that ‘mental 
rationality’ here is both a precondition for having certain mental states as well as a 
capacity that can be exercised to form and revise mental states. 
 
 
16 What counts as ‘proper functioning’ for some cognitive faculty can be cached out in different ways. 
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What Plantinga’s distinctions lack is an account of ‘rationality’ that captures its use in 
expressions about the relations among an agent’s mental states. For example, ‘It 
wasn’t rational for Stephen to believe that Tony would be on time,’ or, ‘Irene has always 
been a stickler for paying her taxes on time, so it was irrational of her not to intend to 
submit her forms by the end of this month.’ The example of Stephen might be captured 
in terms of Plantinga’s deontological sense of rationality. Stephen violated an 
epistemic duty by not apportioning his belief to the evidence that Tony has never been 
on time for anyone’s party. But the Irene example is not captured by evidential duties. 
Irene believes she ought to pay her taxes on time, and she knew the deadline to submit 
her forms. Thus, her lack of intention to submit her forms is not contrary to available 
evidence, but rather does not cohere with her belief about what she ought to do.  
If one wanted to hold fast to Plantinga’s ‘deontological rationality’ distinction, then one 
could point out the difference between the Stephen and Irene cases as concerning 
different kinds of attitudes, beliefs and intentions respectively. However, a more fruitful 
course would be to abandon Plantinga’s deontological sense and identify a broader 
meaning of rationality that encompasses both Stephen’s and Irene’s cases. I think that 
it is useful to drop the ethical connotation in Plantinga’s term, not because rationality 
does not issue use with prescriptions (I think we can preserve this connotation of 
rationality in the term ‘rational requirement’ below), but because going against 
rationality is not always clearly a breach of duty. What I have in mind is rationality as 
a property of your state of mind, specifically that your state of mind is such that it could 
have arisen from the exercise of your rational capacities. This sense of rationality, 
‘structural rationality’ (Broome, forthcoming), encompasses cases like Stephen’s, 
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where your mental states, in this case a particular belief, is regarded as irrational for 
being contrary to Stephen’s available evidence. It also covers cases like Irene’s, 
whose attitudes, the belief to pay taxes on time and a lack of an intention to do so, are 
not consistent with each other.  
While the adjectives associated with mental rationality are ‘rational’ and ‘non-rational’, 
those of structural rationality are ‘rational’ and ‘irrational’. Structural rationality, while 
being broader than Plantinga’s deontological rationality, also has the merit of showing 
an important way in which we often think of the semantic connection between the 
former and mental rationality. First, structural rationality is understood as a state that 
should arise from employing your mental rationality. This is not to say that all instances 
of structural rationality in fact arise from an exercise of mental rationality, nor does all 
exercise of mental rationality result in structurally rational states of mind. You could 
have a structurally rational state of mind by accident, or you could exercise your 
rational capacities poorly. Nevertheless, a structurally rational state of mind is that 
state of mind that would generally arise from properly exercising one’s rational 
capacities. In light of this, paradigmatic cases of structural rationality should be 
understood as the result of exercising your rational capacities. Second, we regard 
having mental rationality as a condition for whether you can have structural rationality. 
It is only by virtue of ascribing mental rationality that we further ascribe structural 
rationality or irrationality to a person. Similarly, we do not ascribe structural irrationality 
to an entity with a mind that does not have mental rationality. My childhood pet dog, 
Pippin, could never be ascribed structural rationality or irrationality since she was 
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mentally a non-rational pet. Plantinga’s definition of deontic rationality does not 
demonstrate this connection of structural rationality with mental rationality. 
Lastly, Plantinga’s distinctions lack an account of an important and commonly used 
term in the literature on rationality. Rationality is often referred to as a source of 
requirements, with the phrase, ‘rationality requires’ picking out those requirements 
given by rationality. This phrase can be taken in two ways. On the one hand, ‘rationality 
requires’ can be taken to pick out a condition for having the property of rationality 
similar to how ‘mastery requires practice’ picks out practice as a necessary condition 
for having mastery. On the other hand, ‘rationality requires’ can be understood as 
reifying rationality, treating it as a source of prescriptions external to an agent and her 
mental states and which imposes imperatives on her.  This is the use of ‘rationality 
requires’ in statements like, ‘Rationality requires that you have consistent intentions.’ 
Although we sometimes might use the phrase ‘rationality requires’ to pick out a 
necessary condition for rationality, this is not the same as when we use the phrase as 
a prescription. I will briefly point to two related ways in which reified rationality – i.e., 
rationality as a source of prescriptions – is distinct from the ‘necessary condition for’ 
sense of rational requirement. First, there are many conditions that are necessary for 
having the property of rationality but that are not prescriptions of rationality. The fact 
that having a mind, for example, is a necessary condition for the property of rationality 
does not mean that rationality prescribes of us that we have a mind. What we mean 
by statements that use the phrase ‘rational requirement’ is often much narrower than 
picking out a necessary condition for rationality. 
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Second, and related to the first, a rational requirement as a ‘necessary condition for 
rationality’ does not imply any kind of prescription in the way we often mean when 
using rationality in the reified sense. When using ‘rationality requires’ in a reified sense, 
we mean that there is some prescription, given to us by a rational source, that we 
should see to if we are to obey the prescriptions of that source. This is analogous to 
how the phrase ‘law requires’ is used to pick out a prescription that is given by a legal 
source. While it is a necessary condition for a law to be written out, this is not what is 
often meant when using ‘law requires’ in the sense of having a legal prescription.  
The reified sense of ‘rationality requires’ refers to a prescription whose satisfaction is 
up to us in some relevant way that a necessary condition need not be. For instance, 
while having a mind is a necessary condition for rationality, it is not a prescription of 
rationality that we have a mind since that is not up to us. Thus, ‘rationality requires’ 
has two distinct meanings, either as a necessary condition for having the property of 
rationality, or as a prescription that is given by rationality as a reified source of 
prescriptions. Which of these two senses should be understood by ‘rationality 
requires’? Broome (forthcoming) rejects the former notion that ‘rationality requires’ 
picks out necessary conditions for structural rationality. If this were so, he says, then 
rationality would have as requirements that you be alive and that you have mental 
rationality, since these conditions are necessary for having structural rationality. But 
since structural rationality does not require us to be alive or to have mental rationality, 
we should rather understand the phrase ‘rationality requires’ in the sense of a reified 
source of requirements. Broome claims that this is how we generally use the phrase 
in our normal language. 
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I think that Broome is too quick to claim that ‘rationality requires’ is not meant to pick 
out any necessary conditions for having the property of rationality. Enabling conditions, 
like being alive or having a rational capacity, can be distinguished from essential 
conditions of rationality, and it is the latter that is picked out by ‘rationality requires’. 
Nonetheless, I think that we should accept the point that we sometimes do mean 
‘rationality requires’ in the sense of being given by a reified source rather than the 
property sense. 
These three uses of rationality are ubiquitous in the current literature, although not all 
theorists employ the same terminology as I have used here. To recapitulate, 
‘rationality’ can be used for (i) the property of having certain mental capacities (mental 
rationality), (ii) the property of an agent’s state of mind that reflects the proper exercise 
of those mental capacities (structural rationality), or (iii) the source of requirements 
that govern an agent’s state of mind or the essential conditions under which a mind 
can be ascribed structural rationality (reified requirements of rationality). These are the 
three semantically related senses of ‘rationality’ with which my account is concerned. 
2.2.3. Rationality and epistemic justification 
Before delving into the nature of rational requirements, I ought to flag a further possible 
meaning of rationality – epistemic justification. Justification of this kind is taken as the 
property that makes our true beliefs knowledge (in addition to some suitably non-
accidental property). The latter part of the twentieth century was dominated by the 
debate around whether this property depends on internal or external features of how 
a belief is formed. Details of the debate aside, what is interesting for me here is the 
assumed synonymity between ‘justification’ and ‘rationality’. Kurt Sylvan (2014a: 83-
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84) provides some quotes that highlight a widespread assumed equivalence between 
the terms. For example, 
‘[R]easonable’ and ‘rational’ are virtual synonyms for ‘justified’. (Cohen, 1984: 
283) 
The metaepistemological project I am interested in concerns the concepts of 
justified or rational belief… [T]he expression ‘rational’ might be somewhat less 
misleading than the expression ‘justified’, but I will continue to use the two terms 
interchangeably… (Fumerton, 1995: 19) 
Rationality, justification, reasonableness: same thing. Use whichever word you 
like. (Dogramaci, 2015: 777) 
Against this trend of treating ‘justification’ and ‘rationality’ synonymously, Sylvan 
(2014a, 84ff) provides an argument for divorcing the terms. The difference, he claims, 
is between, on the one hand, justification as the ‘balance of possessed objective 
reasons’, and, on the other hand, rationality as either the ‘balance of apparent reasons’ 
or the ‘balance of believed reasons’ (Sylvan, 2014a: 95). While Sylvan’s view rests on 
particular views of justification and rationality which can be contested, I think that 
rationality and justification should be kept conceptually distinct at least for the following 
general reason. 
Rationality is a putatively internal affair. (I discuss this in section 2.4 below.) Even 
theorists who disagree with a strong version of internalism about rationality take it at 
minimum as predominantly concerned with relations among mental states rather than 
how well those states reflect the world outside the mind. Now, let us assume that 
structural rationality has only to do with the state of your mind, and that the 
requirements of rationality thus have jurisdiction only over your attitudes. Further 
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assume that rationality is synonymous with epistemic justification, or at the very least 
that it is sufficient for epistemic justification along with some suitably non-accidental 
property. These two assumptions would prejudge epistemic justification as robustly 
internalist. But this flies in the face of externalism about justification, ignoring work by 
Alvin Goldman (1979), Plantinga (1993a), Ernest Sosa (in BonJour & Sosa, 2003), 
and many others.17 Since debates surrounding rationality can largely be conducted 
without prejudging the nature of epistemic justification, and since assuming 
synonymity leads to an uncharitable dismissal of externalist views on justification, I will 
proceed by keeping justificatory concerns separate from issues regarding rationality.18 
Furthermore, the nature of rationality is of interest beyond its prescriptions about 
beliefs. Rationality requires things of your intentions, hopes, and even affections. 
Taking rationality as sufficient for epistemic justification hijacks the full range of 
rationality in favour of solving a narrow range of problems focussed on true beliefs and 
knowledge. 
 
 
17 Some might disagree with Plantinga being lumped with theorists of justification since he explicitly 
distances his work from the term ‘justification’ in favour of ‘warrant’ (Plantinga, 1993: 43-46). However, 
Plantinga takes ‘warrant’ to mean that property in sufficient quantity or degree that makes a true belief 
knowledge. This is essentially the same meaning of ‘justification’ that other theorists employ, and so I 
think Plantinga can be put in the externalist justification camp broadly construed. 
18 Clayton Littlejohn (2018: 547) also notes that knowledge is independent of rationality if you take 
rationality as something that ‘depends upon how things look from your perspective’. 
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2.3. Requirements of Rationality 
A ‘requirement’ in general refers to a norm, prescription, or rule. In one respect, as 
Broome (2007c) notes, all requirements are normative insofar as they involve a correct 
way of satisfying them. The requirement to brush your teeth before bed is correctly 
satisfied by brushing your teeth before bed. However, in another respect, requirements 
on their own are not normative in the sense of telling you what you ought to do, all 
things considered. 
Requirements on their own are not necessarily deontic, normative, or even good. (I 
discuss normativity and reasons in more detail in chapter 6, section 6.5.) The 
requirement to keep the promises that you make is a requirement you ought to satisfy 
in virtue of it being a moral requirement. But there are many requirements that are not 
normative in this way, such as the requirement to greet a fellow Scout with a left-hand 
handshake is a requirement only for Scouts. Only Scouts are subject to these 
requirements.   
It is thus an open question whether the requirements that issue from rationality are 
normative in some way or not, since they are not normative merely in virtue of being 
requirements. I pick up on this issue of the normativity of rational requirements in the 
following section (2.4) and in extensive detail in chapter 6. For now, I discuss the 
general nature of requirements of rationality, indicating three main characteristics: they 
are contingent on the agent’s local conditions, satisfying them would maximise or 
increase an agent’s rationality, and they usually have wide scope. 
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2.3.1. The nature of rational requirements 
What rationality requires of us in general is that our mental states or attitudes be 
related to each other in certain ways. Some theorists take it that this is predominantly 
governed by what apparent reasons you have for holding and not holding certain 
attitudes, others do not. I cover that disagreement in the following section (2.4). But 
for now, it suffices to say that rationality requires coherence among certain of your 
attitudes like beliefs, intentions, and hopes. It requires that, if you have a certain 
attitude or set of attitudes, then you form a further attitude. It sometimes requires that 
you do not hold other attitudes, or that your attitudes be arranged in certain relations. 
For example, rationality requires of you that if you intend to be rich and believe that 
opening a bank account is necessary for you to be rich, then you intend to open a 
bank account. 
As norms, requirements of rationality can be thought of as either constitutive (in the 
same way that the rules of chess constitute the game of chess) or regulative (in the 
way that the rules of the road regulate driving). While it is generally accepted that 
requirements of rationality are regulative insofar as they prescribe or prohibit holding 
certain attitudes, some think that requirements are constitutive of certain attitudes.19 
According to this latter view, rational requirements that regulate certain kinds of 
attitudes, say intentions, are constitutive of holding intentional attitudes. For an attitude 
to be characterised as an intention, in other words, is just for it to be subject to certain 
 
 
19 For an example of this view, see Wedgwood (2017: 147): ‘[T]he norms of rationality applying to a 
given type of mental state are in a sense constitutive of the nature of that type of state.’ 
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requirements of rationality. This is a contentious view of attitudes and rational 
requirements,20 and not one that my account of rationality depends on. I therefore will 
not address this issue further. 
To continue with the line of inquiry into the general nature of rational requirements, are 
such requirements contingent upon an agent’s conditions? Julian Fink (214: 911) gives 
the following schema for rational requirements: ‘necessarily, for some worlds w, 
subjects S, and attitude proposition S Xs, at w, rationality requires of S that S Xs.’ An 
attitude proposition is ‘a single proposition that ascribes a single attitude or a 
combination of attitudes (or their absence) to a subject’ (Fink, 2004: 911), such as 
‘Toni prefers potato over squash if she believes the squash is boiled.’ For uniformity I 
adjust Fink’s ‘Xs’ to ‘φs’. 
General requirement (GR). At w, rationality requires of S that S φs. 
(Fink, 2014: 912, with my adjustment of ‘Xs’ to ‘φs’) 
On this general formulation of a requirement of rationality, an agent is required to have 
some attitude, contingent upon her ‘world’ or the conditions she is in. On Fink’s 
formulation of rational requirements, your conditions determine what requirement of 
rationality you are under. For example, the fact that you now believe that you ought to 
pay your taxes is a condition that you are now subject to the requirement that you 
intend to pay your taxes. 
 
 
20 Among those who take attitudes, specifically beliefs, to be constituted by norms, see for example 
Shah and Velleman (2005). Against this view, see Steglich-Petersen (2006). 
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But why should we think that a rational requirement, say, to intend to pay taxes, is 
contingent upon an agent’s conditions, such as having a normative belief? If rational 
requirements do not depend on an agent’s conditions like her mental states, as I think 
is the case, then rational requirements are necessary; they are the same in all possible 
worlds. 
Some requirements might plausibly be contingent. For example, prudence may require 
you to take out a loan to repay a debt. But, were you fully prudent to begin with, you 
may not have come to be in debt in the first place. So, some requirements may be 
different across possible worlds. 
But requirements like those that issue from rationality, I think, are not contingent. 
Assuming that rational requirements are concerned with relations among our attitudes 
rather than with particular attitudes,21 those relations are rationally prescribed in every 
possible world. There would be no conditions – no attitudes you could have or lack – 
that would impose more, fewer, or different requirements on whether you have the 
property of structural rationality. At the very least, I know of no examples or 
requirements that show that this could be the case with wide-scope requirements. 
But even if rational requirements have a wide scope, we nevertheless are ordinarily 
concerned with what rationality requires of us in our local situations rather than about 
the necessary and sufficient conditions for having the property of structural rationality. 
 
 
21 I discuss below my reasons for thinking that rational requirements are generally like this, i.e., that 
they have a wide scope. 
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When considering our own or another agent’s apparent mental states, we are not 
concerned with all the requirements necessary for structural rationality. Rather, we 
focus on particular ways in which we or another agent fall short of, or meet, the 
prescriptions of rationality by considering a limited range of requirements relevant to 
the situation. I thus agree with Broome (2013: 119) that, ‘We are more interested in 
coping with our actual imperfect situation than in how to be perfect.’ This ordinary use 
of ‘rationality requires’ as which requirements are relevant to our current imperfect 
state of rationality rather than the necessary conditions for the property of structural 
rationality is captured by the source sense of rationality. 
Thus, although (wide-scope) rational requirements are necessary for having the 
property of structural rationality, what ‘rationality requires’ of an agent in the source 
sense is taken as local, depending on the interests and situation of an agent. I thus 
subscribe to Fink’s formulation of a general requirement of rationality insofar as it is 
understood in the source sense of rational requirements. However, since the rational 
requirements I will be using for the rest of the thesis do not depend on the condition 
‘w’ for whether they are requirements in the property sense, I will leave this out of my 
formulations. 
I just mentioned that I think that rational requirements generally govern relations 
among our mental states rather than particular attitudes. I now turn to discussing 
whether rational requirements are narrow- or wide-scope. The scope of a rational 
requirement refers to the number of attitude relations over which the requirement 
makes some prescription. In the case of a requirement having a narrow scope, only 
one possible attitude is prescribed. 
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Narrow Scope: Necessarily, if S φs, then rationality requires of S that S ψs. 
According to this formulation, if S finds that she now φs, what rationality requires of 
her is a particular attitude: that she ψs. In contrast, in the case of a requirement having 
a wide scope, it is not a particular attitude but a relation among attitudes that is 
prescribed.  
Wide Scope: Necessarily, rationality requires of S that (if S φs, S ψs). 
What is required in the case of wide-scope requirements is that a subject ensures that 
the {φ→ψ} relation obtains, regardless of which attitudes are adopted. 
To see how this applies to an actual requirement of rationality, take the rational 
requirement of enkrasia. The basic idea behind enkrasia is that certain of our deontic 
or moral beliefs should match up with our practical attitudes. So, for example, I am 
required by rationality that, if I believe I ought to visit my mother on Mother’s Day, I 
intend to visit my mother on Mother’s Day. I would be irrational for believing that I ought 
to visit my mother while not intending to do so. There are several ways of formulating 
this requirement (Broome, 2004: 322, Broome, 2013: 172, Wedgwood, 2017: 199). A 
simple narrow-scope formulation runs as follows. 
Enkrasia (N): Necessarily, if S believes S ought to A, then rationality requires 
of S that S intends to A. 
An obvious problem with the narrow-scope formulation of enkrasia is that rationality 
would require that you intend to do anything that you believe you ought to do. In other 
words, narrow-scope enkrasia implausibly bootstraps a rational requirement to intend 
something merely from your belief that you ought to do it (Kolodny, 2005: 539). It is 
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thus more plausible to accept the wide-scope formulation of enkrasia, which avoids 
this issue. 
Enkrasia (W): Necessarily, rationality requires of S that, if S believes S ought 
to A, S intends to A. 
The wide-scope formulation prescribes that a certain relation obtains between an 
agent’s normative beliefs and her intentions. The scope of the requirement in Enkrasia 
(W) covers both the belief and the intention, while the scope of the requirement in 
Enkrasia (N) only covers the intention. Since narrow-scope requirements implausibly 
lead to bootstrapping the rationality of certain beliefs – such as in the case of Enkrasia 
(N) – while wide-scope requirements avoid this problem,  I think that it is more plausible 
that, generally, requirements of rationality have a wide scope. 
I say ‘generally’ because I do not think that all requirements of rationality have a wide 
scope. Broome (2005: 323, 2013: 153) demonstrates this by arguing that at least one 
requirement of rationality is most plausibly formulated as having a narrow scope, 
namely the requirement not to believe a contradiction. This requirement would be 
formulated in the following way. 
No Contradiction: Necessarily, rationality requires of S that S not believe that p 
and that ¬p at the same time. 
This might initially strike one as a wide-scope requirement since it may seem that the 
requirement permits S to either believe p or ¬p, but this is not the case. The 
requirement merely prohibits any single belief in which p and ¬p are held. And since it 
is a requirement that governs only one attitude rather than several attitudes or the 
relation among attitudes, it is a narrow-scope requirement. Furthermore, since the 
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requirement governs only a single, albeit propositionally complex, belief, it is not 
possible to formulate as wide-scope.  
So, with a few exceptions, requirements of rationality are prescribed of a subject given 
her local conditions, satisfying them would maximise or at least increase a subject’s 
structural rationality, and they generally have wide scope. Of the requirements of 
rationality, there are two general types – diachronic and synchronic requirements. 
Following Broome’s (2013) work, I now present this distinction.  
2.3.2. Formulating requirements: diachronic and synchronic, 
process or state? 
The distinction between diachronic and synchronic requirements of rationality is meant 
to contrast requirements that take account of the different points in time certain 
attitudes are held with requirements that pertain only to one point in time. As such, 
each attitude governed by a synchronic requirement is indexed to the same point in 
time, while diachronic requirements govern attitudes over time. This distinction is 
necessary for understanding the distinction between process and state requirements, 
which is relevant particularly in chapter 6 where I argue against a process formulation 
of rational requirements. 
As an example of a synchronic requirement, take the enkratic requirement of 
rationality,22 here presented with more precision. 
 
 
22 I provide additional examples of both synchronic and diachronic requirements of rationality in chapter 
5 (section 5.3). 
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Enkrasia: Rationality requires of S that, if 
(1) S believes at t that she herself ought that p, and if 
(2) S believes at t that, if she herself were then to intend that p, because of that, 
p would be so, and if 
(3) S believes at t that, if she herself were not then to intend that p, because of 
that, p would not be so, then 
(4) S intends at t that p. 
(Broome, 2013: 170, with my adjustment of ‘N’ to ‘S’) 
To illustrate the clauses of enkrasia, say that you are working on a report for a client. 
You believe that you ought to check the spelling before submitting it, and that if you 
intend to check the spelling, because of that, the spelling will indeed get checked. Say 
that you also believe that if you were not to intend to check the spelling, because of 
that, the spelling would not get checked. Given the above, you intend to check the 
spelling, and satisfy the enkratic requirement. But say you think that your supervisor 
will read your report before it goes to the client, and, therefore, that if you were not to 
intend to check the spelling, then the spelling would get checked by your supervisor in 
any event. In this case, you would not violate the enkratic requirement by not intending 
to check the spelling.  
Diachronic requirements, in contrast, govern attitudes held over time (Broome, 2013: 
177). For instance, the requirement of persistent intentions prescribes that you 
maintain an intention to A at t2 if you held the intention to A at t1 and no cancelling 
event occurred. A cancelling event would be, for example, to form the belief that you 
ought not to A. Say that in December you intend to get a job in government, and that 
no cancelling event occurs. You are thus in January required to intend to get a job in 
government. But say that later on in December you consider that you would prefer 
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being a stay-at-home-dad, or that you come to believe that the government is evil and 
ought not be worked for. Each of these would constitute a cancelling event for your 
intention to work for government. A similar diachronic requirement governs the 
persistence of our beliefs. 
So much for synchronic and diachronic requirements. I now consider a distinction 
between ‘process requirements’ and ‘state requirements’, drawn by Julian Fink (2012) 
and Niko Kolodny (2005, 2007) draws. While this distinction, as I will show, is ultimately 
relevant to the question of the scope of rational requirements, I place it here due to its 
logical proximity to diachronic requirements. 
According to Kolodny (2007: 371), ‘State requirements require that you be a certain 
way at a given time. Process requirements require you to do something over time.’ 
The kind of ‘doing’ Kolodny presumably has in mind in the case of process 
requirements of rationality has to do with the mental sense of an action, as in forming 
an intention or abstaining from holding a belief. A state view of the requirements of 
rationality would regard them as prescribing states of mind in which attitudes cohere 
with each other and prohibiting states of mind in which attitudes do not cohere. In 
contrast, a process view of rational requirements formulates them as telling you how 
to proceed with regard to adopting, maintaining, or revising attitudes given your 
present state of mind. Kolodny holds that many – possibly all – requirements of 
rationality are process requirements. 
I mentioned that Kolodny’s view ultimately has to do with the scope of rational 
requirements. His idea, roughly, is this. Were rational requirements to have wide 
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scope, they would be open-ended about how to satisfy them. But since rational 
requirements are process-requirements and, as such, inform us on how we are to 
proceed to avoid incoherent attitudinal relations, rational requirements have narrow 
scope. 
Although I think Kolodny draws attention to some interesting implications of wide-
scope formulations of rational requirements, there are two worries about it. First, as 
Broome (2013: 143-144) objects, Kolodny’s formulation of process-requirements of 
rationality are indistinguishable from diachronic requirements of rationality. This is 
because diachronic requirements are indexed to at least two points of time (t1 and t2), 
and process-requirements similarly specify what act you should perform to hold an 
attitude at a later time (t2) given your present state (t1). Broome’s concern is that 
process-requirements reduce all requirements of rationality to diachronic 
requirements. Second, as Kiesewetter (2017: 72-73) argues, a diachronic formulation 
of a requirement like enkrasia (above in synchronic form) is not a requirement of 
rationality. For instance, it is not the case that rationality requires of you that, if you 
now believe that you ought to pay your taxes, then at a later time you intend to pay 
your taxes. But, since we take (synchronic) enkrasia as a paradigmatic example of a 
rational requirement, this cannot be right. Thus, we should reject process-requirement 
formulations.  
Regardless of how strong Broome’s and Kiesewetter’s objections are, or the possibility 
of defending Kolodny’s position on process-requirements of rationality, Kolodny’s 
position highlights something interesting. The difference between Broome and 
Kolodny seems to me to reside in the two theorists’ different views of what rational 
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requirements are meant to do. Specifically, for Kolodny, the function of rational 
requirements is to describe and evaluate the process by which you revise or maintain 
attitudes. In contrast, for Broome, rational requirements concern the state of mind that 
counts as rational, rather than the process by which you come to be in that state. For 
Broome (2017: 153), the fact that you violate rational requirements at one point in time 
while your attitudes ‘catch up’ at a later point in time is not problematic. This has to do 
with the manner in which we should satisfy (or not violate) requirements of rationality 
rather than which mental states are rational or irrational. For Kolodny (2005: 519-521, 
2007: 373-376), however, rather than assess whether your state of mind is irrational, 
what rational requirements should say is precisely what you should do about your 
attitudes given your current state of mind. 
I revisit this issue in chapter 6 (6.4.2), where I argue that it is a mistake to formulate 
requirements of rationality as process-requirements. To anticipate, state-requirements 
are better suited for explaining how there is often more than one plausible way to 
satisfy a requirement of rationality, while process-requirements do not. Furthermore, 
process-requirements are not the only option for performing the functions they are 
presumed to do; it is possible to satisfy the same functions with an account of state-
requirements of rationality.  
2.3.3. Argument for indifference about scope 
Although prima facie implausible or odd, I argue that a difference in scope does not 
affect the conditions under which a set of mental states satisfies, does not violate, or 
avoids a requirement of rationality. The conditions are the same only if using these 
three categories (satisfy, violate, avoid); using dichotomous categories (satisfy and 
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violate) may yield a difference. I will then briefly demonstrate that I take the difference 
in scope to have significance on the normative structure of requirements, although I 
only address this fully in chapter 6 (section 6.2). 
I think that the disagreement over wide- and narrow-scope formulations rests on an 
assumption about how you ought to go about satisfying or not violating a given 
requirement. I argue here that, although apparently odd, differences in scope do not 
affect whether a set of mental states satisfies, violates, or avoids a rational 
requirement.23  
In order to demonstrate this, let us suspend the category of ‘avoiding’ a rational 
requirement and see how far the categories of ‘satisfy’ and ‘violate’ get us. I will then 
 
 
23 After developing the argument below, I discovered that Kolodny (2007) makes the same claim: ‘There 
is a “difference in satisfaction”, we might say, not no difference in violation. This suggests that the choice 
between wide and narrow scope matters only in so far as the difference between satisfying a 
requirement and not violating it matters’ (Kolodny, 2008: 374). Unfortunately, I only came across 
Kolodny’s version and Kiesewetter’s (2017: 71-72) reference to this argument after the fact. I should 
note, though, two crucial differences between our arguments. First, while Kolodny infers from his version 
of the argument that the scope of rational state-requirements only matters when ‘the difference between 
satisfying a requirement and not violating it matters’, I claim that the scope still matters by virtue of the 
normative structure of a requirement. Second, Kolodny claims that it should matter whether you violate 
a requirement of rationality, and that a process-requirement formulation accounts for this. I do not think 
it has to matter. 
Broome (2013: 134) also points out that formulating rational requirements according to a narrow- or 
wide-scope formulation makes no difference to the property of rationality. ‘Either way, you are rational 
at exactly the same worlds.’ I also encountered this only after constructing my demonstration. 
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show that adding the category of ‘avoids’ steers clear of a problem that we land in by  
using these dichotomous categories exclusively. 
In a possible world in which the only two attitudes a mind can hold are φ and ψ, say 
Seb is in the following state S1. 
S1: {φ; ¬ψ}  
Assume further that there is only one requirement of rationality in this world, but that 
we do not know whether it has narrow or a wide scope. 
RRN: If you φ, then rationality requires that you ψ. 
RRW: Rationality requires that, if you φ, then you ψ. 
Seb is irrational – that is, not structurally rational – since his state of mind S1 violates 
the requirement of rationality whether formulated narrowly or widely. Assuming Seb 
has a relevant degree of control over whether he φs or ψs, his options for alternative 
states of mind are thus.  
S2: {φ; ψ}  
S3: {¬φ; ψ} 
S4: {¬φ; ¬ ψ} 
For which of these options of combinations of mental states should Seb opt if he wants 
to be structurally rational? Again, assume Seb’s state of mind can either only satisfy 
or violate a rational requirement. For theorists who think there is a difference between 
narrow- and wide-scope requirements, Seb’s options are different depending on the 
kind of requirement in question. To satisfy the narrow-scope requirement of rationality 
(RRN), given that Seb now φs, he is required to ψ. The fact that Seb φs is a condition 
for him to have to ψ, and so no other option to satisfy is available Thus, adopting the 
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state of mind S2 is his only course for satisfying narrow-scope structural rationality. 
Any other state would not satisfy RRN. This is set out in column (2) of Table 1 below. 
Satisfying the wide-scope formulation (RRW) leaves Seb with more choice. Given that 
Seb now φs, according to RRW he can rationally ψ. State of mind S2 meets this 
rationally satisfactory choice. And given that Seb now ¬ψs, RRW is also satisfied if Seb 
¬φs. In this case the state of mind S4 is rationally satisfactory. Additionally, Seb could 
change both his attitudes to the negation of their present states, which makes S3 
available. Thus, states S2, S3, and S4 are equally satisfactory for achieving wide-scope 
structural rationality. Column (4) of Table 1 reflects this and indicates that S1 is the 
only state that does not satisfy RRW. 
But structural rationality reflects differently when we consider what conditions do not 
violate requirements of rationality, rather than those that satisfy them. What if Seb is 
concerned to be structurally rational by resolving not to violate any requirement of 
rationality? Doing so is not logically equivalent to satisfying a requirement, at least for 
narrow-scope requirements. For both RRN and RRW formulations, mental states S2, 
S3, and S4 are all not violations of the rational requirement and mental state S1 does 
violate the requirement. This is indicated in column (3) of Table 1 for narrow-scope 
requirements and column (5) of Table 1 for wide-scope requirements. 
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Table 1: ‘Satisfy’ or ‘violate’ rational requirements. 
(1) 
Mental State 
(2) 
Satisfy RRN 
(3) 
¬Violate RRN 
(4) 
Satisfy RRW 
(5) 
¬Violate RRW 
    S1: {Φ; ¬Ψ}  False False False False 
    S2: {Φ; Ψ} True True True True 
    S3: {¬Φ; Ψ} False True True True 
   S4: {¬Φ; ¬Ψ} False True True True 
 
Notice in Table 1 that the conditions (1) under which Seb satisfies RRN (2) are different 
than the conditions under which he satisfies RRW (5). Thus, it seems like there is an 
important difference between whether we formulate requirements of rationality as 
having narrow or wide scope. However, the conditions (1) under which Seb does not 
violate RRN (3) are different than the conditions under which he does not violate (5). 
Thus, the difference between violating and not violating certain requirements of 
rationality, like RRN and RRW, are independent of the formulation of the scope of those 
requirements. 
But there is a problem that seems to emerge when we set out the conditions in the 
above manner. We should expect there to be symmetry between satisfying and not 
violating rational requirements.  
In order to avoid equating satisfying requirements with not violating requirements, we 
should see whether a third category can shed logical light on the conditions under 
which rational requirements are satisfied or not. Broome (2013: 133) claims that there 
63 
 
 
 
 
is a third category of ‘avoiding’ rational requirements. This category refers to states 
that do not positively have the same attitudes in a rational requirement, nor do they 
violate that requirement. 
Taken in this way, rather than classifying S3 and S4 as satisfying the wide-scope 
requirement, we should classify them as not satisfying it. This is represented in column 
(5) in Table 2. Rather than satisfying the wide-scope requirement, we should classify 
these two states as avoiding it, represented in column (7) in Table 2. 
Table 2: ‘Satisfy’, ‘violate’, or ‘avoid’ rational requirements. 
(1) 
Mental 
States 
(2) 
Satisfy 
RRN 
(3) 
¬Violate 
RRN 
(4) 
Satisfy 
RRW  
(5) 
¬Violate 
RRW 
(6) 
Avoid RRN 
(7) 
Avoid  
RRW 
S1 
{Φ; ¬Ψ} False False False False False False 
S2 
{Φ; Ψ} True True True True False False 
S3 
{¬Φ; Ψ} False True False True True True 
S4 
{¬Φ; ¬Ψ} False True False True True True 
By incorporating the third category of avoiding rational requirements, both S3 and S4 
are now categorised as not satisfying RRW (italicised for emphasis). There is now 
consistency between states that satisfy and those that do not violate both the narrow-
scope requirement (columns (2) and (3) in Table 2) and those pertaining to the wide-
scope requirement (columns (4) and (5) in Table 2). And what is more, there is now 
consistency among states that satisfy both narrow- and wide-scope requirements 
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(columns (2) and (4) in Table 2), which was absent in the previous case of excluded 
the category of avoiding rational requirements (columns (2) and (4) in Table 1). 
Thus, if we accept that rational requirements can be satisfied, violated, or avoided, it 
makes no difference to the rationality of Seb’s mental states whether the rational 
requirement is narrow- or wide-scope. Both formulations rationally permit the same 
combinations of mental states for Seb not to violate rationality. 
What, then, is the difference between narrow- and wide-scope requirements if the 
conditions that satisfy (or violate or avoid them) are the same? Kolodny (2007) claims 
that the rational equivalence among states in light of the scope of rational requirements 
indicates that another kind of requirement formulation should step up to offer an 
account that does show a difference. He claims that process-requirements of 
rationality fit the bill by indexing narrow-scope requirements to time. Having some 
attitude φ at t1 rationally requires that you hold attitude ψ at t2. There is only one way 
to satisfy this requirement, and only the same way not to violate it. But I will leave the 
notion of process-requirements where I left it at the end of the previous subsection 
(2.3.2), anticipating my treatment later on in chapter 6. 
The moral that I would like to draw from my preceding argument is that, while I concede 
that there is no difference between narrow- and wide-scope requirements when it 
comes to which combinations of mental states affect how we satisfy, violate, or avoid 
rational requirements, there is another difference that does matter. As I mentioned 
above, this difference is one in the normative structure of requirements, and will be of 
importance in my argument for the normativity of rational requirements in chapter 6 
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(section 6.2). Specifically, part of the normative structure of requirements is that they 
are factually non-detachable. This is captured in wide-scope requirement formulations, 
but not narrow-scope formulations. 
Detachment allows for a proposition to be inferred by modus ponens. A rough 
definition of detachment is this. 
Detachment: (X and (X→Y)) →Y. 
Factual detachment with regard to requirements has the following structure, where X 
is a contingent fact. 
Factual detachment: (X and (S is required that X→Y)) → S is required that Y. 
The normative difference between narrow- and wide-scope requirements is that the 
former allow for factual detachment while the latter do not. I will illustrate this starting 
with two examples of requirements that are unrelated to rationality. Take the following 
wide- and narrow-scope formulations of the requirement that Scouts are required to 
greet with their left hand. 
RSN: If you are a Scout, you are required to greet with your left hand. 
RSW: You are required that, if you are a Scout, you greet with your left hand. 
The narrow and wide formulations differ in whether the requirement to greet with your 
left hand is detachable. On RSN, the requirement to greet with your left hand is 
detachable from the antecedent (that you are a Scout). Thus, according to RSN, if it is 
true that you are a Scout, then it is true that you are required to greet with your left 
hand. 
In contrast, the wide-scope formulation, RSW, does not permit detaching the 
consequent. The requirement to greet with your left hand is indexed to the fact that 
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you are a Scout. In this way, your requirement to greet with your left hand is not 
independent of your being a Scout, and is therefore not detachable from it. If you are 
a Scout, it does not follow that you have a requirement to greet with your left hand. 
The same applies to a requirement of rationality that governs a set of attitudes, such 
as the requirement to intend to do what you believe you ought to do. And while the 
conditions under which you do not violate this requirement are the same as those 
conditions under which you do not violate its narrow-scope counterpart, the difference 
in scope is relevant for accounting for why the consequent of a requirement is not 
logically independent. As mentioned, I will make more of the normative significance of 
the non-detachment of wide-scope requirements in chapter 6 (section 6.2). 
2.4. Further Debate on Rationality 
My overview of rationality as a source of requirements in the preceding sections has 
covered a number of disagreements regarding the nature of rationality and its 
requirements. There is disagreement over whether requirements of rationality have 
narrow or wide scope, whether they should be formulated as process- or state-
requirements, and whether disagreement over narrow- or wide-scope formulations 
matter given that there is no difference between the conditions under which a 
combination of mental states does not violate a narrow- or wide-scope requirement. 
In addition to these differences, I discuss three further debates beginning with 
reasons-responsiveness and supervenience, followed by the normativity of rationality. 
I provide these discussions in order to introduce arguments that will become relevant 
later.  
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I first consider the view that rationality consists in responding correctly to reasons, as 
well as some objections and responses to this view. I then introduce the intuition, 
accepted by most theorists on rationality, that rationality supervenes on the mind. 
While this thesis is easy to reconcile with the view that there are requirements of 
rationality that govern the relations among your attitudes, reasons-responsivism needs 
more of an explanation of how rationality can both supervene on the mind and require 
that we respond to external reasons. Finally, I outline some issues in the recent debate 
on the normativity of rationality, pointing to how reasons-responsivism attempts to 
address the question by reducing the normativity of what rationality requires to that for 
which you have reasons. What emerges from these overviews are four considerations 
against taking rationality as equivalent to responding correctly to reasons. 
2.4.1. Responding correctly to reasons 
A significant disagreement exists between those who take structural rationality to 
consist in responding correctly to some form of reasons (Kiesewetter, 2017, Kolodny, 
2008, and Lord, 2017) and those who take it as consisting in some form of attitudinal 
coherence (Broome, 2007a, 2013, and Fink, 2018). Thus far I have ignored the former 
position of reasons-responsiveness in favour of a reified stance on rational 
requirements. I hope that by the end of this section my position on rejecting reasons-
responsivism will be regarded as plausible. 
For Broome (2007a, 2013, forthcoming), structural rationality consists in satisfying 
reified requirements of rationality. He offers several arguments against conceiving of 
rationality as equivalent to responding correctly to reasons. I present three of these 
objections here. The first is what he calls the ‘quick objection’, which runs as follows. 
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‘On some occasion, there might be a reason for you to achieve something but, without 
any irrationality on your part, you might not believe the reason exists’ (Broome, 2007b: 
67). Broome’s example is that the fact that the fish in front of you has salmonella is a 
reason for you not to eat it, but that you are unaware of this reason does not make you 
irrational for intending to eat it.24 Thus, you could fail to respond correctly to a reason 
without failing to be rational. 
Broome notes that there is some merit in defence of reasons-responsiveness that 
bypasses the quick objection by taking certain attitudes as reasons for holding further 
attitudes. He calls these ‘attitudinal reasons’. According to the theory of attitudinal 
reasons, your belief, for example, that you ought to pay taxes is a reason for you to 
intend to pay taxes. If attitudinal reasons are what you ought to respond to in order to 
be rational, this would not run into the problem of you having a reason about which 
you are unaware. 
Broome’s second argument is aimed against this theory of attitudinal reasons. Broome 
(2013: 79-81) points out that if you have contradictory beliefs, one giving you reason 
to φ and one giving you a reason to ¬φ, but in neither case a conclusive reason, then 
whether you φ or ¬φ you are responding incorrectly to one of your available reasons 
and therefore are not fully rational. Furthermore, attitudinal reasons, if they exist, would 
 
 
24 Broome (forthcoming) gives another recent version of this objection that makes essentially the same 
point as follows. The property of rationality supervenes on the mind. The property of being reasons-
responsive depends on the external world. Thus, the properties of rationality and responding correctly 
to reasons cannot be co-extensional. 
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be problematic for bootstrapping reasons from attitudes. (If believing you ought to F is 
an attitudinal reason to intend to F, you can bootstrap a rational requirement to intend 
to F merely from forming that belief.) For instance, you can have a reason to hold any 
attitude if only you believe you ought to have that attitude. 
I think that this second objection might be addressed by modifying reasons-
responsiveness to a kind of ‘balance of available reasons’ account of reasons, such 
as that articulated by Sylvan (2014a: 95). Some reasons-responsivists, such as Errol 
Lord, reject the notion that rationality issues requirements. Indeed, reasons-
responsivists would not be committed to rational requirements since reasons, of one 
kind or another, are sufficient for accounting for what rationality prescribes of your 
attitudes. Although neither available reason to φ nor to ¬φ is conclusive, one could 
outweigh the other. But even if they weighed equally,25 by conceiving rationality as a 
response to the balance of available reasons provides a way out by not having to 
rationally respond to one reason and irrationally neglect another reason. 
The third and last objection of Broome I present is also directed against the theory of 
attitudinal reasons. Broome (2013: 81-82) contends that there is good reason to think 
that attitudinal reasons do not exist at all. Take the following attitudinal reason: 
 
 
25 A similar problem could be faced on a reified stance, which equally holds that she now ought to intend 
to p and also believes she now ought to intend to q. This is not quite the same as the reasons-
responsivist’s problem since it is rationally available on the stance of reified rationality to revise one of 
these beliefs. But this seems like a fishy way out. 
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If you believe p and you believe that if p then q, your two beliefs are together a 
reason for you to believe q. (Broome, 2013: 76) 
Suppose there is just less than conclusive evidence for q, and there is no evidence for 
p although you still believe p. If attitudinal-reasons-responsiveness is right, then, says 
Broome, your beliefs p and if p then q should tip the balance and give you conclusive 
reason to believe q. But it is wrong that your beliefs could add to the reason that 
evidence gives you in this way. Furthermore, even if one rejects this example, the 
theory of attitudinal reasons entails bootstrapping a reason to hold a belief from what 
you already believe; ‘if you believe p and you believe if p then p, these beliefs 
constitute a reason for you to believe p’ (Broome, 2013: 82). This is plainly wrong and 
sufficient for Broome to doubt the existence of attitudinal reasons. 
Despite its obstacles, reasons-responsivism has much intuitive appeal. Kiesewetter 
(2017: 160-161) sets out several attractive features of reasons-responsivism. One of 
the strongest, I think, is that it unifies the issues of rational normativity and structural 
rationality into a single theory. The normativity of rationality derives from its 
responsiveness to reasons – whether you regard reasons as the fundamental source 
of normativity or one among several – and structural rationality arises from the reasons 
for which an agent has to hold particular attitudes. 
I pick up the question of whether rationality consists in responding correctly to reasons 
in chapter 6 (subsection 6.4.1). I argue that there are problems with reasons-
responsivism that make it unappealing especially for accounting for the normativity of 
rationality. Whether you take reasons to be factive or attitudinal, responding correctly 
to your reasons may lead you to violate what rationality requires of you. 
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2.4.2. Rationality supervenes on the mind 
In Clayton Littlejohn’s overview of the relationship between rationality and reasons, 
‘there is no simple story about the relationship between believing rationality and 
responding correctly to the evidence or the reasons…’ (2018b: 530). This is primarily 
due to the tension between the view that rationality supervenes on the mind, for which 
only an agent’s mental properties are relevant (Wedgwood, 2002), and responding 
correctly to external or objective reasons, whose basis does not depend on an agent’s 
mental properties. To clarify, supervenience on the mind amounts to evaluating the 
rationality of a mind merely on its internal properties, such that the same states of mind 
at different points in time or in different external states of affairs are both rational to the 
same degree. On this account, if I had a twin who was mentally identical to me, 
including that we both believed that we each lived in Beijing, only he lived in Beijing 
and I lived in London, we would both be equally rational.  
Broome (2013: 89) takes it for granted that rationality should be understood as 
supervening on the mind. However, he does provide one consideration for thinking of 
it in this way: failing to act on an intention is not a failure of your rationality (Broome, 
2013: 151-152). If something prevents you from taking the means (a non-mental act) 
to an intended end, he argues, even if it is caused by your mind, say, due to a 
psychological misfire, that is not an error attributable to your rationality. Another 
consideration from an example by Broome that I mention above, failing to believe that 
the fish in front of you has salmonella is not a failure of your rationality. Thus, there 
are some intuitive reasons to think that rationality is not concerned with states and 
properties external to your mind.  
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While some version of supervenience on the mind is held by most theorists on 
rationality,26 Lord (2017), an adherent of reasons-responsiveness, rejects such an 
outright subjectivist perspective on rationality. Lord’s (2017: 1131) view ‘places 
importance both on the mind-independent reasons and on the agent’s perspective.’ 
This view is similar to other accounts of reasons-responsivism, such as Sylvan’s 
(2014b) view, roughly, that ‘apparent reasons’ are treated as ‘objective reasons’ by 
competent agents. It may seem as if there is a tension in the reasons-responsiveness 
camp between honouring the intuitively mental domain of rationality and the factive 
nature of reasons.27 However, Kiesewetter provides an interesting way through this 
tension. Kiesewetter (2017: 167) distinguishes between the claims of rational 
supervenience and mental property internalism. He defines the former as, ‘Whether S 
is rationally required to φ depends only on S’s mental properties’, and the latter as, 
‘S’s mental properties depend only on S’s internal state’ (Kiesewetter, 2017: 167-168, 
with my adjustment of ‘A’ to ‘S’). This distinction allows Kiesewetter to consistently 
accept supervenience while denying internalism about mental properties. His view, 
instead, is that the content of some attitudes is in part dependent on non-mental 
conditions, such that your evidence – and by extension your reason – ‘is both factive 
and supervenes on the mind’ (Kiesewetter, 2017: 169). For example, your belief that 
 
 
26 See, for instance, Kiesewetter (2017), Kolodny (2005), Parfit (1997), and Wedgwood (2017). 
27 Of course, not everyone accepts the facticity of reasons. See, for instance, Fantl and McGrath (2009). 
I provide an argument against one version of an internalist account of reasons-responsivism in chapter 
6 (section 6.4.1). 
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a missile approaches is a reason for you to intend to duck. Supervenience means that 
rationality is concerned with your mental properties of how your belief in an 
approaching missile and your intentions match up. But the content of your belief that 
a missile approaches, in virtue of which the belief counts as a reason, depends on 
something beyond your mind, namely that a missile approaches. For reasons-
responsivists, this provides an interesting way to accommodate rational 
supervenience while preserving the facticity of reasons. 
Although I do not think that reasons-responsivism about rationality is a convincing 
position, as I argue in chapter 6 (6.4.1), I think that Kiesewetter’s attempt to preserve 
rational supervenience in conjunction with the facticity of reasons is not successful. 
The claim that the content of mental states depends on non-mental properties does 
not demonstrate that rational requirements do not supervene on the mind. Imagine 
that the content of your belief that a missile approaches is mistaken. It is possible for 
that failure to be attributable to a number of things going wrong – a faulty recognition 
of a sound, poor peripheral vision, or a prank being pulled on you. But wherever the 
fault might be diagnosed, it is not the fault of your rationality. Since a failure of the 
content of some mental state to match up with non-mental properties is not a failure 
of rationality, rationality itself is not responsible for taking into account non-mental 
properties. Thus, I take the requirements of structural rationality to supervene on the 
mind. 
2.4.3. Normative questions 
I now consider the debate around the question of whether rationality is normative. It is 
important to recall that requirements of rationality should not be taken as normative off 
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the bat (see the beginning of section 2.3). Requirements – and the same goes for 
duties, responsibilities, and so forth – are not necessarily normative. Scouts are 
required to shake with their left hand. South Africa requires that you drive on the left 
side of the road. But neither of these is strictly normative. If you are not a Scout, or if 
you are not driving on a public road in South Africa, these requirements would not 
apply to you. And even when they do, they are not evidently normative in the sense of 
telling us what we ought to do. In light of this, when referring to requirement of 
rationality, I do so in a way that is neutral regarding their normativity. 
According to Broome (2007a), the normative question has to do with whether rational 
requirements give us pro tanto reasons to φ. But there are many more normative 
questions surrounding rationality than merely getting pro tanto reasons from rational 
requirements. Nevertheless, Broome’s normative question is a good starting point, 
especially since his work has addressed many directions for arguing for this specific 
kind of normativity. 
There is a general tension between coherentists’ and reasons-responsivists’ 
approaches to addressing the normative question. For a coherentist like Broome, the 
normative question has to do with whether rational requirements give us pro tanto 
reasons to φ. If rationality were normative, such normativity would consist in rational 
requirements giving us pro tanto reasons. Thus, while someone like Broome is not a 
reasons-responsivist when it comes to the nature of rationality, he does accept that 
pro tanto reasons feature in an agent’s normative considerations. 
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Reasons-responsivists, on the other hand, take the reasons to which rationality is 
purported to respond as normative. This sets up a complex relationship between 
rationality and normativity. For instance, if being a reason is the fundamental 
normative property, then are reasons normative while rationality is not? If rationality 
issues us with reasons by virtue of being necessary for responding correctly to 
reasons, then does rationality also consist in responding to the reason of having 
rationality? Or is it that rationality derives its normativity from allowing us to respond 
to reasons, since we could not respond in the absence of properly functioning rational 
capacities? 
I will not address these questions here. I will take it for granted that, for reasons-
responsivists, the putative normativity of rationality is intimately connected to the more 
fundamental normativity of the reasons to which you respond. Consider Lord and 
Kiesewetter as cases of reasons-responsivist accounts of rational normativity. Lord’s 
view collapses the distinctions not only between rational requirements and reasons, 
but also between reasons and normativity. 
If what you are rationally required to do is what you possess decisive reasons 
to do, and what you ought to do is what you possess decisive reasons to do, 
then the requirements of rationality just are the requirements you ought to 
comply with. Indeed, on my picture, there is no space between what the 
(possessed) reasons require, what rationality requires, and what you ought to 
do. (Lord, 2017: 1149) 
By ‘possessed decisive reason’ Lord means having on balance conclusive reason to 
ɸ. Kiesewetter holds a similar reasons-responsivist view on rational normativity. 
Reasons-responsivism, for him, ‘entails that rational requirements are necessarily 
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accompanied by normative reasons without having to appeal to a special reason to 
follow such requirements’ (Kiesewetter, forthcoming). For both Kiesewetter and Lord, 
rationality follows from the normative reasons you posses. Rationality is thus not itself 
normative but coincides with normative reasons. Kolodny (2005) does not agree with 
this account, arguing that the apparent normativity of rational requirements is merely 
the normativity of the reasons we possess; there cannot be a reason to satisfy the 
requirements of rationality. 
Since reasons-responsivists like Kiesewetter and Lord have a direct answer to the 
question of the normativity of rationality, I consider the views surrounding accounts of 
the normativity of rational requirements. There are two broad approaches for 
understanding the putative normativity of rational requirements. On the one hand, one 
can understand rational requirements as having indirect normativity. You ought to 
either have mental rationality or you ought to satisfy many of the requirements of 
rationality in general. Having mental rationality, or satisfying many of the requirements 
of rationality, might be seen as necessary for something else normative, like achieving 
what morality or prudence requires of you. Thus, rational requirements are indirectly 
normative by virtue of being necessary for accomplishing other things that you ought 
to accomplish. 
Another indirect understanding of rational-requirement normativity has to do with being 
praiseworthy for being rational or criticisable for not being rational. This view holds that 
rationality has normativity built into its general use rather than specific instances of 
satisfying its requirements. Wedgwood, for instance, gives the following view.  
77 
 
 
 
 
To use our faculty of [rationality] ‘properly’ is to use it as it should be used. 
When a belief or choice derives from the proper use of this faculty, it thereby 
has what in the broadest sense could be called a kind of virtue or excellence – 
a feature in virtue of which beliefs (and the like) can count as good, or worthy 
of a certain kind of commendation. There can, I think, be no doubt that the word 
‘rational’ sometimes has this normative meaning. (Wedgwood, 2017: 25-26, 
italics in original) 
On this account, you are praiseworthy, good, or commendable due to having used 
your rational capacities properly. A similar view is endorsed by Kiesewetter (2017), for 
whom you are criticisable for not being rational. The normativity of rationality in general 
is thus taken to be evidence that all instances of satisfying rational requirements are 
normative, too. I argue for a version of this view in chapter 6 (6.5). 
Broome argues that the problem with such indirect accounts of rational normativity is 
that they do not provide a reason to satisfy any particular requirement of rationality. 
These views assume, he urges, that you ought to have rational capacities (mental 
rationality) or that it is good to properly exercise those capacities. However, 
It does not follow that you ought to satisfy those requirements in those 
instances. Nor does it follow that you have a pro tanto reason to satisfy those 
requirements in those instances. (Broome, 2005: 334)  
Just because a particular end is normative, in other words, it does not follow that a 
sufficient means to that end is normative.  
But this objection is not conclusive. Nicholas Shackel (2015), for instance, provides an 
indirect defence of rational normativity: if we assume that mental rationality is 
normative, and its exercise causes us to satisfy requirements for mental rationality, 
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then the property of normativity from mental rationality can be transmitted to satisfying 
rational requirements by the facts that a rational disposition causes you to satisfy 
rational requirements and that rational requirements are essentially dependent upon 
a rational disposition. (I consider and reject this argument in detail in chapter 6, 
subsection 6.4.3). 
There are also direct accounts of the normativity of rational requirements in the 
literature. According to these, a rational requirement is normative if – and only if, for 
some (Lord, 2017: 1149) – either it issues us a pro tanto reason or it is a requirement 
that we otherwise ought to satisfy. Nicholas Southwood, for instance, holds that ‘…the 
normativity of rationality is a matter of reasons that are internal to rationality, not 
reasons that are external to it. It is a matter, if you like, of reasons of rationality, not 
independent reasons to obey rationality’ (Southwood, 2008: 18). Southwood here 
provides a useful contrast with indirect approaches to understanding rational 
normativity. Under an indirect approach, the reason to satisfy, say, a particular 
requirement of rationality, is due to the ‘external’ (indirect) reason of rationality being 
a good way of accomplishing things that you ought to accomplish, like moral 
requirements. What the direct approach attempts to provide is an account of the 
‘internal’ (direct) pro tanto reasons that rational requirements give us. 
Broome (2005, 2007b, 2013, forthcoming) argues extensively that there is yet no 
satisfactory account of rational requirements giving you any reason to hold an attitude. 
Broome confesses that, although he holds that rational requirements do give us pro 
tanto reasons, there is no satisfactory argument for it available at present. Even if one 
accepts that rationality consists in responding correctly to reasons, this only shows 
79 
 
 
 
 
that rationality requires that you respond to already existing reasons; rational 
requirements themselves are not shown by this account to provide independent 
reasons.  
Broome’s scepticism about rational requirements issuing independent pro tanto 
reasons might make one question whether conceiving of rationality in terms of 
requirements is a plausible strategy. Kiesewetter (forthcoming) points out that, on 
Broome’s view, it is not clear as to exactly what rational requirements are. They are 
often described by Broome as analogous to other sources of requirements like the law 
and morality. But, Kiesewetter notes, the former source’s requirements are generally 
social norms while the latter are paradigmatically normative. Thus, if rational 
requirements are not socially constructed, it could very well be that they are simply 
normative in the same way that moral requirements are. 
To round off this section, four considerations arise from this overview in favour of 
conceiving rationality in terms of satisfying requirements rather than as responding 
correctly to reasons. First, rationality as a source of requirements keeps rationality 
distinct from other normative issues, while responsiveness takes rational requirements 
to be anything you have a reason to do; there is a clearer conceptual distinction 
between rational requirements and reasons that responsiveness does not provide. 
Second, and consequently, rationality as a source of requirements leaves open the 
question of the normativity of rationality, while responsiveness directly associates 
rationality and normativity by reducing the former to reasons. Third, rationality as a 
source of requirements bypasses the intuitive tension between the external, factive 
nature of reasons and the mental nature of rationality, while responsiveness treads on 
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this line. Fourth, rationality as a source of requirements is consistent with entailing a 
certain kind of reasons-responsiveness without reducing rationality to responsiveness, 
while responsiveness cannot entail non-reason-responding requirements. While I take 
these prima facie considerations as sufficient grounds for not adopting a reasons-
responsivist approach to rationality for my account, I provide additional arguments 
against this approach in chapter 6 (section 6.4.1). 
2.5. Conclusion 
The general view of rationality that has emerged from this chapter centres on three 
senses of the word: mental rationality as a capacity for forming attitudes in a certain 
way, structural rationality as a property of an agent’s state of mind that reflects the 
exercise of mental rationality, and reified rationality as the requirements issued by 
rationality. The requirements of rationality supervene on the mind and generally have 
a wide scope for assessing the structural rationality of a set of attitudes. I gave an 
overview of several issues pertaining to rationality that are relevant for the project of 
this thesis, such as different formulations of rational requirements, the question of 
whether rationality is normative, and rationality as responding correctly to reasons.  
In chapter 4 I home in on mental rationality and its exercise as the focal point of my 
account of rationality as an intellectual virtue, although structural rationality and 
requirements of rationality will feature strongly especially where I argue for the 
normativity of rational requirements in chapter 6. 
  
81 
 
 
 
 
 A General Account of Intellectual 
Virtue 
 
3.1. Introduction 
What conception of intellectual virtue can plausibly dovetail with the preceding general 
account of rationality? My aim in this chapter is to give an account of what I take to be 
the three central elements of intellectual virtue. I do not take each of these elements 
to be necessary for all intellectual virtues. Rather, they are meant to sketch the 
contours of intellectual virtue broadly, delineating features that pick out more of a 
‘family resemblance’ among intellectual virtues than constitutive conditions. I attempt 
to give such an outline as far as possible in a way that incorporates intuitions about 
intellectual virtues from both reliabilist and responsibilist camps. Reliabilist accounts 
of intellectual virtue highlight the reliability of some capacity for producing some 
intellectually important state, while responsibilists focus on the praiseworthiness of an 
agent in their possession of some virtue. 
In keeping with the method set out in chapter 1 (subsection 1.5.1) of seeking the best 
fit of rationality as an intellectual virtue, I focus on those elements of intellectual virtue 
that appear to most plausibly match up with rationality. I am thus not concerned with 
resolving debates and disagreements surrounding intellectual virtue in virtue 
epistemology. I aim, rather, to develop an understanding of intellectual virtue that is 
both broad and informative. It is broad to the degree that it is not committed to a 
particular side in the main debates or to solving a particular problem within 
epistemology or value theory. And it is informative for understanding the function of 
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intellectual virtue in achieving epistemic or intellectual aims in a way that speaks to 
current debates and problems in epistemology and value theory. Although the three 
elements that I develop in this chapter are not all necessarily constitutive of intellectual 
virtue, I motivate each as a desideratum of a general account of intellectual virtue. 
I proceed as follows. In section 3.2 I discuss two distinctions within virtue epistemology 
that are useful for situating my general account of intellectual virtue. The first is 
between reliabilism and responsibilism, and the second between understanding 
intellectual virtue in terms of a narrow or a broad range of intellectual goods. I place 
my account of intellectual virtue more towards the responsibilism camp, although I 
draw substantially from the reliabilist approach, and I describe my concern with 
epistemic goods broadly construed. 
From this position, I argue in section 3.3 for what I take as the first element of 
intellectual virtue, weakly reliable success of character disposition. I argue that the 
success of an intellectual virtue is attributable to a certain kind of disposition, what I 
call a ‘character disposition’, distinct from the more scientific notion of a ‘static 
disposition.’ I argue that this kind of disposition is virtuous insofar as it makes an agent 
reliably form, revise, or abstain from forming intellectual attitudes in conditions and 
environments appropriate for the operation of that disposition. I then argue that this 
reliable success is best evaluated by an agent’s track record rather than hypothetical 
possible-world scenarios. 
In section 3.4, the second element of intellectual virtue for which I argue is that of an 
agent having an appropriate intellectual goal. Although I am not able to provide a 
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watertight definition of what constitutes an intellectual goal, I offer a rough outline of 
what I take intellectual goals to be. Intellectual virtues generally have either an 
immediate goal or aim, a ‘skopos’, or an overall or end goal, a ‘telos’.  
In section 3.5 I argue for an account of praiseworthiness that attempts to 
accommodate the praiseworthiness of both reliabilist faculty-virtues as well as 
responsibilist character-virtues. An intellectual virtue is praiseworthy, on my account, 
when an agent exercises that virtue’s capacity properly out of a motivation for an 
appropriate intellectual goal, in a way that either results in a good action or in some 
other valuable consequence. 
3.2.  Virtue Epistemology 
In this section, I sketch two distinctions within virtue epistemology in order to situate 
the account of virtue relevant for my claim that rationality is a virtue. The first distinction 
is between what kinds of properties of an agent count as intellectual virtues – whether 
they are faculties or character traits. The second is between what kind of epistemic 
problems the concept of an intellectual virtue is meant to address – whether they are 
limited to traditional late-twentieth century epistemology problems around knowledge 
and justification or are applicable to understanding a broader range of epistemic 
goods. 
Heather Battaly (2008) notes that virtue epistemology emerged in the 1980s as an 
alternative to the predominantly ‘belief-based’ approach to epistemic questions. She 
says that for any epistemic theory built upon a belief-based approach, ‘beliefs are the 
primary objects of epistemic evaluation, and knowledge and justification, which are 
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evaluations of beliefs, are the fundamental concepts and properties in epistemology’ 
(Battaly, 2008: 640). In contrast, virtue epistemology is fundamentally concerned with 
intellectual virtues, which concern evaluations of inquiring agents rather than of their 
beliefs. This focus on agential rather than doxastic evaluations has been carried out 
by two different camps in virtue epistemology, reliabilism and responsibilism (Axtell, 
1997).  
The first of these two camps is represented most notably by John Greco (2000) and 
Ernest Sosa (1991). For reliabilists, those characteristics that make for an excellent 
cogniser are stable faculties that produce knowledge.28 Reliabilists take such 
characteristics to be natural cognitive faculties that reliably form true beliefs under 
normal circumstances. For instance, Sosa’s account of intellectual virtue runs as 
follows: 
A subject S’s intellectual virtue V relative to an ‘environment’ E may be defined 
as S’s disposition to believe correctly propositions in a field F relative to which 
S stands in conditions C, in ‘environment’ E. (Sosa, 1991: 140) 
On this view, an intellectual virtue is the disposition to form true beliefs when the 
subject is in an environment and conditions conducive towards that disposition forming 
true beliefs. On this definition, any disposition that matches this description counts as 
an intellectual virtue, such as your perception and memory. John Turri, Mark Alfano, 
 
 
28 Greco contrasts this kind of reliabilism – what he call’s ‘simple reliabilism’ – with his more nuanced 
version of ‘agent reliabilism’ (Greco, 1999: 273). I use Sosa’s ‘simple reliabilism’ here as a useful 
concept for contrasting its differences with responsibilism. 
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and Greco (2017) label reliabilist virtues ‘faculty-virtues,’ due to their focus on natural 
cognitive faculties that are normally regarded as conducive towards epistemic 
success, such as forming true beliefs. Since neither the reliability of our cognitive 
faculties nor the appropriateness of the environment and conditions are accessible to 
us upon reflection, this is often taken as an externalist account of intellectual virtue. 
In the other camp, responsibilists take intellectual virtues as acquired characteristics 
of an agent, that are conducive to epistemically good inquiry. As acquired rather than 
natural characteristics, responsibilists view intellectual virtues as something over 
which we have some degree of control. Most prominent among responsibilists are 
Jason Baehr (2011), James Montmarquet (1993), and Linda Zagzebski (1996). 
Zagzebski gives the following paradigmatic expression of the responsibilist view of 
intellectual virtue. 
An act of intellectual virtue A is an act that arises from the motivational 
component of A, is something a person with virtue A would (probably) do in the 
circumstances, is successful in achieving the end of the A motivation, and is 
such that the agent acquires a true belief…through these features of the act. 
(Zagzebski, 1996: 270, italics in original) 
For Zagzebski, an intellectually virtuous act is necessarily tied to an appropriate 
motivation and success that are intrinsic to that virtue. The faculty-virtues of reliabilists 
do not involve a motivational component, and therefore do not count as intellectual 
virtues for responsibilists. It is rather ‘trait-virtues’ (Turri, Alfano, and Greco: 2017) that 
responsibilists take to be intellectual virtues, such as intellectual courage and open-
mindedness. While the success of certain faculty-virtues like perception are not 
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accessible to an agent, trait-virtues are accessible to a degree and it is therefore up to 
the agent whether she develops those virtues. 
As will become evident in this chapter, my account of the elements of intellectual virtue 
generally falls within a responsibilist characterisation of intellectual virtue. However, I 
also argue that important insights from reliabilist virtue epistemology also be 
incorporated as far as they can be reconciled with responsibilist insights. Reliabilism 
need not be logically inconsistent with responsibilism. For instance, Greco, a reliabilist, 
advocates what he calls ‘agent reliabilism’, according to which intellectual virtue 
consists in ‘stable and reliable dispositions that make up S’s cognitive character’ 
(Greco, 1999: 288, emphasis added). Depending on what one takes to be a 
‘disposition’, and what a subject’s ‘cognitive character’ entails, this definition could be 
made consistent with a responsibilist view of intellectual virtue. For instance, a 
disposition could be taken as a voluntary response to certain conditions, cultivated 
over time to become a persistent part of your cognitive character. For Greco (1999: 
287), an agent’s cognitive character ‘may include both a person’s natural cognitive 
faculties as well as her acquired habits of thought.’ Thus, Greco grants that either 
cognitive faculties or voluntary, acquired intellectual traits can count as intellectual 
virtues. 
Of course, it is not possible to incorporate all aspects of reliabilism into a responsibilist 
account of intellectual virtue. I do not take this to imply that these aspects of reliabilism 
are not at all relevant for understanding intellectual virtue. Rather, I prefer to focus on 
developing a responsibilist account of virtue. The latter is able to incorporate the 
reliabilist success condition into its account of virtue. However, that which I find most 
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appealing about responsibilism, its account of praiseworthiness, is difficult to 
incorporate into the reliabilist concept of ‘faculty-virtues.’ I therefore primarily adopt a 
responsibilist approach to intellectual virtue since it is the more congenial for 
accounting for the normativity or value of rationality. I discuss this point in more detail 
in section 3.5 below and section 4.5 in the next chapter. 
The second distinction in virtue epistemology relevant to my argument has to do with 
what kind of problems the concept of an intellectual virtue is supposed to address. 
Although virtue epistemology regards agent evaluations as more fundamental than 
evaluations of beliefs or other attitudes, it can apply agent evaluations to different 
epistemic concerns. The difference to which I would like to draw attention here 
concerns whether intellectual virtue is applied to a narrow or a broad range of 
epistemic goods. 
Both Sosa’s reliabilist definition and Zagzebski’s responsibilist one above analyse the 
concept of intellectual virtue in terms of the role it plays in bringing an agent into a 
state of knowledge or true belief. Although they differ on what constitutes an 
intellectual virtue, both take the concept to be useful in evaluating an agent’s state in 
relation to knowledge. These kinds of employment of intellectual virtue apply the 
concept to a single epistemic good –knowledge or true belief. In this way, both Sosa’s 
and Zagzebski’s brands of virtue epistemology have a narrow concern in terms of the 
kinds of epistemic goods the intellectual virtues are supposed to achieve. A mark of a 
narrow epistemic concern can be discerned in an account’s definition of an intellectual 
virtue in terms of acquiring knowledge or true belief. 
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In contrast, accounts that employ intellectual virtue to a broad range of epistemic 
goods do not define intellectual virtue in terms of knowledge or true belief. Some 
theorists, like Jonathan Kvanvig (1992) and Roberts and Wood (2007), situate 
intellectual virtues within a broader epistemic arena. For the latter, for example, a 
virtue is ‘an acquired base of excellent [intellectual] functioning in some generically 
human sphere of activity that is challenging and important’ (Roberts and Wood, 2007: 
59-60). Such challenging and important intellectual functioning does not need to be 
limited to acquiring knowledge or true beliefs; you could acquire a base of intellectual 
functioning in, say, understanding or wisdom. While ‘having understanding’ is 
sometimes used synonymously with having propositional knowledge, such as in a 
case of, ‘She understands that World War Two broke out in 1939.’ The meaning of 
‘understanding’ used by Roberts and Wood, Kvanvig, and others in the context of 
epistemic goods is that of ‘objectual understanding,’29 where an agent understands a 
body of information or a subject matter rather than individual propositions (Kvanvig, 
2003: 191). 
One might claim that this kind of objectual understanding is only an epistemic good by 
virtue of contributing toward epistemic justification, and thereby is a function of having 
knowledge. However, Roberts and Wood (2003: 55) argue that, since you can have 
this kind of understanding without knowledge, and knowledge without this kind of 
understanding, epistemic goods like ‘acquaintance and understanding do far more 
 
 
29 A similar meaning is also captured by Duncan Pritchard’s (2009: 12) term ‘holistic understanding’. 
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than serve as parts of the justification or warrant of beliefs.’ Thus, epistemic goods 
besides knowledge can be studied for their own sake, independently of the role they 
might play in producing knowledge. 
A broad concern with epistemic goods like understanding and wisdom need not rule 
out the role intellectual virtues play in bringing an agent to a state of knowledge or true 
belief. But such an approach does not limit intellectual virtues to that role. According 
to the broad concern, there are epistemic goods pertinent to intellectual virtues beyond 
that of knowledge, justification, or true belief. 
Since my general account of rationality understands the term as not limited merely to 
concerns about knowledge or justification, my treatment of the elements of intellectual 
virtue below go beyond how intellectual virtue is conceived of as bringing an agent to 
a state of knowledge. I thus adopt the broad approach of understanding how 
intellectual virtue functions within the arena of epistemic goods in general. 
3.3. Reliability 
I now turn to outlining what I take to be three central elements in a constellation of 
conditions for intellectual virtue. As I have mentioned, not all of these elements are 
necessary conditions for all intellectual virtues, but rather constitute a kind of family 
resemblance among intellectual virtues. I argue in this section for what I take to be the 
reliability or success condition of intellectual virtue. Both reliabilism and responsibilism 
have success conditions built into their definitions of intellectual virtue. Both would 
agree roughly that, in part, an intellectual virtue is a disposition or capacity to reliably 
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form intellectual attitudes. Since this is quite broad and imprecise, how are we to refine 
this element? 
I begin (3.3.1) by clarifying that I take a specific kind of intellectual disposition – what 
I call a ‘character disposition’ – to be the subject of reliable functioning. I then (3.3.2) 
distinguish between two ways in which these dispositions can be regarded as reliable, 
either strongly or weakly. I argue that intellectually virtuous dispositions are weakly 
reliable rather than strongly reliable, and that this reliability applies to a disposition 
forming or abstaining from forming an attitude. Third, I (3.3.3) argue that when 
evaluating the weak reliability of a disposition, it is an agent’s track record of 
performance that ought to be evaluated rather than the possibility of the disposition 
performing reliably. Lastly, I discuss (3.3.4) a problem for the claim that intellectual 
virtues have a success condition. 
3.3.1. Dispositions and capacities 
To begin with, what is it in a virtuous agent that is supposed to function reliably? For 
Sosa (1991: 140) and many reliabilists, it is a natural disposition, such as your memory 
or sight. In contrast, for Zagzebski (1996: 137) and other responsibilists, what is 
virtuous is ‘a deep and enduring acquired excellence of a person’. For the moment, I 
bracket the issue of whether the capacity, disposition, or whatever kind of ‘excellence’ 
of a person should be understood as natural or acquired. I will pick up on this in section 
3.6 below. Should intellectual virtues be understood as capacities, dispositions, or 
something else? 
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One might make the case that capacities and dispositions are more or less 
synonymous, and that we therefore do not need to bother with a distinction or 
clarification. In their overview of dispositional properties, Sungho Choi and Michael 
Fara (2018) note that an array of different terms are used to denote a disposition, such 
as ‘capacity’, ‘competence’, ‘potentiality’, and ‘tendency’. Sosa, for instance, defines a 
competence as a kind of disposition: ‘a competence is a disposition, one with a basis 
resident in the competent agent, one that would in appropriately normal conditions 
ensure (or make highly likely) the success of any relevant performance issued by it’ 
(Sosa, 2007: 29). So, one might think that it is insignificant to choose between 
‘capacity’ and ‘disposition’ if they are synonymous. 
However, I think that this is a significant choice for the following reasons. First, 
‘disposition’ is quite a loaded term in a way that ‘capacity’ is not. The most important 
connotation of ‘disposition’ for the purpose of my project is that it is widely regarded 
as a property that does not have much explanatory power (for example, Jackson 
(1996), Mackie (1977), and Prior et al. (1982)). While this is contested, I think that it is 
quite convincing at least that, even if dispositions do have causal relevance, they are 
not always sufficient for a causal explanation. For instance, if one assumes that the 
disposition of a glass to break is in some way causally relevant to the fact that it broke, 
pointing out the disposition in response to the query of why the glass broke is not 
informative about the stimulus condition under which the glass broke. Was it dropped, 
struck, or thrown? Dispositions on their own do not furnish us with this information. 
Thus, if dispositions do not provide a sufficient degree of explanatory information, then 
92 
 
 
 
 
they are arguably not the kind of property that is useful for understanding intellectual 
virtues and the way in which they can be reliable. 
Nonetheless, I think that there are different senses of ‘disposition’ that do possess 
more explanatory power. For instance, if asked, ‘Why didn’t she stand up and fight?’ 
and you respond with, ‘Because she’s a coward,’ you have provided a relevant piece 
of causal information that is lacking in the case in which you cite fragility to explain the 
broken glass. What then distinguishes the fragile glass explanation from the coward 
explanation?  
What distinguishes these two cases is not the difference in the kind of causal scenario, 
where different pieces of the causal story are being sought – one the stimulus condition 
and the other the disposition. Rather, taking my cue from Julia Annas (2011), I think 
that there are two kinds of dispositions at play here, what I will call ‘static’ and 
‘character’ dispositions. Both are dispositions in the sense that they describe 
tendencies to respond in a certain way under relevant stimulus conditions. The 
distinguishing feature between them is that, while character dispositions are 
dispositional properties that involve a relevant degree of voluntary control or volition 
for their manifestations, static dispositions do not involve any relevant voluntary control 
for their manifestations. By ‘volition’ and a ‘relevant degree of voluntary control’ I mean 
that an agent is accountable for the manifestation of some disposition, or that the 
manifestation is attributable to the agent.30 A glass has no volition over whether it 
 
 
30 It could be the case that what distinguishes a coward from a brave person is that the former lacks 
precisely any volitional input in the manifestation of her cowardly behaviour, and that it is only someone 
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breaks when put in a certain stimulus condition, but a coward does have such control 
over, and therefore has some responsibility for, how she responds. We might 
represent the differences between the two kinds of dispositions as follows: 
Static disposition:  Disposition + Stimulus = Manifestation 
Character disposition:  Disposition + Stimulus + Volition = Manifestation 
I think Julia Annas is making the same basic distinction when she claims the following 
about dispositions and virtue. 
[A]lthough it is natural for us to think of a virtue as a disposition, we should be 
careful not to confuse this with the scientific notion of disposition, which just is 
a static lasting tendency. A classic example is that glass has a disposition to 
break under certain circumstances. This is not the notion we need, since glass 
does not have a disposition by way of doing anything, nor can it learn to develop 
selectively as a result of encounters with different circumstances. A virtue is not 
a static condition like this; it is a disposition as a result of which [the agent] acts 
and thinks in a certain way, and which is at any time strengthened by her 
generous responses and weakened by failures to have them. (Annas, 2011: 8-
9) 
Annas adds that a non-static disposition (what I call a ‘character disposition’) is 
strengthened and reinforced by its exercise. So, character dispositions are 
dispositions in the sense of causing a manifestation under relevant stimulus 
conditions, provided an agent is volitionally involved, and thus such dispositions are 
 
 
who has voluntary control over her manifested dispositions of character who possesses a disposition 
of character. Whatever the precise formulation of the role of volition in manifesting a character 
disposition, I take it that what distinguishes character dispositions from static dispositions can be 
intelligibly attributed to what is up to the agent. 
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strengthened by the repeated agential involvement in bringing about its 
manifestations. Apart from differentiating dispositions relevant for virtues, this 
distinction also has the merit of telling us why it is that static dispositions do not provide 
sufficient causal information while character dispositions provide an explanation in the 
context of specifying what manifestations are up to the agent. It has likewise the 
advantage of explaining why certain acts are regularly performed by an agent that 
makes character dispositions important properties for understanding virtue, and the 
object of focus of what is functioning reliably in an intellectually virtuous agent. Thus, 
while explanations that do not involve the agent may refer to static dispositions, 
explanations that involve attributing some involvement or responsibility to an agent 
refer to character dispositions. Since the latter is most suited for an account of 
dispositions in intellectual virtue, this is the sense of ‘disposition’ or ‘capacity’ that I will 
be using. 
3.3.2. Weak reliability to form or abstain from forming 
Now that I have clarified that I take it to be a character disposition of a virtuous agent 
that functions with reliable success, what should be understood by this reliability? 
Interestingly, it is often responsibilism that has a stronger success condition than 
reliabilism. For instance, Zagzebski’s reliable success condition, in her definition of an 
intellectually virtuous act, is that such an act ‘is successful in achieving the end’ 
(Zagzebski, 1996: 270). An intellectually virtuous agent, according to this kind of 
responsibilism, would be reliably successful by achieving her intellectually virtuous 
aims. Following Wayne Riggs (2003: 208), I call this kind of reliable success ‘strong 
reliability’. 
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Strong reliability is too strong to be a virtuous feature of an intellectual disposition, 
though. An intellectual agent in an environment that is unsuitable for, say, forming true 
beliefs, may form a false belief out of no fault of her disposition’s reliability nor her 
exercise of her disposition. Consider Barney the barn spotter31 who goes on a barn 
spotting trip. He spots what he thinks might be a barn in the distance and pulls out his 
barn-oculars. Although not entirely clear, he studies the colour of the walls, the angle 
of the crossbeams and the roof, and the number of windows. He concludes that this 
must be a barn and forms that belief. But Barney does not know that he is in Barn 
Façade county where there are hundreds of barn cut-outs, of which the observed barn 
is one. Unfortunately for Barney, his belief, though formed by his otherwise reliable 
barn-spotting disposition and in a virtuous manner, is false. We might call the formation 
of Barney’s belief ‘unlucky’ since he could have just as easily drove up a different road 
into Real Barn county and formed true beliefs out of his virtuously exercised 
disposition. Although it is not necessary for an account of intellectual virtue to 
distinguish between accidental and non-accidental true belief, this example illustrates 
the need to index an intellectual disposition’s success to environments and conditions 
appropriate for its reliability. Fortunately, reliabilism offers the conceptual tools for 
adding just this kind of qualification. Reliabilism regards the success of an intellectual 
virtue as contingent upon appropriate conditions and environments. Recall Sosa’s 
 
 
31 This illustration is adapted from Duncan Pritchard’s similar example of environmental good luck 
(Pritchard et. al., 2010: 35-36). My adaptation is meant to zoom in on the necessity of environmentally 
suitable conditions for a disposition to operate reliably. 
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definition of an intellectual virtue as a ‘disposition to believe correctly proposition in a 
field F relative to which [an agent] stands in conditions C, in ‘environment’ E’ (Sosa, 
1991: 140). Following Riggs (2003: 208), I call this brand of success condition ‘weak 
reliability’. According to this formulation, Barney’s true belief is not a function of his 
virtuous disposition, since his disposition to form true beliefs about barns is indexed to 
environments in which there is not a preponderance of fake barns. 
In light of this, I understand intellectual virtue in part to be a character disposition to 
reliably form intellectual attitudes in conditions and environments appropriate for 
forming those attitudes. But there is one additional adjustment that needs to be made 
to this element. Not all intellectual virtues aim at forming attitudes. For instance, it is 
characteristic of the intellectual virtue of firmness that an agent either abstains from 
forming or maintains attitudes under certain conditions, such as how fundamental an 
attitude is or the degree of evidence available. Thus, the reliability element of 
intellectual virtue should be amended to reliably form, abstain from forming, or 
maintain intellectual attitudes under appropriate conditions and environments. I take 
this to cover the full range of possible mental acts with regards to an attitude, including 
adjusting attitudes, revising attitudes, and so forth. 
3.3.3. Track record reliability 
Philosophers are wont to evaluate the reliability of capacities or dispositions in 
counterfactual terms – of how they would perform were they in certain conditions or 
environments. The common way of explicating these kinds of evaluations is in terms 
of possible worlds. For instance, Nozick’s (1981) tracking theory of knowledge holds 
that an agent in the actual world knows a proposition only if in all nearby possible 
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worlds she would believe that proposition were it true. Sometimes this tool is used to 
investigate what conditions and environments are relevant for cognitive faculties to 
function reliably (e.g., Goldman 1979). But I think that for the purpose of evaluating 
whether an agent is intellectually virtuous insofar as her disposition functions reliably, 
possible world and other modal evaluations are not suitable. 
Ordinarily, when an agent is evaluated as intellectually virtuous, it is her success over 
time, her ‘track record’ that is considered. If an agent achieves some intellectual goal 
from a well-functioning disposition on one occasion, this is sufficient to count the agent 
or her disposition as intellectually virtuous. Gauging the success of an agent in 
achieving intellectually virtuous goals must involve her track record of performance.  
For this reason, I think that the reliability of a disposition’s performance is virtuous only 
if the disposition is either maximally successful or increasingly successful in 
appropriate conditions and environments. For a subject to be either maximally 
successful or increasingly successful means that the epistemic subject shows an 
increasing trend in the success of her intellectual achievements over time. An 
intellectually virtuous agent may reach a point where is it impossible or at least very 
difficult to increase her intellectual success because she has mastered certain 
intellectual virtues. Such an agent need not increase in success in order to be 
considered virtuous since she already maintains a high to maximal degree of success. 
Thus, if you are already maximally successful in achieving your intellectual aims, you 
need not become increasingly successful to be considered intellectually virtuous. But 
if you are not maximally successful, then you ought to trend toward get better at 
achieving your intellectual aims. Such an improvement ought to be a trend since you 
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may fail to achieve an intellectual good at one time or another, yet succeed in similar 
scenarios in the future due to learning how better to achieve your aim given past 
failure.32 
Evaluating whether an agent’s disposition is maximally successful or increasingly 
successful is only possible by taking her track record over time into account, rather 
than how the disposition would perform were it in a nearby possible world. To illustrate, 
imagine an agent in the actual world who has never learned how to play chess, but 
who in a nearby possible world has learned how to play chess and is a Grandmaster. 
The only relevant difference between these two worlds is that in the nearby world the 
agent has learned chess, whereas in the actual world she has not. In both worlds the 
agent has the same disposition to be a Grandmaster, but in the actual world she does 
not hold his title. What distinguishes the evaluation of the non-Grandmaster agent from 
the Grandmaster agent is not their difference in disposition, but their difference in track 
record. Similarly, an agent with dispositions that would reliably perform well 
intellectually but does not have a track record of success is not regarded as 
intellectually virtuous.  
A track record approach to evaluations of intellectual virtue allows for dealing with 
cases of good and bad intellectual luck. You might be intellectually lucky or unlucky 
on several occasions, but your intellectual virtue or lack thereof will generally show in 
 
 
32 See also Sosa’s (1991: 284-285) and Roberts and Woods’ (2017: 91) arguments that it is the 
developed disposition rather than the dormant skill that counts as virtuous. This further supports my 
view in the following paragraph. 
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your track record, especially in your trend of successes and failures. It could be 
objected, though, that an agent’s track record cannot account for extreme and 
persistent good luck in achieving her intellectual goal. It is possible that an agent is 
lucky enough to increasingly succeed in achieving her intellectual goals. But this is to 
overlook that track-record success is not all that there is to evaluating intellectual 
success. An agent is also required to manifest her intellectual disposition in a way that 
eliminates accidentally reliable success. An agent who has a lucky successful track 
record is not responsible for successfully manifesting her intellectual disposition, and 
therefore is not virtuous. 
3.3.4. Is reliability necessary? 
Before moving on from the subject of reliability and success, I should note that there 
might be an argument against reliability as an element of intellectual virtue. On the 
one hand, it would appear that intellectual virtues must be reliably successful in order 
to count as virtues. The majority of virtue epistemologists take some success condition 
to be inherent to virtue. In fact, intellectual virtues may even have a stronger 
requirement for success than moral virtues. Julia Annas (2003) argues for this claim.  
According to Annas, a morally virtuous action, such as rescuing someone from a 
burning building, counts as courageous even if the person saved dies in the process 
and is thus unsuccessful in achieving its aim. In contrast, says Annas, intellectual 
dispositions like perception or memory that do not succeed in forming true beliefs are 
not properly virtuous. For instance, a memory that brings to mind false memories is 
not an intellectual virtue due to its lack of success. Although one might not regard all 
intellectual virtues as having the aim of forming true beliefs (as I claim below in 3.4), 
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the point still stands: an intellectual disposition or capacity that is not successful in 
achieving that at which it aims is generally not regarded as virtuous. 
On the other hand, we sometimes attribute intellectual virtue even in the absence of 
success. James Montmarquet (1993:21) notes that figures like Aristotle and Newton 
are widely lauded as exemplars of intellectual virtue despite being at the same time 
regarded as having developed scientific theories that have been thoroughly falsified. 
Intellectual virtue therefore does not necessarily seem to be coextensive with 
intellectual success. A further consideration, brought up by Riggs (2003: 217ff), is that 
some intellectual virtues, such as understanding not only do not require true belief, but 
may even require false beliefs (in order for us to appropriately generalise by 
abstracting from the messy details of the world).  
I am unsure how to resolve this tension, although I think that there is merit in analysing 
particular intellectual virtues and their success-requirements. Perhaps certain 
intellectual virtues are less concerned with forming true beliefs, like being an 
intellectual pioneer, or being intellectually enduring. Or perhaps Aristotle’s and 
Newton’s theories were a result of intellectually virtuous dispositions, but their lack of 
success is attributable to their intellectual and technological conditions and 
environments. At all events, I will argue that intellectual virtue may have a range of 
appropriate intellectual goals beyond the narrow epistemic goal of forming true beliefs. 
I will argue in the following chapter that reliable success in satisfying requirements of 
rationality is a necessary component of rationality as a virtue. 
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3.4. Intellectual Goal 
The second element of intellectual virtue I outline in this chapter is that of an agent 
aiming at an appropriate intellectual goal. In this section, I first clarify the related terms 
of aim, goal, good, and motivation, as well as distinguish between two types of goal – 
skopos and telos. I then offer a way of distinguishing between intellectual and moral 
virtues based on the characteristic goal of a virtue. Lastly, I offer an outline of 
intellectual goals that allows for a wide range of goals appropriate to intellectual 
virtues. 
My claim is that it is generally characteristic of an intellectual virtue that it aims at an 
appropriate intellectual goal, or, rather, that an agent who is intellectually virtuous in a 
particular respect aims at an appropriate intellectual goal. What does it mean for an 
agent to have such an aim, and what is the goal at which she aims? 
To begin with, a goal is an identifiable good in which an agent has an interest; the 
good is the ‘content’ of the goal, so to speak. A good can be just about anything – 
wealth, reputation, or the most impressive collection of Pokémon cards in your school. 
What makes some good the ‘right kind’ for the goal of a virtue is up for dispute. For 
Aristotle (1999: 1097b22-1098a20), it would have been something constitutive of 
human flourishing, which includes virtue itself. For Alasdair MacIntyre (2007: 191), an 
appropriate good is that which is ‘internal’ to some practice: excellent form and 
composure in the practice of cricket batsmanship, novel and useful knowledge in the 
practice of science, graceful illustration of human aspiration and emotion in ballet, and 
so forth. Assuming a broad definition of virtue like that offered by Roberts and Wood 
(2007: 59), we could say that an appropriate good for a virtuous goal is anything that 
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might be accomplished or gained by ‘some generically human sphere of activity that 
is challenging and important.’  
To generalise from Aristotle’s, MacIntyre’s, and Roberts and Woods’ views, then, what 
makes some goal appropriate to a virtue is that achieving that goal is partly constitutive 
of the activity, practice, or pursuit of a virtue. If the possibility of achieving some goal 
is in some significant way precluded, then it would make little sense to pursue it. This 
helps to distinguish between aiming for certain goods that may be important or helpful 
for being virtuous but whose absence does not undermine a virtue, and certain goods 
whose absence would preclude the possibility of pursuing a virtue. For instance, 
having a certain amount of wealth is very helpful for, say, having the virtue of 
friendliness, but since not having a certain amount of wealth does not prevent one 
from pursuing other goals internal to friendliness, wealth is not an appropriate goal of 
friendliness. In contrast, if building strong interpersonal relationships were impossible, 
then there would be no sense in developing the practices that would otherwise 
produce the virtue of friendship. In this way, building strong interpersonal relationships 
is an appropriate goal of friendliness. 
A goal is some good toward which an agent aims. For an agent to aim at some goal 
is for her actions to be motivated by and directed toward some good. I thus take ‘aim’ 
to be a kind of motivation and use the two equivalently as it suits the context. When 
speaking of a virtuous agent, I will refer to her as having a motivation. When speaking 
about a virtue, I will use the metaphor of the virtue having an aim. I take it that when a 
virtuous agent acts in a certain way in order to achieve that at which she aims, 
achieving her aim is partially what motivates her to act in that way. For example, the 
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good of generosity toward which a virtuous agent aims is, say, the benefit and well-
being of the recipient at the personal expense of the agent.33 Such an aim both 
motivates and directs the agent to act in certain ways, such as for instance spending 
time transferring skills to her student. A less generous person may act in the same 
way, though, for instance if she were required to keep a certain number of office hours. 
Her motivation in this case would be to follow a rule rather than the good of her 
student’s development. 
A final and important clarification is needed. The goal of a virtue can be of two kinds. 
An agent could be motivated by some immediate effect that she hopes will be caused 
by an action. Or an agent could be motivated by some end-goal toward which she 
hopes her action will contribute to achieving. This distinction is not merely meant to 
claim that some virtuous action is sufficient for achieving its goal while other virtuous 
action only promotes some goal. Rather, the distinction is meant to highlight two ways 
in which virtues are characteristically related to their goals. This is especially important 
for my argument in chapter 5 (5.4.3) that a rational agent can be motivated by an 
overall aim while immediately satisfying rational requirements at which she does not 
(explicitly) aim. 
Heather Battaly (2015: 9-11) distinguishes between virtues of the former kind as non-
teleological or effect-focussed virtues and the latter as teleological or end-focussed 
virtues. While Battaly’s distinction is between two kinds of virtue, Julia Annas (2003: 
 
 
33 I draw on Roberts and Wood’s (2007: 286ff) discussion of generosity. 
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24) draws a similar distinction between the kinds of aim in a virtue. (On Annas’ view, 
this distinction between two kinds of aims can be applied to the same virtue, where 
appropriate, although a virtue may have only one of the kinds of aims she describes.) 
This distinction is between the telos or ‘overall aim’ of a virtue and the skopos or 
‘immediate target’ of a virtue. To illustrate this distinction with some examples, 
consider that part of conscientiousness is to carefully and thoroughly do your work. 
This is the telos of conscientiousness, while the skopos is open-ended depending on 
what is required in order for you to do your work carefully and thoroughly. It may be, 
say, to check your emails twice a day. The skopos is directed toward achieving the 
telos of careful and thorough work. Some virtues do not have a characteristic telos, 
such as courage, although they have a characteristic skopos, like the immediate aim 
of courage to overcome fear or to tackle daunting obstacles. A skopos of one virtue 
may be aimed at in order to achieve the telos of some other virtue, such as an agent 
having the telos of the virtue of the love of knowledge (acquiring knowledge that is 
difficult to get), or that of the virtue of social justice. Both these virtues’ teloses may be 
aimed at when an agent exercises her courage when aiming at overcoming a particular 
obstacle. 
A virtuous agent therefore aims at some skopos or telos appropriate to a virtue by 
being motivated to act purposefully to achieve that skopos or telos. I will argue in 
chapter 5 that the appropriate intellectual telos of rationality is that of attitudinal 
harmony. 
Before outlining intellectual goals in general, I should note that it is often the goal of 
some virtue that characterises it as a moral or as an intellectual virtue. In other words, 
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one way of distinguishing between intellectual and moral virtues is in terms of their 
characteristic goals; moral virtues aim at moral ends, while intellectual virtues aim at 
intellectual ends. I am not committed to any hard distinction between moral and 
intellectual virtues. However, given that I hope to demonstrate the normativity of 
rationality, I do not assume that intellectual virtue is a species of moral virtue. Doing 
so may elicit a quick answer to the normative question that intellectual virtues are 
normative by virtue of their being a species of moral virtue. One implication of this view 
would be that all rational requirements are just moral requirements, which is quite a 
radical claim and not one that I would endorse. While some like Lord (2017) think that 
rational requirements indicate what you ought to do – and thus follow moral 
requirements – this is different than claiming that rational requirements are moral 
requirements. 
This does not imply that I therefore assume that intellectual virtue – especially a 
putative one such as rationality – does not hold any relevance for morality or moral 
virtues. For instance, one of the paradigmatic requirements of rationality is enkrasia. 
According to this requirement, an agent is to intend to do what she believes she ought 
to do. A requirement such as this, indeed any requirement of rationality that has to do 
with an agent’s intentions, is clearly of relevance to morality or moral virtue. 
I claimed above that what makes some goal appropriate to some virtue is that it is 
indispensable to practicing or pursuing that virtue, or that pursuing that virtue without 
the possibility of achieving that goal would be senseless. I also noted that one of the 
important ways in which moral virtues are distinguished from intellectual virtues is in 
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terms of their goals. What, then, makes a goal intellectual, such that it belongs to and 
indicates an intellectual virtue? 
In order to address this question, let us first consider some examples of intellectual 
goals that some thinkers have offered. 
Aristotle (1985) distinguishes between two kinds of intellectual virtues – those 
concerned with scientific knowledge, and those with practical thinking. Of particular 
interest to the current project is the intellectual virtue of phronesis (practical wisdom) 
(1140b), which is the virtue of both having knowledge about human flourishing and of 
putting that knowledge into practical effect. I will discuss phronesis again in the 
following chapter, focussing on the intersection of epistemic and practical concerns in 
a single virtue. What is important to note about phronesis qua intellectual virtue is that 
its goal is concerned with both thinking about the human good and how to apply it in 
one’s own life; it is concerned that is with both theoretical and practical rationality.  
Incorporating both epistemic and practical concerns into intellectual virtue is not as 
prominent among contemporary virtue theorists. Although holding true beliefs is 
commonly regarded as a fundamental intellectual good among theorists, some have 
pointed to other non-doxastic goals that are just as much classified as ‘intellectual’. 
John Dewey (1933: 30, quoted in Zagzebski, 1996: 173), for instance, defines the 
intellectual virtue of open-mindedness as ‘freedom from prejudice, partisanship, and 
such other habits as close the mind and make it unwilling to consider new problems 
and entertain new ideas’. According to this definition, the goal of open-mindedness is 
freedom from prejudice – not to form or abstain from forming attitudes, but the ability 
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to ‘entertain’ attitudes you might believe are false, outdated, or insufficiently supported 
by evidence.  
Robert Roberts and Jay Wood (2007: 36-56) also discuss the intellectual goods of 
acquaintance, coherence, and understanding. And to these may be added other goods 
such as originality and wisdom. And although propositional knowledge is entangled 
with other intellectual goods, it would be more than a stretch to claim that the ultimate 
end of all intellectual goods is propositional knowledge. Roberts and Wood (2007: 55) 
state that ‘acquaintance and understanding do far more than serve as parts of the 
justification or warrant of beliefs.’ 
So, the goals of intellectual virtue are not exclusively concerned with knowledge or 
belief-justification. While this is an important goal of many intellectual virtues, other 
goals like thinking and acting in accordance with human flourishing, or originality, or 
coherence are all characteristically intellectual goals. In general, then, I think that it is 
plausible to take intellectual goals as those goals concerned with excellent inquiry and 
thought, including thought about practical matters. Intellectual goals that have 
corresponding intellectual virtues are appropriate to those virtues insofar as those 
virtues are characteristically concerned with achieving those goals.  
Aiming at intellectual goods, i.e., being motivated by an intellectual goal, is partially 
constitutive of possessing intellectual virtue, since achieving intellectual goods in a 
haphazard manner or by accident – that is, without aiming at them – is not an indication 
that you will continue to make such achievements in the future.  
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Furthermore, a necessary component of virtue is that an agent makes part of her 
character a motivation for – a desire for or a conscious pursuit of – a corresponding 
goal internal to that virtue. It is not sufficient to have merely a reliable capacity that 
happens to cause you to act in ways in accordance with how an intellectually virtuous 
person would act. For instance, as Roberts and Wood (2017: 2017) point out, you can 
be motivated to be intellectually courageous for a non-virtuous goal, such as achieving 
fame or spreading hatred. Developing the proficiencies and qualities necessary for 
intellectual courage is not sufficient for being intellectually virtuous – an agent is also 
required to be motivated by the characteristic goal of intellectual courage. 
3.5. Praiseworthiness 
The third element of intellectual virtue is a kind of praiseworthiness, normativity, 
goodness, or value. ‘Virtue’ is a fundamentally normative concept, whether one takes 
it to be praiseworthy to possess, a kind of excellence, or necessary for human 
flourishing. But there are many views on precisely where the normativity or 
praiseworthiness of human virtues in general, and intellectual virtues in particular, 
reside. James Montmarquet (2008: 3939) takes the praiseworthiness of an intellectual 
virtue to reside in the fact that an agent has control over, and therefore is responsible 
for, the presence of an intellectual virtue. For Zagzebski (1996: 202-203), the 
goodness of a virtuous motive is of particular interest. And Battaly (2015: 9) notes that 
some accounts of intellectual virtue are valuable for ‘reliable success in attaining good 
ends or effects’; this would make intellectual virtues instrumentally valuable. For 
others, such as Ralph Wedgwood (2017), the value of virtue is multifaceted. 
Wedgwood (2017: 141) distinguishes between three ways in which a virtue can be 
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considered good – the good of the disposition, the good of the manifestation of that 
disposition, and the abstract goodness of events that are ordinarily manifested by that 
disposition. 
It is plausible that, at least for virtues that do aim at some intellectual goal,34 part of 
the explanation for why it is good, praiseworthy, or valuable to have some virtue is the 
fact that, first, that goal is something valuable to achieve or to bring about and, second, 
an agent is motivated by that valuable goal. In this way, an agent’s motivation is the 
glue that holds together the praiseworthiness of some virtue’s aim and the agent’s 
character. In this section, I first consider three problems faced by reliabilism in 
accounting for the praiseworthiness of intellectual virtue (subsection 3.5.1). I admit that 
not all of these alleged problems need to be acknowledged by reliabilists. But for the 
sake of the intuition that intellectual virtues are praiseworthy I regard them as issues 
in need of being addressed in order for paradigmatically reliabilist virtues (faculty-
virtues) to be considered praiseworthy. In order to redeem as praiseworthy these 
faculty-virtues, I then argue for a unified account of praiseworthiness that incorporates 
both character-virtues and faculty-virtues (subsection 3.5.2). 
 
 
34 It may be the case that not all virtues have goods at which they aim. This might be problematic for 
accounts of the goodness, praiseworthiness, or value of a virtue that depend on the normativity of 
having some virtuous motivation as constitutive of the goodness or praiseworthiness of a virtue. But I 
will leave this difficulty aside, since it seems to be an essential feature of virtues that do aim at goods. 
Furthermore, I attempt to develop an account of praiseworthiness that is consistent with virtues that do 
not have characteristic aims. 
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Although I present an account that seeks to unify the responsibility and 
praiseworthiness of faculty- and character-virtues, my aim is to explore the ways in 
which (intellectual) virtues are conceived of as praiseworthy. While there are real 
differences between difference accounts of how intellectual virtues are praiseworthy, 
I do not aim to resolve the issue here. At the very least, this discussion of the 
praiseworthiness of intellectual virtue demonstrates how normatively rich the concept 
is. If rationality can plausibly be conceived of as an intellectual virtue, there are many 
resources within intellectual virtue for exploring the normativity or praiseworthiness of 
rationality.  
3.5.1. Problems with reliabilism 
Reliabilism faces at least three problems in its account of the praiseworthiness or value 
of intellectual virtues. Reliabilists usually explain the praiseworthiness of intellectual 
virtues in terms of their being good distinctive traits of a certain kind of object. 
Sharpness is a virtue of a knife but not of a teacup; long battery life is a virtue of a 
mobile phone but not of a washing basket, a good memory is a virtue of an inquirer 
but not of an automobile. But reliabilism’s account struggles to explain the distinctive 
kind of praiseworthiness that we ascribe to human virtues like courage and open-
mindedness. I present three problems with the reliabilist account on this front.  
The first problem with this account qua account of praiseworthiness is that it is not 
informative about what is praiseworthy about intellectual virtues. According to Judith 
Thomson (2008), for any goodness-fixing kind – that is, for any kind of thing that has 
a function for which certain properties are good – there are evaluative properties the 
possession of which is praiseworthy for that kind of thing. Being a carving knife is a 
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goodness-fixing kind, since there are certain properties that a carving knife must have 
in order for it to be a good carving knife, like being sharp. Thomson’s (2008: 76-77) 
idea is that when you ascribe a property like sharpness to a carving knife, although 
that property is not good simpliciter, you are praising the carving knife qua carving 
knife. The same goes for things like comedians who are witty, or theatrical productions 
that are entertaining. To ascribe these properties to these kinds of things is just to 
praise them, according to Thomson. Similarly, Sosa (1991: 271) claims that there is a 
broad sense of ‘virtue’ according to which ‘anything with a function – natural or artificial 
– does have virtues.’ Having ears that hear and eyes that see, therefore, are virtues 
of a human, assuming the function of humans is to acquire knowledge. 
This might be satisfactory as an account of faculties or qualities that are good or 
valuable to possess for forming true beliefs, or even for achieving other intellectual 
goods. While we often value objects for having features constitutive of their functions, 
we do not ordinarily praise them as such. A well-made vase is valuable, but it is not 
praiseworthy in the same sense as the potter who sculpted the vase is praiseworthy. 
Reliabilists might not admit that this is a problem with their account; perhaps virtues 
are valuable, or produce valuable states, but are not praiseworthy. Since I think that 
intellectual virtues are praiseworthy, I take this problem as real.  
The second problem I find with reliabilism is that it locates the value of intellectual 
virtues too narrowly, solely in their ability to cause valuable states like true beliefs. 
Since, for reliabilists, intellectual virtues are valuable for a kind of thing to perform its 
function, then the only two immediate and fundamental functions of intellectual virtues 
like sight, memory, and hearing are survival or forming true beliefs. Assuming that 
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survival is not the function that reliabilists take intellectual virtues to perform, what 
makes intellectual virtues valuable is their reliability for forming true beliefs. This is 
problematic for two reasons. First, there are other intellectual goods that intellectual 
virtues should aim at besides true beliefs, as I discussed in the preceding section (3.4). 
Second, the value of intellectual virtues does not reside solely in their consequences. 
It is also valuable to have intellectually virtuous motivations, to desire certain 
intellectual goods like understanding and honesty. Even desiring truth is virtuous in a 
distinct way from forming true beliefs; someone with excellent faculty-virtues but no 
desire for truth could form more true beliefs than someone who has the desire for truth. 
And it would arguably be the person with a desire for true beliefs who is more 
intellectually virtuous than the person who simply forms more true beliefs. This same 
problem is identified by Zagzebski (2003) and Jonathan Kvanvig (2003), often referred 
to as the ‘swamping problem’. Reliabilism does not account for what is valuable about 
having justified true beliefs or knowledge. Since the reliability of a process is a matter 
of this process leading to true beliefs most of the time, a reliably formed true belief is 
no more valuable than an accidentally true one. To use Zagzebski’s (2003) example, 
an excellent espresso made by a machine that reliably produces good coffee is no 
more valuable than an excellent espresso accidentally produced by a faulty espresso 
machine. Similarly, if what makes a faculty a virtue is merely its reliability in producing 
good states like true belief, we would be unable to capture the value of the virtue, 
which includes the motivation and effort of the agent, and other considerations that we 
might typically expect to make a difference in a virtue account. 
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The third problem I find with reliabilism is that it does not require any degree of 
voluntary control or responsibility on the part of the agent in order for her to exercise 
intellectual virtues. Yet I take it as fundamental that praiseworthiness requires that it 
is up to the agent at least to some degree to exercise her capacity (see below). 
Reliabilist descriptions of faculty-virtues do not consider the control of the agent in 
exercising them. 
If the above is on the right track and reliabilism is unable to plausibly account for the 
praiseworthiness of intellectual virtues, one might think either that reliabilism’s faculty-
virtues are not praiseworthy, or that faculty-virtues do not strictly count as intellectual 
virtues. However, I argue below that the praiseworthiness of faculty-virtues can be 
redeemed by demonstrating that agents have a relevant degree of voluntary control 
over how her capacities are exercised. This is true of the praiseworthiness of 
character-virtues, too. 
3.5.2. Volition, value, and praiseworthiness 
As I already mentioned, I appreciate that these considerations are not conclusive. 
However, even if one is not convinced that the above are problems for a reliabilist 
account of praiseworthiness, I think that there is philosophical appeal to the account I 
develop below in virtue of its attempt to unify the praiseworthiness of faculty-virtues 
and character-virtues. I will here build on my earlier concept of a character disposition 
(from subsection 3.3.1) as a disposition whose manifestation involves a relevant 
degree of an agent’s volition. I aim to show how faculty-virtues like perception and 
memory and character virtues like courage can both be subsumed under the same 
account of praiseworthiness. 
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My account of the praiseworthiness of virtue involves two components: essential 
features and non-essential features. While the former features are all necessary, of 
the non-essential features at least one should be present. Praiseworthiness 
necessarily involves (a), (b), (c), and either (d) or (e): 
(a) Having some capacity whose exercise is within an agent’s control, and 
(b) Correctly exercising that capacity, and 
(c) Exercising that capacity out of an appropriate motivation, and 
 either: 
(d) Conditions (a), (b), and (c) together is a good or valuable action, 
or 
(e) Conditions (a), (b), and (c) together bring about a good or valuable related 
outcome.35 
To put this more succinctly, a virtuous agent is praiseworthy for exercising some 
capacity correctly and out of an appropriate motivation in a way that is good or that 
brings about a valuable consequence.  
By saying that exercising some capacity is within your control in condition (a), I mean 
that it is possible for you to volitionally exercise that capacity or that exercising that 
capacity is the result of your prior volitional exercise of that capacity. This, I think, is 
relevant for accounting for the praiseworthiness of virtue, but not praiseworthiness in 
general. There may be something praiseworthy about automatic cognitive processes 
 
 
35 I should briefly point out that conditions of praiseworthiness are not symmetrical with conditions for 
blameworthiness. While violating these conditions imply that an agent falls short of praiseworthiness, 
the negation of any of these conditions does not imply that the agent is blameworthy. 
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that cause you to work out arithmetic problems very quickly. My account would hold 
that this is praiseworthy if this automatic process is the result of having repeatedly 
volitionally exercised your arithmetic capacity to the point of using it automatically, or 
that this process may reflexively become volitionally under your control. But if this 
automatic process is neither the result of voluntary exercise, nor is it in any way under 
your control, then it is not praiseworthy on account of any intellectual virtue as I 
understand the term. It may well be praiseworthy for some other reason, however. 
Conditions (d) and (e) are necessary to exclude capacities whose proper exercise are 
not generally regarded as praiseworthy. For instance, agents who properly exercise 
their locomotive capacities out of a motivation to do so are not thereby praiseworthy. 
While locomotive actions may be neutral with regard to value by definition, a soldier 
who has the capacity and motivation to be brave, and who exercises his capacity well, 
but who never succeeds in acting bravely is not praiseworthy. Similarly, conditions (a), 
(b), and (c) are necessary to rule out accidentally valuable actions and consequences. 
A clumsy soldier who accidentally discharges his gun and kills an enemy is not 
praiseworthy for having done so. 
I take it as more fundamental to a virtuous agent’s praiseworthiness whether she has 
a relevant degree of control over exercising her faculties and character traits rather 
than over whether she possesses those faculties and traits. As such, I am not 
concerned with whether intellectual virtues are natural or acquired for the purpose of 
accounting for their praiseworthiness. Natural features like sight and hearing cannot 
be acquired by those who do not have them. But those who do have these natural 
features are intellectually responsible for maximising their effectiveness. While 
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exercising certain faculty-virtues might be involuntary or even unconscious like 
perception and memory, you can improve and hone the performance of these 
faculties. Faculty-virtues, and especially their improvement, are to some degree things 
for which agents have some volitional control through education, therapy, and 
exercise. Even access to technology can be used to improve faculty-virtues, such as 
wearing glasses to improve your eyesight. Applying yourself in education, finding and 
putting effort into therapy, practicing exercises, and exploiting technology are all ways 
in which it is up to you for improving your faculty-virtues. 
Since faculty-virtues do not exclude a degree of volition by an agent for their proper 
exercise, character dispositions36 may include certain faculty-virtues. Character 
dispositions do not necessarily exclude faculty-virtues, since employing faculty-virtues 
is sometimes a function of an agent’s volition to some extent. Furthermore, where 
employing the virtue is not a function of an agent’s volition, it is still to some degree 
under the control the agent to develop the capacity of the faculty, such as through the 
methods mentioned above. Faculty-virtues thus, similarly to character-virtues like 
open-mindedness and humility, involve a degree of volitional control by the agent for 
their proper exercise and improvement. 
Although faculty- and character-virtues share this element of volitional control for their 
exercise to some degree or another, character-virtues may arguably require more 
 
 
36 See subsection 3.3.1 above for my account of character dispositions as dispositions that require 
some volitional input from the agent for their manifestation. 
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effort than faculty-virtues for their effective operation. In the same way, we often 
ascribe more praise to agents who have cultivated character-virtues than to agents 
who have developed and honed their faculty-virtues. It is possible that the 
praiseworthiness of virtues lies on the same continuum of the degree of volitional 
control that is involved in its proper exercise. The greater the extent to which a virtue 
is up to an agent for its proper exercise, the more praiseworthy she is for it.37An 
objection to this proposal could be that what motivates an agent to improve her faculty-
virtues is what is most fundamental in her improving her faculty-virtues, and thus that 
an acquired motivation rather than a natural faculty is fundamentally what is 
praiseworthy in an agent. Someone with this view might cite John Dewey, who makes 
the following point: 
Possession of this information [about the best forms of thought] is no guarantee 
for ability to think well. Moreover, there are no set exercises in correct thinking 
whose repeated performance will cause one to be a good thinker. The 
information and the exercises are both of value. But no individual realizes their 
value except as he is personally animated by certain dominant attitudes in his 
own character. (Dewey, 1933: 29-30, quoted in Zagzebski, 1996: 172) 
While there is information about what forms of thinking are better, and while there are 
exercises for thought, the information and exercises are not sufficient to become a 
better thinker. Rather, Dewey’s point about being ‘personally animated’ points to an 
 
 
37 I should mention again that a capacity’s exercise being under your control does not exclude 
automatically exercising a capacity from being praiseworthy when that automation is the result of or 
may reflexively come under your volitional control. 
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agent having the appropriate motivation to employ or exercise her dispositions in 
certain ways, and that this motivation is more fundamental than the effects of how an 
agent acts out of this motivation. Without an agent’s appropriate motivation to hone 
her faculty-virtues, or even her character-virtues for that matter, no agent ‘realizes their 
value’. 
I suggest that this counts as a consideration in favour of including an agent’s 
motivation in evaluating whether she is praiseworthy. But it does not negate the 
necessity of an agent being motivated to act or think in such a way as to bring about 
(or ‘realise’) something of value. An appropriate motivation is insufficient for praising 
an agent for exercising her capacity, but so is the fact that an agent acted well or 
achieved a valuable consequence. Both are necessary in an account of what makes 
a virtuous agent praiseworthy. The clumsy soldier is not praiseworthy for helping the 
war effort any more than the brave soldier who never succeeds in acting bravely. 
If understood in this way, faculty- and character-virtues can be understood as 
praiseworthy under the same account, where an intellectually virtuous character 
disposition is praiseworthy to the degree to which its exercise is up to the agent out of 
an appropriate motivation, and that it results in a good action or valuable consequence.  
3.6. Conclusion 
I have outlined my general account of intellectual virtue in this chapter, identifying three 
general characteristics. First, an intellectual virtue involves a character disposition to 
reliably form intellectual attitudes in appropriate conditions and environments, and to 
do so with maximal or increasing success. Second, an intellectual virtue is 
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characterised by an agent being motivated by an appropriate intellectual goal, whether 
it is a skopos or a telos. I argue that an intellectual goal need not revolve around 
epistemic goods like knowledge or true belief, but that it can plausibly aim at a wide 
range of intellectual goods, such as open-mindedness and understanding. Third, 
intellectual virtues are generally characterised as praiseworthy. My account of this is 
that an agent exercise her intellectual capacity with a relevant degree of voluntary 
control and out of a motivation for an appropriate intellectual good. Such exercises are 
praiseworthy when they bring an agent to act in a good way or produce a valuable 
result. 
In the next chapter, I build on these three elements to begin developing my account of 
rationality as an intellectual virtue. 
 
 
  
120 
 
 
 
 
 Rationality as an Intellectual Virtue 
 
4.1. Introduction 
Having provided general accounts of rationality and of intellectual virtue, I am now in 
a position to offer my initial account of rationality as an intellectual virtue in this chapter. 
I offer this account by demonstrating that rationality can plausibly be conceived of 
along the lines of the three characteristic elements of intellectual virtue. In this way, 
my account amounts to claiming that an agent is rational only if she possesses a 
rational capacity to reliably satisfy rational requirements in appropriate conditions and 
environments out of a motivation for the rational goal for its own sake, and that she is 
praiseworthy for doing so. 
I first clarify that the focal point of my account of rationality as an intellectual virtue is 
mental rationality, specifically its exercise and the agent’s motivation for its exercise 
(section 4.2). In section 4.3 I argue for three things. First, I argue that the rational 
capacity is a character disposition insofar as its exercise is to some degree under the 
control of the agent (subsection 4.3.1). Second, I distinguish between the various 
conditions under which an agent reliably exercises her rational capacity (subsection 
4.3.2). Third, I argue that an agent’s track record of success be taken into account 
when evaluating whether she is fully rational or not (subsection 4.3.3). 
In section 4.4 I argue that the rational goal is most plausibly understood as a kind of 
telos rather than a skopos. I address an apparent problem with conceiving of the 
rational goal as a telos. Finally, in section 4.5 I briefly present my view for the 
praiseworthiness of a rational agent based on my account of praiseworthiness from 
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the previous chapter. Both my accounts of the rational goal and praiseworthiness are 
left undeveloped. I expand on these in the following two chapters. 
4.2. Whose Virtue? Which Rationality? 
To recapitulate, an intellectual virtue is a disposition of character to reliably form, 
revise, or abstain from forming intellectual attitudes in relevant conditions and 
environments that an agent exercises out of a motivation to achieve an appropriate 
intellectual goal, and an agent who does so is praiseworthy both for exercising her 
capacity in this way and for the valuable actions or outcomes of its exercise. In this 
section, I provide an initial approximation of the sense of ‘rationality’ that I take to be 
an intellectual virtue. I show that ‘mental rationality’ is primarily the focal point of 
rationality as an intellectual virtue, although this sense must be qualified as the agent’s 
exercise of this capacity out of a motivation for an appropriate rational goal. 
To begin with, what sense of rationality is picked out when claiming that rationality is 
an intellectual virtue of the kind developed in the preceding chapter? To recall, the 
three central senses of rationality that I distinguished in chapter 2 were, 
(1) Mental rationality. The property of an agent who has certain mental 
capacities the proper exercise of which produces states of mind that 
satisfy the requirements of rationality. 
(2) Structural rationality. The property of a set of mental states whose 
relations reflect the proper exercise of rational capacities; in other words, 
the property of a state of mind such that it satisfies the requirements of 
rationality.  
(3) Requirements of rationality. The requirements that govern a set of 
mental states and their relations such that they possess the property of 
structural rationality. 
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Which of these meanings of rationality is appropriate for understanding rationality as 
an intellectual virtue? To begin with, it does not make sense to refer to the third sense 
– requirements of rationality – as a kind of virtue. It is not up to the inquiring agent in 
any way what is rationally required of her. While it may be a ‘virtue’, in the sense of 
being a kind of excellence, of an agent to be keenly aware of such requirements, that 
she is capable of satisfying those requirements, or that her mental states satisfy those 
requirements, those requirements insofar as they apply to the agent are not up to her. 
Is structural rationality an intellectual virtue, then? In some sense, it is an intellectual 
excellence of a mind that it satisfies the requirements of rationality. And while this kind 
of evaluation could intelligibly be attributed to an agent who possesses structural 
rationality, it is not properly applicable to the inquiring agent qua agent but rather to 
her state of mind. Furthermore, this kind of excellence is static, since it applies only to 
a mind at the moment at which it is structurally rational, and not to how it is that the 
mind came to be in a structurally rational state nor how reliably it is in such a state. 
Thus, although it is an excellence of a mind to be structurally rational, this cannot be 
the property that is properly picked out by ‘virtue of rationality’. 
Rather, ‘mental rationality’ is the primary sense by which rationality should be 
understood as an intellectual virtue. (I say that this is the ‘primary sense’ as it does not 
exhaust the meaning of rationality as an intellectual virtue; this will become clearer 
momentarily.) Although it is the task of the present chapter to elucidate what I mean 
by ‘rationality as an intellectual virtue’, I begin here by outlining some ways in which 
this sense most suitably fits into the category of intellectual virtue. At its most 
fundamental, an intellectual virtue is a kind of disposition of an agent, the manifestation 
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of which results in the agent forming or abstaining from forming certain attitudes. 
Similarly, mental rationality is a capacity of an agent, the proper exercise of which 
forms or revises attitudes like beliefs and intentions38 in such a way that the agent’s 
mental states conform to the requirements of rationality. 
Let me first mention an important qualification to my understanding of mental 
rationality as an intellectual virtue. Mental rationality does not exhaust the sense of 
what is picked out by ‘rationality as an intellectual virtue’. None of the aforementioned 
meanings of ‘rationality’ help to elucidate what I have in mind; I thus need to clarify the 
specific sense in which rationality is an intellectual virtue. For any given virtue, the 
virtue of an agent extends not only to those capacities and dispositions relevant to that 
virtue, but also to how those capacities and dispositions are exercised in certain 
conditions and environments. This is captured in the first element of the weak reliability 
of intellectual virtue. Similarly, when speaking of rationality as an intellectual virtue, it 
is not merely relevant that an agent possesses a rational capacity, but also how well 
she exercises her rational capacities. 
So the intellectual virtue of rationality involves mental rationality and its exercise. But 
there is one further qualification. A rational agent is to exercise her mental rationality 
also out of an appropriate motivation for achieving a rational goal. This will be the 
 
 
38 Intentions may initially seem like non-intellectual kind of attitude. I argue later in this chapter (4.4) that 
intentions can be incorporated into intellectual virtues. 
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sense in which I take rationality to be an intellectual virtue. I will further add to this view 
a component of praiseworthiness. 
In light of this, rationality as an intellectual virtue picks out both an agent’s rational 
capacity and the proper exercise of it in producing a state of mind that satisfies the 
requirements of rationality. But the agent must also be motivated by the appropriate 
rational goal, and, together with the proper exercise and the value thereof, a rational 
agent is praiseworthy. Before developing these accounts of a rational goal and being 
praiseworthy for possessing rationality, I first develop in detail an account of mental 
rationality as a character disposition, as well as those conditions and environments in 
which mental rationality reliably operates. It is this picture of rationality as an 
intellectual virtue that I begin developing in the remainder of this chapter, and 
substantiate in the following two chapters. 
4.3. Reliable Rationality 
The first element of intellectual virtue, recall, is that it is a character disposition to 
reliably form, revise, or abstain from forming intellectual attitudes in appropriate 
conditions and environments. In demonstrating that mental rationality can plausibly be 
understood in terms of these conditions, I begin by discussing how mental rationality 
and its exercise can be understood as a character disposition. I then develop a 
distinction between enabling conditions and essential conditions in order to delineate 
those conditions and environments appropriate for exercising rational dispositions. 
Finally, I discuss how mental rationality and its exercise might be understood in terms 
of an agent’s track record of success in a similar way to intellectual virtue. 
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4.3.1. The character disposition of rationality 
Recall that I take intellectual virtues to involve ‘character dispositions’, the 
manifestation of which also involves a relevant degree of volitional control from the 
agent. (I contrasted these, in section 3.3.1 with ‘static dispositions’ whose 
manifestation is exclusively dependent upon stimulus conditions.)  In the case of 
rationality as a character disposition, the stimulus condition is any mental state an 
agent is in that does not satisfy all rational requirements that apply to her at that time, 
barring certain conditions and environments I discuss in the following subsection. 
But does the manifestation of a rational disposition also include a relevant degree of 
voluntary control, such that it is a character disposition rather than a static disposition? 
Much of the time, inquiring agents are not even aware that their mental states are 
constantly adjusting to satisfy requirements of rationality given new beliefs and 
intentions that are forming. It does not take a second thought for most people to intend 
to open their umbrella before they step outside to walk to the bus. Although there is 
an intention formed based on their beliefs about the weather and the most effective 
means to arrive at the bus stop timeously and comfortably, such an attitude is formed 
unconsciously.  
Cases like these occur all the time, but they do not imply that there is no relevant 
degree of voluntary control involved whatsoever. Certain inferences of what to 
rationally intend require more deliberation, such as what time to leave in order to catch 
which bus that will arrive in time for, but not too long before, the 16:30 train. Other 
intentions, such as one not to have more dessert, are clearly the rational ones to hold 
but require deliberate willpower to adopt when the hotel has a buffet dinner. 
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Furthermore, while unconsciously satisfying or not satisfying a requirement of 
rationality might not involve any voluntary control at that moment, you do have 
voluntary control over reflecting on your decisions, habits, and judgments, as well as 
over intervening in order to develop better decisions, habits, and judgments of 
satisfying what is rationally required of you. 
A strong objection to this position is that no attitudes are within your purview, let alone 
within your voluntary control. Doxastic involuntarists (such as Alston, 1989)39 claim 
that beliefs are not under the voluntary control of the agent, and that they are adopted 
automatically given things like the evidence available to an agent. This could be just 
as true for other attitudes like intentions and hopes, although, even if it is not, beliefs 
make up a large portion of the attitudes governed by rational requirements. I accept 
that an attitude like a belief is not under an agent’s control in the same way as lifting 
her arm is; this is not the kind of minimal voluntarism that I claim is necessary for 
manifesting an agent’s rational capacity. But the doxastic involuntarist claims that an 
agent cannot be held accountable for her beliefs at all. 
There are ample responses to doxastic involuntarism, either claiming that there are 
direct (Steup, 2000 and Weatherson, 2008) or indirect (Audi, 2008) ways in which we 
have some degree of volitional control over our beliefs. Although I am not in a position 
to adjudicate this issue, my account of rationality is not committed to any claim about 
direct doxastic voluntarism. It is a fairly uncontroversial point that beliefs are not 
 
 
39 See Feldman (2000) for an account of doxastic involuntarism that preserves doxastic oughts. 
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directly responsive to our volition. However, if an agent has no relevant degree of 
control whatsoever over her beliefs, then this throws a spanner into accounts of 
rationality that claim that an agent has some accountability for meeting or violating the 
standards of rationality. 
In fact, there are ways in which an agent has some control over causing her beliefs to 
change (or remain unchanged). Modelling the data, coming into contact with new 
evidence, or spending time in a community are some possible ways in which your 
beliefs might change (or remain the same). But neither of these methods involves an 
exercise of one’s rational capacity. 
How might exercising rationality cause you to change certain attitudes such as your 
beliefs? It does so through reasoning. Broome (2013) provides a strong account of 
reasoning that is, for the most part, consistent with my account of rationality as a virtue. 
Broadly, according to Broome (2013: 221-246), reasoning is a conscious process that 
an agent does by which the content of certain attitudes cause you to hold a new 
attitude. Most fundamentally, reasoning is a causal process that happens in your mind, 
in which the content of some attitude(s) causes you to hold a new attitude. 
Furthermore, this process is something in which an agent is actively and consciously 
involved, for instance by ‘calling to mind’ (Broome, 2013: 222) in some manner the 
contents of certain attitudes about which you are reasoning. 
What distinguishes correct from incorrect reasoning is not that correct reasoning 
results in you coming to satisfy a rational requirement – doing so can just as well be 
the result of poor reasoning, and not all correct reasoning ends with satisfying a 
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rational requirement. Rather, says Broome (2013: 246-248), correct reasoning is 
governed by rational permissions on which are based rules of reasoning.40 Given the 
fact that satisfying rational requirements is not the criterion for proper reasoning, 
proper reasoning is also not necessary for having a structurally rational state of mind. 
Having mental states that satisfy the relations prescribed by rational requirements 
need not arise exclusively from correct reasoning. 
For the most part, this account of reasoning is consistent with what I refer to as an 
exercising her rational disposition, and so it is useful for making sense of this 
component of my account. However, I should mention two points on which my account 
or rationality as a virtue differs in its relation to reasoning from Broome’s. The first is 
that, for Broome, it is not necessary to reason properly for an agent to have the 
property of structural rationality. Given that structural rationality is just the property of 
having one’s state of mind in conformity with the requirements of rationality, this claim 
is of course right. But on my account of rationality as an intellectual virtue, since 
exercising your rational capacity is a necessary feature of having the virtue of 
rationality, and doing so is equivalent with reasoning, reasoning correctly is necessary 
for being rationally virtuous. 
 
 
40 Rational permissions may intuitively be thought to be derived in some way from rational requirements, 
given that the most natural way to satisfy a rational requirement is to follow rules of reasoning based 
on rational permissions. But, as Broome (2013: 258) notes, such a derivation would be complicated to 
demonstrate. 
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A second difference is that while Broome’s account of reasoning describes only active 
reasoning, my account of reasoning includes some unconscious or automatic 
processes of reasoning. Recall that my account of volitional control in the preceding 
chapter (3.3.1 and 3.5.2) includes automatic processes either that are the result of 
prior volitional exercise of a capacity or that can be reflexively volitional. On this view, 
automatic reasoning that is done from prior exercises of reasoning or that can be 
reflexively ‘taken over’ by an agent also count as exercising an agent’s rational 
disposition. So, while Broome regards reasoning as a conscious activity in which 
certain attitudes of yours cause you to hold a new attitude, I regard reasoning in the 
same way with the addition that reasoning also includes unconscious processes that 
have been formed from earlier conscious reasoning or that can, on reflection, become 
conscious processes. 
4.3.2. Conditions and environments appropriate for rationality 
What are the conditions and environments in which rational dispositions cause us to 
satisfy the requirements of rationality? Before getting into what I take these conditions 
and environments to be, I need to clarify two issues that are pertinent to rational 
supervenience. Recall that I take the stance that requirements of rationality supervene 
on the mind: if two minds are in the same state, those minds are both rational to the 
same degree regardless of whether their beliefs are true or their intentions are acted 
upon.  
The first issue that needs clarification has to do with whether rational supervenience 
is consistent with intellectual virtue. One might think that the success of intellectual 
virtue is at least partially dependent upon the external environment, while rationality is 
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not. For instance, the success of intellectual perseverance depends on overcoming 
obstacles to understanding. While these obstacles may be internal to the agent, they 
may likewise be obstacles in her environment that the agent needs to overcome. 
However, many intellectual virtues do not have this dependence on the external 
environment for their success. The love of knowledge requires an internal motivation 
towards and value of knowledge, intellectual courage requires overcoming fear, and 
conscientiousness requires being careful of mistakes. All of these outcomes are 
internal to the mind. Therefore, not all intellectual virtues aim at external success, 
thereby allowing the mental supervenience of rationality a chance to be tested as an 
intellectual virtue. 
The second issue has to do with whether mental supervenience entails internalism 
about the conditions under which an agent’s rational disposition is to be appropriately 
exercised? At first blush, it may seem apparent that, since the requirements of 
rationality are only concerned with states internal to the mind, the only conditions 
relevant for whether a disposition responsible for satisfying those requirements, i.e., 
mental rationality, operates should likewise be internal to the mind. However, this is 
not so. There can be conditions external to the mind that are relevant to whether an 
agent is able to exercise her mental rationality. An agent may be unaware that she 
has a brain lesion that is causing her to always intend the third most effective means 
to an end she intends. Although this lesion is both external to the agent’s mind in the 
sense of being inaccessible to her, it is relevant to her not satisfying a requirement of 
rationality, that is, to her failing to intend the most effective means to an end she 
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intends. Therefore, conditions and environments relevant to the reliability of mental 
rationality can be external to the mind in this way. 
This leads us to the question of what the appropriate conditions and environments are 
for the reliable operation of an agent’s rational disposition? In addressing this question, 
two kinds of conditions should be distinguished, enabling conditions and applicability 
conditions. Enabling conditions are those conditions that enable the agent to satisfy 
the requirements of rationality to which she is subject. The fundamental enabling 
condition is that the agent has the disposition of mental rationality. Without this 
disposition an agent would be a non-rational being and furthermore not be subject to 
any requirements of rationality at all. Other enabling conditions are those that make it 
possible for an agent to engage in reasoning, such as the ability to form conclusion-
attitudes from premise-attitudes. 
Having a rational disposition presupposes all necessary enabling conditions for the 
existence of this disposition, such as that the agent has the capacity to hold attitudes, 
and that she is able to deliberate or reason in such a way as to properly revise her 
attitudes. Let us call these kinds of enabling conditions that are necessary for an agent 
to satisfy requirements of rationality positive enabling conditions. But there are also 
conditions that must be absent in order for an agent to be capable of satisfying rational 
requirements; call these negative enabling conditions, such as the absence of severe 
mental illness. Extreme depression, for example, would prevent an agent from 
satisfying many requirements of rationality, and as such its absence is an enabling 
condition for her rational disposition to operate reliably. Although in a case like 
depression the agent is normally aware that her mental health is preventing her from 
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intellectually flourishing, there are negative enabling conditions that an agent may be 
oblivious to, such as the brain lesion that causes you to always adopt the third most 
effective means to an end. 
There is an important similarity here between rationality and many other intellectual 
virtues. Conditions like severe mental illness not only undermine the reliable operation 
of mental rationality but many other intellectual virtues. To again use depression as an 
example, such a condition would prevent an intellectually courageous person from 
overcoming her fear, or a lover of knowledge to appropriately value and pursue 
knowledge. It would be a curious thing if the absence of a negative enabling condition 
were to prevent rationality from functioning while allowing other intellectual virtues to 
continue unhindered. As it happens, the same negative enabling conditions apply to 
both rationality and other intellectual virtues. 
Apart from positive and negative enabling conditions, we might also inquire whether 
there are conditions under which an agent may or may not be subject to certain rational 
requirements. We might call such conditions ‘applicability conditions’. I think that it is 
a mistake to think that there are applicability conditions for exercising an agent’s 
rational capacity, but I will follow this line of inquiry to demonstrate the fault. In looking 
for applicability conditions, we might ask whether having a certain attitudes like the 
belief that you ought to pay your taxes and the belief that it is up to you to pay your 
taxes together constitute a condition for the applicability of the enkratic requirement of 
rationality. 
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But it is not the case that holding these two beliefs makes it the case that the enkratic 
requirement is applicable to you. Rather, as I discussed in chapter 2 (2.3.1), the fact 
that rational requirements are generally wide-scope makes it the case that an agent is 
subject to them necessarily; the enkratic requirement is applicable to an agent 
regardless of the particular attitudes she has. Rather, given that what rationality 
requires is certain conditional relations to obtain among your attitudes, every agent is 
at all times subject to every requirement of rationality. In this way, the applicability of 
every rational requirement to an agent is not contingent upon her environment, 
conditions, or her state of mind.  
The necessity of rational requirements also explains why certain bogus rational 
requirements are not applicable to an agent. Some might think that an agent is 
rationally required to satisfy conditions about her attitudes merely on the basis that 
she believes that it is rational to do so. On this view, an agent’s belief about what is 
rationally required of her would make her subject to a bogus rational requirement. For 
instance, imagine Bob has the following beliefs. 
1. I am in Tshwane. 
2. If I am in Pretoria, then I am in Tshwane. 
3. I am rationally required that, if I believe that I am in Tshwane, and I believe that 
(if I am in Pretoria then I am in Tshwane), then I believe that I am in Pretoria. 
Belief (3) is clearly wrong. Bob is not required by rationality to infer the antecedent 
from the consequent. The explanation for why Bob is not subject to his belief about a 
bogus rational requirement is the fact that the applicability of rational requirements are 
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necessary. In every possible world in which Bob satisfies the bogus rational 
requirement he is less than perfectly rational. This is not conditional upon what he 
believes is required of him.  
In sum, those conditions and environments for reliably exercising an agent’s rational 
disposition are those in which positive and negative enabling conditions are present, 
i.e. there is an absence of anything preventing the agent from properly exercising her 
rational disposition. I argued that, given the necessity of rational requirements, it is a 
mistake to think that there are applicability conditions. I should point out that, at this 
stage, I have not provided any substantial arguments against reasons-responsivism. 
If reasons-responsivism is true, then there would be applicability conditions – having 
a reason to ɸ makes the rational requirement to ɸ applicable to an agent. I reject 
reasons-responsivism at length in chapter 6, and so I do not think that applicability 
conditions apply to an agent exercising her rational capacity. 
4.3.3. Track record of exercising mental rationality 
In the previous chapter I argued that the reliability of an intellectual disposition’s 
performance is virtuous only if it is maximally or increasingly successful in appropriate 
conditions and environments. Thus, an agent’s record of success over time, or track 
record, is relevant for evaluating her degree of intellectual virtue. In the case of 
rationality, a rational agent should be maximally or increasingly successful in satisfying 
the requirements of rationality in the appropriate conditions outlined above. 
I contrasted this evaluative approach with a possible worlds approach, according to 
which the reliability of a capacity is evaluated on the basis of how it would function in 
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a nearby possible world in which the state of affairs is slightly different. In the case of 
structural rationality, actual success is what counts to be evaluated as ‘fully rational’. 
Ordinarily, an agent’s state of mind is evaluated as rational when it satisfies the 
requirements of rationality, not counterfactually – whether it would satisfy the 
requirements were she in some possible world with a different condition or 
environment. 
Although the notion of a track record of success is not applied to evaluating states of 
mind as fully rational, I think that it would be a useful approach to adopt for rationality. 
I think this is evident from a contrast between Axel, who is structurally rational to the 
highest degree in all possible worlds at one point in time but does not have track record 
reliability, and Relf, who has a reliable track record of being moderately structurally 
rational in the actual world but not all possible worlds. At the present point in time t3, 
Axel has a state of mind that fully satisfies all the requirements of rationality that are 
applicable to him and would do so under counterfactual conditions. But before this 
point in time at t1 and t2, Axel manages an average of only 30% structural rationality. 
Relf, on the other hand, has never satisfied all applicable requirements of rationality 
at earlier times t1 and t2, although he has satisfied some. But by consistent effort he 
has increased his average structural rationality from 55% at t1 to 65% at t2, and now 
to 75% at t3, in the present. However, Relf would have less than 75% structural 
rationality in other possible worlds at t3. Regardless of the putative value or 
praiseworthiness of having structural rationality, it is intuitively evident that Relf is more 
rational than Axel. The obvious explanation for why we intuitively take Relf to be the 
more rational is that he has a more impressive track record of structural rationality. 
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Axel’s once-off success, even in all possible worlds, is no indication of his past or 
future success, nor of the voluntary effort he applies to exercising his rational capacity. 
A rational agent is evaluated as such based on her actually satisfying requirements of 
rationality. This much is consistent with the track-record evaluation of intellectual 
virtues. Ordinarily, I do not think that an agent is necessarily regarded as ‘more 
rational’ for being increasingly or maximally successful in exercising her rational 
capacity. Since this might be missing, or is at least sometimes missing, from our 
ordinary judgments regarding whether an agent is rational or not, I think that our 
judgments would benefit from adopting the approach of track record reliability from 
intellectual virtue theory. 
I have demonstrated in this section that mental rationality involves a relevant degree 
of an agent’s voluntary control in order to be exercised, and that it is therefore a 
character disposition. I argued that the rationality supervening on the mind does not 
exclude it from being plausibly understood as an intellectual virtue since many other 
intellectual virtues do not depend on external conditions for their success. Similarly, I 
argued that rational supervenience does not preclude external conditions from being 
relevant to properly exercising an agent’s rational disposition. I then outlined two kinds 
of conditions appropriate for mental rationality to operate, namely enabling conditions 
and conditions of applicability. Finally, I argued that the explanation for the intuition of 
why one agent is more rational than another is that the more rational agent has a better 
track record of rational success. 
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4.4. The Goal of Rationality 
In chapter 3, I followed Battaly (2015) in distinguishing between the skopos – the 
immediate consequence – and the telos – the end goal aimed at by means of the 
immediate consequence – of intellectual virtues. In the case of courage, the 
characteristic skopos of being courageous is overcoming fear, while courage does not 
have a single characteristic telos. (Other virtues have a characteristic telos but no 
single skopos.) The skopos of a virtue like courage can be used for vicious ends. For 
instance, the skopos of courage (overcoming fear) can be used to achieve a nefarious 
telos of vandalising a public amenity. Not all intellectual virtues have a particular telos. 
Courage, again, can have the telos of achieving knowledge that is difficult to acquire 
or the telos of attaining justice. What is essential in the case of intellectual virtue is that 
the agent is appropriately motivated by an intellectual goal, whether achieved by 
aiming at some skopos or telos.  
The purpose of this section is to provide an initial account of the appropriate goal that 
motivates a rational agent. Although this component is not part of general accounts of 
rationality, I think that an agent who is not motivated by this goal is not fully rational. 
In this section, I first argue that the goal of rationality is best characterised as a telos 
rather than a skopos. I then address a prima facie problem with this position. Note that 
I do not argue here for what I take the rational telos to be; this is the task of chapter 5, 
in which I argue that the rational goal is that of attitudinal harmony. ‘The rational telos’ 
should thus be read as a placeholder for this concept.  
Before addressing what the appropriate kind of intellectual goal motivates a rational 
agent, I should provide a reason for thinking that rationality can appropriately be 
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described as having an intellectual goal at all. Given that rational requirements govern 
not only the paradigmatic ‘intellectual’ attitude of beliefs but also practical attitudes like 
intentions, one might ask whether the scope of attitudes governed by rationality 
precludes it from being a genuinely intellectual attitude. To address this question, I will 
first refer to Aristotle’s conception of intellectual virtue and second to Roberts and 
Wood’s (2007) characterisation of intellectual virtue. 
Aristotle distinguishes between two kinds of intellectual virtues, those concerned with 
theoretical knowledge and those concerned with practical thinking, either for craftwork 
or for wise or virtuous action. Thus, for Aristotle, intellectual virtue does not govern 
only beliefs but also practical attitudes and even actions. Zagzebski (1996: 141) points 
out that, for Aristotle, what distinguishes between intellectual and moral virtue is that 
the former involves acts of thinking while the latter involves affective states. If we apply 
this to the case of rationality, even requirements that only govern intentions do so in a 
way in which our thinking (or reasoning) has a direct influence over what attitudes we 
hold or abandon. On this view of intellectual virtue, rationality should be understood 
as governing an intellectual part of the agent – her attitudes – insofar as those attitudes 
are responsive to an agent’s thought or reasoning. 
More contemporary theorists on intellectual virtue Roberts and Wood (2007) also 
provide an account of intellectual virtue that is partial towards classifying rationality as 
an intellectual virtue. According to Roberts and Wood (2007: 64), all virtues are 
excellences in generically human spheres of activities. What distinguishes intellectual 
virtues from non-intellectual virtues is the former’s relation to intellectual goods 
(Roberts and Wood, 2007: 60), by an agent being motivated by an intellectual good, 
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or by an agent achieving an intellectual good, or both (Roberts and Wood, 2007: 71-
72). In my account in chapter 6, I argue that the intellectual good by which an agent is 
motivated and that is achieved from exercising one’s rational capacity is that of 
attitudinal harmony. This property applies to relations among various attitudes, such 
as intentions, beliefs, and even interests and goals. 
The scope of the goal of attitudinal harmony is analogous in certain relevant respects 
to phronesis, a paradigmatic intellectual virtue. Phronesis is concerned with ‘grasping 
the truth, involving reason, and concerned with action about human goods’ (Aristotle, 
1999: 1140b). Thus, phronesis cuts across theoretic and practical goals and 
incorporates intellectual, practical, and moral concerns in a way that seeks to 
harmonise them in a person’s affection, thought, and action. 
Thus, in accordance with Aristotle and Roberts and Wood, the scope rationality can 
be made consistent with the goals of intellectual virtue. The way in which we improve 
our rational situation is by means of an intellectual activity – bringing our attitudes to 
mind and reasoning about them. Furthermore, the fact that some virtue is an 
intellectual virtue does not exclude from it a concern for practical matters, whether 
intentions or actions. 
I return now to the question of what the appropriate kind of intellectual goal is that 
motivates a rational agent. To be specific, this question is concerned with whether the 
characteristic goal of rationality is a skopos or a telos. To clarify what I mean by a 
virtue’s characteristic goal, consider that the virtue of courage has the skopos of 
overcoming fear, and that this skopos can be used as a means of achieving some 
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further telos. Whatever telos a courageous agent aims at is not characteristic of 
courage. Rather, it is the skopos of overcoming fear that is characteristic of courage. 
For some other virtue, like justice, there is no characteristic skopos but rather a 
characteristic telos, like the impartial restoration of order.  
Is the characteristic goal of rationality, then, a skopos or a telos? If it is a skopos, the 
most natural candidate is that of having a structurally rational state of mind. And, since 
structural rationality is constituted by satisfying the requirements of rationality, the 
skopos of a rational agent at any point in time would be to satisfy the requirements of 
rationality to which she is subject. On this account, an agent’s skopos can be 
characterised in one of two ways. Either a rational agent has the single skopos of ‘now 
satisfy whatever rationality requires’ of the agent, or she has a manifold skopos of ‘now 
satisfying enkrasia’ and ‘now satisfying modus ponens’ and ‘now satisfy no contrary 
beliefs’ and so forth. But conceiving the rational goal as a skopos in either of these 
ways faces two problems. 
The first problem is an epistemic one. A rational agent is often ignorant of particular 
requirements of rationality, whether they are the requirements to which she is subject 
or those that she satisfies. Nor do rational requirements need to be accessible 
(whether dispositionally or reflectively) to an agent in order for her to count as being 
rational. It may be the case that, for example, it is accessible to a virtuously 
courageous agent that she has the immediate aim of overcoming her fear. But this 
does not seem to intuitively be the case with a rational agent; the rational requirement 
that she satisfies need not be accessible to her. For one thing, working out what the 
requirements of rationality are is a difficult and time-consuming task over which there 
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is much disagreement. (Recall my discussions from chapter 2 on differences over how 
rational requirements should be formulated.) If it were true that a rational agent has 
epistemic access to the requirements of rationality, this would be an excessively high 
bar. An agent who satisfies all the conditions of rationality, including all applicable 
requirements of rationality, but who believes that rational requirements have narrow 
rather than wide scope, is not fully rational on this account. Furthermore, many 
intuitively rational agents do not, in fact, hold the requisite concept of a rational 
requirement. This does not diminish their rationality. 
The second problem has to do with how a rational skopos could motivate an agent. 
Assume for the sake of this argument that the requirements of rationality are 
accessible to an agent. If an agent has a manifold skopos of now satisfying enkrasia 
and now satisfying modus ponens, etc., then a rational agent would have to be 
motivated by a multiplicity of rational aims, one for each requirement. Given how 
implausible this is, we might think that a rational agent should only have the single 
skopos of now satisfying whatever rationality requires of her. But I seriously doubt 
whether all instances of a rational agent satisfying rational requirements are motivated 
by this aim. It seems somewhat arbitrary for an agent to claim that her motive for 
revising her attitudes is due to it being what rationality requires of her. But even if this 
were not arbitrary, the latter account of a rational skopos still faces the epistemic 
problem that rational requirements generally are not accessible to the agent, nor is it 
necessary for them to be. 
Due to these epistemic and motivational problems with a skopos account of the 
rational goal, I do not think that this is a plausible answer. Rather, I think that the 
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characteristic goal of rationality is more plausibly taken as a telos. Rather than aiming 
to satisfy many rational requirements about which the agent is unaware, the rational 
agent has the overall aim of her state of mind having a certain order or coherence to 
it. (This order, I will argue in the following chapter, is that of an attitudinally harmonious 
state of mind.) A rational telos avoids the above problems of a skopos account. It is 
more plausibly a motivation for an agent to order her attitudes in a rational way, and it 
is more plausibly accessible to an agent that she is ordering her attitudes in this way. 
However, a prima facie problem with a telos account is that whatever the rational telos 
is, it must have some relation to an agent’s immediate satisfaction of rational 
requirements. The means available to achieving some telos may either be open-ended 
or determinate, such as when the telos is constituted by the means. For example, it is 
open-ended how you go about achieving the telos of social justice. There are many 
ways in which opportunities, privilege, and so forth, can be equitably distributed among 
a society. In contrast, although an imperfect example, the telos of becoming an 
ophthalmologist can be achieved in only one way, by moving through the appropriate 
levels of education, training, and specialisation. While a telos like social justice does 
not prescribe specifically the means of its achievements, a telos like ophthalmology 
necessarily is achieved by having appropriate immediate aims that are required for an 
ophthalmological qualification. A rational telos is analogous to ophthalmology in this 
way; an agent can achieve the rational telos only by immediately satisfying specific 
means – the requirements of rationality. 
This is a prima facie problem for an account of the rational telos, since it seems that, 
even if the rational goal should be understood as a certain telos, an agent must 
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additionally have the appropriate skopos of satisfying the rational requirement to which 
she is now subject. A telos account may thus be subject to the same problems of the 
skopos account.  
This problem is overcome by distinguishing between a skopos from the consequences 
of an agent’s action.41 While a skopos is the immediate aim of some virtue’s effect, the 
consequence of an agent’s action does not include the notion of an aim. While a 
courageous agent has the skopos – the immediate aim – of overcoming her fear, an 
agent with the rational telos forms her attitudes in a way that they satisfy rational 
requirements. An agent exercising her rational capacity out of a motivation for the 
rational telos does not imply that she has a particular skopos. Rather, it leads her to 
exercise her capacity in a way that has the consequence of satisfying particular 
requirements of rationality. In this way, the rational requirements that a rational agent 
satisfies need not be accessible to her, nor do they directly motivate her. At the same 
time, though, the agent has the rational telos that is accessible to her and what 
motivates her. 
 
 
41 By an ‘action’ in this context I mean an agent’s exercise of her rational capacity. This can be conceived 
of as an ‘action’ of the mind, which is distinct from observable actions such as speaking, frowning, 
moving, and so forth, although I am not committed to mental actions being in the same class of full-
blown actions in general. I only mean to specify that the relevant consequence in this case is that of the 
internal state of the mind – what mental states an agent forms, revises, or abstains from forming. 
Perhaps another formulation that avoids using ‘action’ would be, ‘the consequence of what an agent 
does’, although this is vague and in need of the same kind of clarification of ‘action’ that I give here. 
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I admit that this distinction between skopos (which includes the element of an aim) 
and the consequence of an action (which excludes aim) may seem suspect to some. 
However, I stand by it and think that it has a psychological analogy in certain cases 
that may make it more intuitively plausible. In reports by agents who acted in an 
emergency to save another person’s life, it is common to hear claims such as, ‘I didn’t 
think about what needed to be done,’ and ‘I just did what I had to.’ Presumably, what 
is meant by these claims is that what an agent did – say, jumping into the lake – was 
not a conscious aim of her action, nor did the agent think that her action was necessary 
for achieving what she was aiming at – say, saving a drowning child. Jumping into the 
lake may be an aim in some cases, or it may be considered necessary for achieving 
some further aim in some cases. But it is possible in certain scenarios that an agent 
neither immediately aims at performing some action nor considers whether performing 
that action is necessary for what it is she aims at. I hope that this illustration makes 
my proposal less suspect; an agent with the rational telos can thereby ‘act’ in a way 
that satisfies rational requirements without immediately aiming at doing so or those 
requirements necessarily being accessible to the agent. 
A final word on the rational telos. It is possible that the rational telos be adopted as an 
intermediary aim for some further end. It could be the case that having the rational 
goal is part of the best means of, say, achieving some epistemic goal of maximising 
the truth of your beliefs and minimising their falsehood.42 Although a rational agent 
 
 
42 ‘Epistemic rationality’ is sometimes taken to be the means (effect) by which the ‘epistemic goal’ 
(Foley, 1987) of now believing true propositions and not believing false propositions is achieved. Under 
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may also have the rational telos for the sake of achieving some further telos, I think 
that she should have the rational telos for its own sake. In other words, an agent who 
has the rational telos merely as a means for some further end is not appropriately 
motivated, and thus not rationally as she should be. 
Debra is a debater who has the telos of winning debates. She is motivated by gaining 
the honour of being the best debater and the sense of superiority that comes with it. 
She has no genuinely intellectual motivation for debating, although she has learned 
that in order to win debates, she must have a coherent position. In order to achieve 
this, she has the rational telos, but only for the sake of helping her win debates. She 
otherwise does not care for the position for which she advocates in a debate. When 
preparing for a debate, Debra is very successful in achieving the rational telos about 
a position. She keeps this set of beliefs as small as possible and always steers the 
debates to topics around these beliefs so that she cannot be accused of holding a 
belief on the topic that does not cohere with another belief that is ‘further afield’ than 
one of the beliefs in her coherent set on the topic. Debra thus has a localised set of 
 
 
this scheme, rationality is regarded as a tool for maximising true beliefs and minimising false beliefs. 
The goal or aim that the intellectual virtue of rationality prescribes is not a goal beyond rationality, but 
rather a goal connected to the inherent nature of rationality itself, to have a coherent mental state. To 
have a further goal, say the epistemic goal, is not inherent to rationality as an intellectual virtue; although 
it may well belong to another intellectual virtue, like understanding or the love of knowledge. (But such 
an intellectual virtue would presumably include some discernment for which beliefs or kinds of beliefs 
are better or more valuable to accumulate than others lest the agent accrues vast amounts of true but 
otherwise valueless propositions like the number of fibres in her blanket). Alternatively, it may be an 
intellectual goal that is not essentially related to any particular intellectual virtue. 
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rational attitudes that she has achieved by exercising her rational disposition. But, on 
my account, Debra is not a fully rational agent for having a rational state of mind in this 
way. Her rational telos is not an appropriate motivation, but merely a means for 
achieving the further end of winning debates.  
In contrast to Debra, Dev the debater aims at the rational goal for its own sake and 
works to have a rational state of mind for all of her attitudes. She is motivated by the 
rational telos for its own sake. Dev also realises that her rational telos is helpful for her 
debate performances, and so she is particularly concerned with aiming at the rational 
telos when working out her position for debates. Dev is more appropriately motivated 
by the rational telos in virtue of aiming at it for its own sake, although she also aims at 
the rational goal for its utility in debates. 
I argue in the following chapter that I take the rational goal to be attitudinal harmony 
among an agent’s mental states. The view that this goal should be aimed at for its own 
sake is further bolstered by my argument in chapter 6, where I claim that attitudinal 
harmony has final value. 
4.5. The Praiseworthiness of Rationality  
I have thus far argued that a rational agent meets the first two elements characteristic 
of intellectual virtues in general – that of reliably exercising the rational capacity in 
appropriate conditions and environments and aiming at the rational telos. In this 
section, I provide a brief initial account of the praiseworthiness of the rational agent, 
although this account will only be completed by the end of chapter 6 where I argue for 
the final value of rationality. 
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Recall from the previous chapter (3.5.2) that I regard it as necessary for a virtuous 
agent’s praiseworthiness for her to possess, exercise, and be appropriately motivated 
in exercising some intellectual capacity, and that doing so is either valuable or results 
in a valuable action or effect. Specifically, an agent is praiseworthy for meeting the 
following conditions.  
(a) Having some capacity whose exercise is within an agent’s control, and 
(b) Correctly exercising that capacity, and 
(c) Exercising that capacity out of an appropriate motivation, and 
 either: 
(d) Conditions (a), (b), and (c) together is a good or valuable action, 
or 
(e) Conditions (a), (b), and (c) together bring about a good or valuable related 
outcome. 
I argued earlier in this chapter that an agent’s rational capacity is a character 
disposition, and that its exercise in the activity of reasoning is within the control of the 
agent (subsection 4.3.1). I also outlined the conditions in which an agent correctly 
exercises her rational capacity (subsection 4.3.2). And I argued for the rational goal 
as a kind of telos by which a rational agent is motivated (section 4.4). If these accounts 
are on the right track, then it is plausible that a rational agent satisfies the three 
necessary conditions of being praiseworthy in the way necessary for virtue. 
This raises the question of whether exercising the rational capacity – the activity of 
reasoning – can be conceived of as a good action itself or as producing a valuable 
outcome. To the former option, the kind of ‘actions’ that are part of an agent exercising 
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her rational capacity are arguably those such as choices, decisions, judgments, and 
other similar mental events that result in forming, revising, or abstaining from certain 
attitudes that will satisfy some rational requirement. While I do not think that these 
kinds of mental actions have the kind of goodness or value necessary for constituting 
praiseworthiness, it is possible that they may be good or valuable. However, the area 
of mental events and the processes from which they emerge is beyond the scope of 
my project. 
But I think that there is sufficient ground for conceiving of the kinds of states of mind 
that exercising the rational capacity brings about as valuable. If this is right, then a 
rational agent is praiseworthy for being rational. Furthermore, this account of 
praiseworthiness is embedded within an account of rationality as a kind of intellectual 
virtue. 
In chapter 6, I will offer an account of the final value of attitudinal harmony – that is, 
the kind of state of mind a rational capacity aims at producing. Although an attitudinally 
harmonious state of mind has final value, and thus does not depend for its value on 
an agent’s exercising her rational capacity or her having the rational telos, an agent is 
not praiseworthy merely on the basis of having an attitudinally harmonious state of 
mind. Rather, an agent is praiseworthy for this state of mind only if it is the product of 
her exercising her rational capacity out a motivation for the rational goal. 
This allows me to complete my explanation of why Debra is not rationally as she should 
be. Debra is only instrumentally interested in achieving the rational goal for the 
purpose of winning her debates. This is not an appropriate rational motivation by virtue 
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of the fact that she is not motivated by the rational telos for its own sake. In order to 
be fully rational, she ought to be motivated by the rational goal for its own sake given 
that the rational goal – that of attitudinal harmony – has final value. Dev is appropriately 
motivated and is thus rationally as she should be, although she is also interested in 
using her rational achievements for the further aim of winning debates. 
4.6. Conclusion 
In this chapter I have given a preliminary outline of the ways in which rationality can 
be conceived of along the lines of the three general characteristics of intellectual 
virtues. I first demonstrated that the focal point of a conception of rationality as an 
intellectual virtue centres on mental rationality, specifically its proper exercise out of 
an appropriate motivation. I then demonstrated that rationality is a character 
disposition whose exercise is the activity of reasoning, that there are positive and 
negative enabling conditions for its exercise, and that an agent’s track record of 
success should be considered when evaluating whether she is rational. 
I then argued that the appropriate rational goal is a kind of telos at which a rational 
agent aims for its own sake. It is the task of the following chapter to provide an account 
of this, which I take as the telos of attitudinal harmony. Finally, I briefly outlined that 
the above account satisfies the three necessary partial conditions of praiseworthiness, 
and that rationality should be understood as praiseworthy in virtue of the fact that its 
consequence of bringing about an attitudinally harmonious state of mind is valuable. 
Providing a more detailed and plausible account of this is the purpose of chapter 6. 
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Although I do not offer the above three elements as sufficient conditions for an agent 
to count as fully rational, the conditions that I offer are necessary. To put my initial 
account thus far of rationality as an intellectual virtue succinctly, an agent is rational 
only if she possesses a rational capacity to reliably satisfy rational requirements in 
appropriate conditions and exercises this capacity out of a motivation for achieving the 
rational goal, and is praiseworthy for doing so. Describing a rational agent in this way 
is to conceive of rationality as a kind of intellectual virtue. 
In the next two chapters I will expand on what I take the rational goal to be (chapter 5) 
and provide an account of the value of rationality (chapter 6) in order to provide 
additional plausibility to my account. 
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 The Goal of Rationality 
 
5.1. Introduction 
I argued in chapter 3 (section 3.4) and chapter 4 (section 4.4) that part of what is 
characteristic of a virtuously rational agent is that she is motivated by, or aims at, an 
appropriate rational goal. The characteristic goal of some virtue could be either an 
immediate effect (skopos) or some end goal (telos). The skopos of courage is 
overcoming fear, although this goal can be used by the agent for achieving any number 
of teloses. In this way, courage is a virtue that has an appropriate skopos, but is not 
limited to achieving any particular telos. In contrast, the virtue of social justice has as 
its appropriate telos, say, that of equally distributing privilege and opportunities across 
society. But social justice does not have a specific skopos for achieving this telos. 
I argued that the appropriate rational goal is best understood as a telos. The purpose 
of this chapter is to develop a substantive account of what this telos is. I will argue that 
the telos of rationality is that of attitudinal harmony, a kind of global attitudinal 
coherence among your attitudes as well as your persistent interests and values over 
time. A consequence of this account is that it also provides a ground for justifying 
requirements as requirements of rationality. 
Section 5.2 clears the ground for seeking a single ground on which to justify 
requirements of rationality independently of the concept of structural rationality. This 
ground would inform us of the appropriate intellectual goal of rationality. In section 5.3, 
I consider three candidates for justifying structural rationality: consistency, expected 
correctness, and mental coherence. I argue that none of these is capable of justifying 
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a number of intuitively paradigmatic rational requirements. In section 5.4 I offer an 
account of attitudinal harmony as a ground for structural rationality and demonstrate 
its ability to ground requirements of rationality. I argue that attitudinal harmony is the 
appropriate rational telos for a virtue of rationality. 
5.2. Clearing Ground for the Rational Goal 
The point of this chapter is to describe the intellectual goal appropriate to mental 
rationality, which accounts for the telos by which a virtuously rational agent is 
motivated. To be motivated by the rational telos is in part constitutive of being a rational 
agent. But despite the focus of an account of rationality as an intellectual virtue on 
mental rationality, providing an informative description of the rational goal requires an 
understanding of structural rationality and the requirements of rationality. This makes 
sense in light of the referents of the three senses of rationality of which I have been 
concerned thus far. 
In this section, I consider a few preliminary options for the rational telos, none of which 
are satisfactory. I reject rational requirements as a rational agent’s goal (subsection 
5.2.1) and argue that accounts of epistemic norms are not directly useful, either 
(subsection 5.2.2). I consider a proposal that is found in several accounts of rationality 
that claim a lack of rationality amounts to unintelligibility, although I argue that the goal 
of intelligibility is not necessary to explain why a requirement is one of rationality 
(subsection 5.2.3).  
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5.2.1. Rational requirements constitute structural rationality 
Recall that the following three senses of rationality have been the focus of my account 
of rationality, and that mental rationality has taken centre stage as the capacity of a 
rational agent that is to be exercised properly out of an appropriate rational motivation. 
(1) Mental rationality. The property of an agent who has certain mental 
capacities the proper exercise of which produces states of mind that 
satisfy the requirements of rationality. 
(2) Structural rationality. The property of a set of mental states whose 
relations reflect the proper exercise of rational capacities; in other words, 
the property of a state of mind such that it satisfies the requirements of 
rationality.  
(3) Requirements of rationality. The requirements that govern a set of 
mental states and their relations such that they possess the property of 
structural rationality. 
Note that the claim that mental rationality produces structurally rational mental states 
is logically equivalent to the claim that mental rationality produces mental states that 
satisfy the requirements of rationality. Given the meaning of mental rationality, a 
natural candidate for the intellectual goal of rationality is the production of structural 
rationality, or, equivalently, the production of a state of mind that satisfies the 
requirements of rationality. But this candidate for the goal of rationality runs into two 
major problems. 
Recall that I argued in the preceding chapter that there are epistemic and motivational 
problems with conceiving the rational goal in terms or rational requirements (4.4).  
I therefore reject this as a candidate for the rational goal. Since the putative goal of 
mental rationality is just to satisfy the requirements of rationality, and, as I claim, such 
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a goal is unsatisfactory as a motivation for a rational agent, is it therefore impossible 
to provide a plausible and informative description of the intellectual goal appropriate 
for virtuously rational motivation?  
I think that a promising line in inquiry for seeking this goal is to ask whether there is 
some general justification for the requirements of rationality, aiming at which would 
bring an agent to satisfy the requirements of rationality without being motivated by any 
particular requirement or by any immediate reference to rational requirements. A more 
general goal would also more easily be epistemically accessibly to an agent. But, as 
Thomas Nagel notes, and as also implied by my definitions of structural rationality and 
requirements of rationality above, the ground on which requirements of rationality are 
justified cannot be drawn from the concept of structural rationality. 
[Structural r]ationality can be defined only in terms of adherence to rational 
requirements. One cannot discover or justify the principles which specify those 
requirements by deriving them from the concept of [structural] rationality, since 
it is precisely those requirements which define the concept, and they must be 
rendered plausible as requirements independently. (Nagel, 1970: 20)43 
This should be an uncontroversial point, given the definitions of structural rationality 
and requirements of rationality with which I am working. The requirements of rationality 
constitute what it means to have structural rationality. Structural rationality does not 
constitute the requirements of rationality. Therefore, whatever possible ground there 
 
 
43 Broome (2013: 150), too, follows Nagel on this point when thinking about how your are able to identify 
the requirements of rationality. 
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is for justifying a requirement as a requirement of rationality must be independent of 
structural rationality. In this way, the problem of describing the intellectual goal that 
motivates a rational agent maps onto the problem of discovering the grounds on which 
requirements of rationality are justified. To anticipate my solution, in the same way that 
‘providing shelter’ is both the justification for the requirements of house-building and 
the appropriate goal of a house builder, so ‘having attitudinal harmony’ both justifies 
the requirements of rationality and is the telos (end-goal) of a rational agent. 
Broome (2013: 150) states that his method for justifying requirements as those of 
rationality is to do so ‘one by one, on particular grounds that seem appropriate.’ The 
grounds on which Broome motivates accepting each requirement are not necessarily 
unified in any way. However, the independent justification of each requirement of 
rationality is not necessarily disparate, either; one requirement of rationality is not 
necessarily justified as such independently of the justification of every other 
requirement of rationality. Nagel’s point is that the justificatory grounds for rational 
requirements are independent of structural rationality, not that they are independent 
of each other. Indeed, there could very well be a single or unified ground on which all 
requirements of rationality are justified (independently of structural rationality). 
I will assume that there is a single ground for requirements of rationality; there are not 
various grounds, each of which explains some requirement or set of requirements of 
rationality. I base this assumption on how we use ‘rationality’ and other attempts that 
have been made to account for rationality under a single concept. When we use 
‘rationality,’ it is employed as a singular term. We speak about a rational person or 
state of mind, a capacity or capacities for rationality, and the requirements or 
156 
 
 
 
 
prescriptions of rationality. If we ordinarily thought of rationality as a kind of cluster 
concept for a manifold of requirements or of sets of requirements, we might rather 
speak of a person who is one certain kind of rational, a capacity for all rationalities, 
and the norms, requirements, or standards of rationalities.44  
5.2.2. Epistemic norms 
Since I am concerned with what might be called norms of rationality, it might be helpful 
to consider accounts from the debate on the normativity of epistemic norms. The 
question driving this debate is whether – and, if so, why – we should care about 
following epistemic norms (Kornblith, 1993 and Mitova, 2016). Veli Mitova (2016: 201) 
gives as rough examples of epistemic norms that you ‘proportion your belief to the 
evidence’ (the evidence norm) and that you ‘do not hold inconsistent beliefs’ (the 
consistency norm). Although I am concerned with requirements (or norms) of 
rationality, these are not exclusive of certain epistemic norms. The consistency norm, 
for instance, is both an epistemic norm and a requirement of rationality. But certain 
requirements of rationality like enkrasia do not count as epistemic norms, nor do 
certain epistemic norms45 as requirements of rationality. Whatever the overlap and 
 
 
44 To speak of ‘rationalities’ is grammatically correct and used in cases to denote exhaustive and 
mutually exclusive aims, methods, or standards. For example, ‘Russia and France have competing 
rationalities in their foreign policies.’ 
45 Since there is disagreement over what constitutes an epistemic norm, I do not presume that epistemic 
norms are necessarily distinct from requirements of rationality. However, I think that there is plausibly 
a difference between rational requirements as norms about the order among your attitudes and 
epistemic norms about what justifies your beliefs. 
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divergence between their extensions, there may be sufficient common ground to 
consider whether accounts of why we should care about following epistemic norms is 
informative. 
Mitova (2016) provides a useful overview of four different accounts of why epistemic 
norms matter, although she notes that this is not an exhaustive overview. An 
exhaustive account of the positions is not necessary for how I address the debate in 
relation to my project. First, the soft-pragmatist account attaches instrumental value to 
epistemic norms, claiming that we should care about following such norms because 
they help us achieve things of further value. Second, the moral view holds that 
epistemic norms are a species of moral norms, such that violating epistemic norms 
impugns our moral status. Third, the normative account (one kind of constitutive 
account) locates the normativity of epistemic norms in the ‘correctness norm’ 
constitutive of the concept of belief, which is the norm that a belief is correct if its 
propositional content is true. And finally, the teleological position (another kind of 
constitutive account) claims that a belief’s aim at truth means that holding some belief 
is to accept the truth of the content of that belief; epistemic norms derive their 
normativity from the truth-acceptance constitutive of belief. 
Unfortunately, none of these accounts is informative for the purpose of explaining 
which requirements (or norms) are those of rationality. The question that the above 
accounts are meant to address is why we should care about following epistemic 
norms. This question takes for granted that there already are epistemic norms to 
follow, such as the consistency norm and the evidence norm. What counts as an 
epistemic norm is not put into question.  
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Indeed, it is the question of what grounds some norm (or requirement) that is the 
question we are interested in answering, specifically the question of what grounds 
some requirement as a requirement of rationality. But the field in which epistemic 
norms are applied is different than that in which rational requirements are applied. 
While epistemic norms are prescriptions in the field of justification and knowledge, 
rational requirements are prescriptions in the field of structural rationality. Certain 
prescriptions may coincide with each other, given that the field of knowledge and 
justification on the one hand and that of rationality, on the other, are concerned with 
beliefs. But in other ways these fields are quite different: the field of rationality is also 
concerned with practical attitudes like intentions, while the field of knowledge is not. 
Part of what justifies some norm or requirement as belonging to a particular source 
rather than another must pick out the field of applicability of that norm or requirement. 
And, since these two fields have different scopes of applicability, their grounds will be 
different. 
5.2.3. Intelligibility 
A common motivation for many accounts of rationality is that rejecting the proposed 
requirements is unintelligible, either for the agent rejecting it or the theoriser of 
rationality.  Is intelligibility, then, the appropriate telos of rationality? I do not think that 
it is. I will first consider some of the claims given by theorists that it is unintelligible to 
deny that an agent is subject to some requirement of rationality. I then respond with 
why I think this line of reasoning does not work.  
Speaking of the requirements derived from his account of expected correctness, 
Wedgwood says, 
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These requirements will strike us as obvious and compelling, and thinkers who 
violate these requirements will strike us as at least to some extent absurd or 
even unintelligible. (Wedgwood, 2017: 242, emphasis added) 
And if we reject the principle of noncontradiction, Robert Fogelin claims after 
recounting Aristotle’s negative demonstration of the law of noncontradiction,  
…[P]eople who reject the law of noncontradiction obliterate any significant 
difference between the speech acts of asserting and denying. In denying the 
law of contradiction, they deprive themselves of the significant use of their own 
speech acts. For this reason, on their own terms, they have no claim to be 
listened to. (Fogelin, 2002: 27, emphasis added) 
Velleman, albeit in the context of decision theory, says, 
…I think that for preferences to make sense, by being synoptically desirable, 
just is for them to be formally rational. (Velleman, 2000: 157) 
These sentiments may be taken as a cue to investigate whether intelligibility provides 
a sufficient ground for rational requirements and, thus, the goal of rationality.  
In response, I think that requirements of rationality may contribute towards 
intelligibility, as a necessary feature or condition of intelligibility; a lack of satisfying any 
requirements of rationality at all would certainly make a state of mind, with all of its 
beliefs, intentions, and so forth, pretty unintelligible. But it is not obvious that violating 
one or two requirements of rationality amount to unintelligibility. Davidson (1985: 196ff) 
makes a similar point when he notes a difficulty in demarcating between requirements 
that constitute certain attitudes, such that to have that attitude is to satisfy that 
requirement necessarily, from requirements of rationality that are possible to violate. 
Similarly, violating some rational requirement does not make an agent’s attitude or 
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state of mind unintelligible. An attitude seems intelligible even though I perceive that 
something is not as it should be. I can understand what is happening and what has 
gone wrong to the degree that I can criticise or correct another person for having 
violated a rational requirement: ‘Just intend to do what you believe you should,’ or 
‘Stop believing that contradiction!’ But violating some requirement of rationality does 
not on its own make an attitude unintelligible. 
5.3. Three Unsatisfactory Contenders 
I now consider three possible accounts for justifying structural rationality – expected 
correctness, consistency, and coherence. I argue that none of these candidates is 
capable of plausibly justifying requirements as requirements of rationality. For the 
purposes of this argument, I take for granted that certain requirements are intuitively 
requirements of rationality. Any plausible ground for justifying the requirements of 
rationality independently of structural rationality must be capable of accounting for why 
these intuitive requirements belong to structural rationality. In particular, I appeal to 
the following requirements of rationality, following Broome’s formulations. 
Enkrasia. Rationality requires of N that, if 
(1) N believes at t that she herself ought that p, and if 
(2) N believes at t that, if she herself were then to intend that p, because of that, p 
would be so, and if 
(3) N believes at t that, if she herself were not then to intend that p, because of 
that, p would not be so, then 
(4) N intends at t that p. (Broome, 2013: 170) 
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Eugene is immigrating to Fiji and believes that he should learn Fijian.46 He believes 
that were he to intend to learn Fijian, then he would do so. But say that Eugene also 
believes that he will learn Fijian regardless of whether he intends to learn the language 
(he has heard that it is easy and quick to pick up without any effort). Eugene therefore 
believes that if he does not intend to learn Fijian he will nevertheless learn Fijian. 
Eugene is therefore not required by rationality to intend to learn Fijian. 
Modus ponens. Rationality requires of N that, if 
[1] N believes at t that p, and 
[2] N believes at t that if p then q, and if 
[3] N cares at t whether q, then 
[4] N believes at t that q. (Broome, 2013: 157) 
Mike believes that if Tod is late, then Tod will get a warning. Mike sees Tod walk in 
late yet again, and thus believes that Tod is late. Is Mike thereby required by rationality 
to believe that Tod will get a warning? We might intuitively think so, until we consider 
whether Mike, or ourselves, are required by rationality to infer and believe all 
propositions that are entailed by our existing beliefs. Surely this cannot be required of 
us by rationality. Rather, we are not fully rational if we fail to believe propositions 
entailed by our existing beliefs when those propositions matter to us. In this way, Mike 
is only required by rationality to believe that Tod will get a warning if, for whatever 
reason, Mike cares whether Tod gets a warning.  
 
 
46 This is Broome’s (2013: 171) example. 
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No contradictory beliefs: Rationality requires of N that N does not believe at t that 
p and also believe at t that not p. (Broome, 2013: 155) 
For example, rationality requires of Nick that he does not now believe that his team is 
winning and also now believe that his team is losing. 
Persistence of belief. If t1 is earlier than t2, rationality requires of N that, if 
[1] N believes at t1 that p, and  
[2] no cancelling event occurs between t1 and t2, and if 
[3] N cares at t2 whether p, then 
[4] either 
[a] N believes at t2 that p, or 
[b] N considers at t2 whether p. (Broome, 2013: 185-86) 
Rationality requires of Phoebe that, since she earlier believed that she was mistaken, 
and nothing occurred between earlier and the present moment that would make her 
change this belief, and since she cares whether she was mistaken, then either Phoebe 
now continues to believe that she was mistaken or she now considers whether she 
was mistaken. 
Persistence of intention. If t1 is earlier than t2, rationality requires of N that, if 
[1] N intends at t1 that p, and  
[2] no cancelling event occurs between t1 and t2, then 
[3] either 
[a] N intends at t2 that p, or 
[b] N considers at t2 whether p. (Broome, 2013: 178) 
For example, rationality requires of Percy that, since Percy earlier intended to pay his 
fine, and nothing has occurred between earlier and now to cause Percy to abstain 
from intending to do so, then Percy either now continues to intend to pay his fine or he 
now considers whether he should. 
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A satisfactory account of the justificatory grounds of structural rationality is able to 
account for why these requirements are paradigmatic requirements of rationality. 
5.3.1. Expected correctness 
The first contender for justifying structural rationality is Wedgwood’s proposal that 
rationality is determined by the expected correctness of a mental state.47 According to 
the view that rationality aims at correctness, every attitude has some external aim 
against which it can be evaluated as correct to a greater or lesser degree. For 
example, a belief is correct to the degree that it is successful in achieving its aim, say, 
of truth. And an intention is correct to the degree that an agent successfully acts to 
achieve what is intended. According to Wedgwood, what makes a mental state rational 
is the degree to which its expected incorrectness measures up against the available 
alternatives of possible worlds. Wedgwood (2017: 217) says, ‘In a slogan, to be 
[structurally] rational is to do as well as possible at minimizing expected incorrectness.’ 
An agent is more rational if she has a mental state that has a lower expected or 
estimated incorrectness than other alternative estimations based on the probability of 
those mental states being correct. 
On the expected correctness account, what makes a requirement on of rationality is 
that it provides a way of choosing between alternative probabilistic estimates of 
correctness of attitudes. As such, the requirement to form beliefs based on your 
 
 
47 Although there are fundamental differences between Wedgwood’s (2017) account of rationality as a 
virtue and my own, his argument that expected correctness is what rational requirements have in 
common (Wedgwood, 2017: 211ff) is worth consideration.  
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sensory experience is a requirement of rationality in virtue of sensory experiences 
generally being excellent indicators of truth (Wedgwood, 2017: 219). Let’s call this the 
sensory requirement of rationality. Sensory experiences indicating that you are sitting 
at your desk – the pressure of your lumpy office chair, the feeling of your head being 
upright rather than laying down, the sight of a familiar laminated surface holding your 
stationary before you – give you a high degree of expected correctness for believing 
that you are sitting at your desk. Moreover, you have no reason to doubt the truth of 
whether you are sitting at your desk. Thus, given this expected correctness of believing 
you are sitting at your desk, and the expected incorrectness of not believing that you 
are sitting at your desk, you would be more rational for believing that you are sitting at 
your desk than not having such a belief. 
How well does expected correctness fare in justifying requirements of rationality like 
the ones set out at the start of this section? Not very well at all, I think; expected 
correctness does not obviously justify several of the above requirements as 
requirements of rationality, although it could justify the modus ponens requirement. 
Deductively valid arguments, like modus ponens, are paradigmatically truth-
preserving inferences. In this way, if have the expectation that your premise beliefs 
are true, then you will be able to expect that the implied conclusion belief from modus 
ponens is true. If you are aiming to minimise expected incorrectness, as Wedgwood’s 
account says a rational person ought to do, then following truth preserving 
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requirements might be a good way of doing so provided that beliefs are given truth 
values rather than degrees of probability.48 
But expected incorrectness does not account for why requirements like enkrasia and 
persistence of intention are requirements of rationality. Moreover, expected 
correctness might include as rational some bizarre requirements. I first spell out its 
difficulties with enkrasia and persistence of intention. 
In the case of enkrasia, an agent could satisfy the expected correctness of her 
normative belief and of her intention not to do what she believes she ought to do. Say 
that you believe that you ought not to kick stray dogs, and that your belief has the 
highest degree of expected correctness among the available alternatives. Your 
normative belief therefore satisfies expected correctness. But say you also have an 
intention to kick every stray dog that you see, and that you expect to be very successful 
in doing so. Your intention therefore also satisfies expected correctness. In this way, 
an agent can satisfy expected correctness without being as she rationally should be 
(due to violating enkrasia). Expected correctness therefore does not justify enkrasia 
as a requirement of rationality. 
 
 
48 Although expected correctness justifies the inferential aspect of the modus ponens requirement as a 
requirement of rationality, it does not limit being subject to this requirement only when such inferences 
matter to the agent. I do not make much of this point here given that I reject expected correctness for 
its inability to justify other requirements of rationality. But I pick up on this issue below (subsection 5.3.3) 
which is a shared problem with coherence. 
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Expected correctness also does not justify persistence requirements as rational. Say 
your expected correctness between paying your fine and not paying your fine changes 
constantly (say, due to your payment depending on whether you feel like it, and your 
feeling like it is in a constant flux). Say that your intention to pay your fine changes 
constantly, too, although in a haphazard manner, without any consideration about 
whether to so intend on your part. Assume that your feeling like paying the fine is not 
a cancelling event for intending to pay it. But, your intention to pay the fine matches 
up precisely with the times at which your expected correctness to pay the fine is high, 
and your intention not to pay the fine matches up precisely with the times at which 
your expected correctness not to pay the fine is high. On Wedgwood’s account, you 
are rational throughout this period in virtue of the expected correctness of your 
intentions staying high at all times. However, you violate the persistence of intention 
requirement and are therefore not rational. 
Expected correctness may be a candidate for justifying particular attitudes, like beliefs 
or intentions. But it is incapable of justifying certain requirements about what relations 
ought to obtain among your attitudes, such as your intentions and normative beliefs, 
and the persistence of your attitudes over time. The expected correctness account is 
not silent on all matters pertaining to the relations among your attitudes. For instance, 
it would champion Bayesian principles as requirements of rationality,49 such that ‘…the 
 
 
49 Although an ideally rational being might satisfy Bayesian requirements, it is highly doubtful that we 
should seek to satisfy them. It is dubious whether it is possible for a human agent to adjust the degrees 
to which she holds attitudes such as beliefs, although it may be possible for an ideal or super-human 
mind. But, as Plantinga argues, it is inappropriate to measure the rationality of a human agent’s mental 
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degrees of belief of an ideally rational person conform to the mathematical principles 
of probability theory’ (Horwich, 1982: 12). But Bayesian requirements, even if they are 
requirements of rationality,50 are not the full story about the relations that rationality 
requires of all your attitudes. For instance, Bayesianism does not inform you on how 
you should order your intentions with your beliefs (enkrasia), or your intentions with 
each other (persistence of intention). 
Apart from not justifying requirements like enkrasia and persistence of intention, 
expected correctness includes within its conception of structural rationality 
requirements that in fact have nothing to do with rationality. For instance, it may well 
justify bizarre requirements, such as my intend predictions requirement below, as 
requirements of rationality. Assuming that the aim of an intention is something like 
‘putting the chosen course of action into effect’ (Wedgwood, 2017: 211), minimising 
 
 
state on the standard of an ideally rational mind. ‘I display nothing but hubris in taking for myself goals 
not suited to my powers, or measuring myself by standards inappropriate for the kind of being I am, 
even if there are beings – beings superior to me – who do not meet these ideals and standards’ 
(Plantinga, 1993: 144). However, certain probabilistic considerations very well could be requirements 
of rationality, such as not forming a belief about a regularity or law if there is a very low probability of its 
truth. In any case, I do not address the question of whether Bayesian requirements are requirements 
of rationality. 
50 It is controversial whether Bayesian requirements are requirements of rationality. For example, see 
Talbot’s (2008) discussion of the epistemic problems with Bayesian requirements, most of which are 
equally applicable to rationality. My argument is unaffected by whether Bayesian requirements are 
required by rationality or not, although my account is committed to there being more requirements of 
rationality than only Bayesian requirements. 
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the expected incorrectness of your intentions would justify the following as a 
requirement of rationality. 
Intend predictions. If t1 is earlier than t2, then it is required of N that, if N believes 
at t1 that she herself will F at t2, N intends at t1 to F at t2. 
This is akin to a bootstrapping requirement (mentioned in 2.3.1), except that, in the 
case of intend predictions, it is an intention that is bootstrapped from your expectation 
that you will put the intended action into effect rather than bootstrapping based on a 
narrow-scope requirement. Say that you now believe that you will smoke a cigarette 
in five minutes’ time. Assuming that you hold this belief due to expectation that it is 
correct (say you smoke at this time every day), you thereby have an expected 
guarantee of putting into effect an intention to smoke in five minutes. Thus, your 
prediction that you will do something, even if it would ordinarily not count as a full-
blown action, would rationally subject you to the requirement to intend to do what you 
predict you will do. But, of course, it would be bizarre, even patently irrational, to intend 
to do what you believe you will do merely on that basis. A similar bizarre requirement 
that follows from expected correctness would be to never intend what you predict you 
have a small chance of successfully actioning; this would keep us, for example, from 
ever attempting something for which we have no or little experience. Thus, expected 
correctness would include under rationality requirements that, if satisfied, would in fact 
make an agent less rational.  
I have argued that Wedgwood’s expected correctness account does not provide a 
basis for justifying requirements like enkrasia and persistence of intention as 
requirements of rationality. Furthermore, it implausibly includes bizarre requirements, 
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such as the intend prediction requirement, as part of structural rationality. As such, 
expected correctness is not a satisfactory contender for justifying which requirements 
belong to structural rationality. 
5.3.2. Consistency 
The second contender for justifying requirements of rationality that I will argue against 
is rationality as consistency. Describing rationality in terms of consistency is common 
both in ordinary non-philosophical speech as well as in philosophical contexts, 51 
although people do not mean that rationality is synonymous with consistency. Having 
a consistent performance or character does not refer to a rational performance or 
character. What, then, is meant when rationality is described in terms of consistency? 
A predominant sense, I think, is that an agent’s mental states are consistent with each 
other, and that this has something to do with those mental states or their contents in 
some way avoiding logical contradictions. But apart from those mental states being 
included in propositions whose logical consistency is being evaluated, such as ‘I 
believe that I ought to pay tax’, mental states do not conform to, or satisfy, principles 
of logic. 
 
 
51 For mentions of rationality in terms of consistency, see, for example, Easwaran (2015), Geach (1977), 
Heuer (2018), Núñez (2020), Price (2008), Smithies (2018), Schick (1963), and Titelbaum (2015). My 
formulation of consistency is different than most views mentioned by these theorists besides Easwaran 
(2015) and Titelbaum (2015), although I hope that my formulation captures the essence of what is often 
meant by ‘consistency’ in discussions of rationality. 
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There are two ways in which to develop this idea. Either it is rational to follow some 
principle for mental states that is based on a logical principle, or the logical principle is 
applied to the propositional content of an agent’s mental states and checked for 
contradictions in that way. 
If we opt for the former, then we could base requirements like no contradictory beliefs 
and no contradictory intentions on the idea of avoiding logical contradictions. Perhaps 
we might even be able base persistence of intention, but I do not think we could get 
much further than that. 
For instance, we would not be able to base enkrasia on the idea of avoiding logical 
contradictions, even if we focus the idea only to the content of attitudes. There is 
nothing logically contradictory between the content of some normative belief that (I 
ought to pay tax) and the content of an intention that (I will not pay tax). 
I am not sure of another way in which the idea of consistency might be expanded in 
justifying other requirements of rationality. And since consistency is unable to account 
for many rational requirements, I reject it as a ground on which to justify requirements 
of rationality. 
5.3.3. Coherence 
The account of attitudinal harmony that I propose below as a basis for justifying 
requirements of rationality develops the notion of coherence I consider here. For this 
reason, I will speak of coherence alone, or ‘mere coherence,’ as a less developed 
version of the concept in this subsection. For the sake of simplicity, though, I will use 
‘coherence’ here as elliptical for ‘mere coherence.’ 
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Coherence is a commonplace description for structural rationality.52 What this idea 
amounts to, roughly, is some kind of order or accordance among your attitudes. For 
instance, 
What rationality requires of you is proper order in your mind. It requires your 
mental states to be properly related to each other. That is to say, it requires 
your mind to be coherent in particular respects. (Broome, 2013: 152) 
I will attempt to develop the notion of mental coherence, and then examine the extent 
to which it is able to justify the requirements of rationality. What is the nature of 
‘coherence,’ when does an object have this property? This can be a difficult question 
to answer clearly. Robert Audi (2004: 27) states, ‘It is difficult to say what constitutes 
coherence. The notion is elusive, and there are highly varying accounts.’53 
One clear available account of coherence for structural rationality can be derived from 
adherence to Bayesian principles of probability (Zynda, 1996). Although probabilistic 
coherence may be part of mental coherence, it does not exhaustively account for the 
kind of coherence that structural rationality is supposed to constitute, as I argued in 
the case of consistency. Perhaps an appropriately exhaustive concept of coherence 
can be gleaned from the nearby field of epistemic justification, such as the theory of 
coherence as justification. Earlier accounts of epistemic coherence have been 
presented in terms of logical implication (Blanshard, 1939) or as probabilistic support 
 
 
52 See, for instance, Audi (2004: 27ff), Broome (2017: 152), Fink (2014), and Kolodny (2005: 511). 
53 The coherence Audi refers to here is that of an account of epistemic justification. Nevertheless, 
‘coherence’ in whatever context of thought or mental life is a tricky concept to clarify. 
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among beliefs (Ewing, 1934), although these have their difficulties.54 Lawrence 
BonJour (1985: 97-99, cited in Olsson, 2017) presents an analysis of five criteria for 
epistemic coherence.  
1. Logical consistency (is necessary for coherence among beliefs) 
2. (Coherence among beliefs is proportionate to) probabilistic consistency 
3. (Coherence is increased by) the number and strength of inferential connections 
among beliefs 
4. (Coherence is decreased by) unconnected subsystems of beliefs 
5. (Coherence is decreased by) unexplained anomalies of beliefs 
Certain aspects of BonJour’s criteria need to be tailored for an account of structural 
rationality. First (1), these criteria must be transposed to be relevant to other attitudes 
in addition to beliefs. Second (2), they need to be categorical criteria rather than criteria 
for degrees of coherence. Logical consistency is the only categorical criterion, the 
others account for ways in which coherence is augmented or diminished. We are 
looking for a conception of rationality as coherence that grounds strict requirements. 
In this way, criteria 4 and 5 are not strictly required by rationality, since an agent is 
permitted to hold unconnected or unexplained attitudes so long as they do not violate 
requirements of rationality. And third (3), they must account for diachronic 
requirements like persistence of belief.  
My attempt at an account of mental coherence is meant to identify mental coherence 
at the levels of (1) attitudinal content, (2) inference, and (3) diachronicity. I hope that 
 
 
54 For a discussion, see Erik Olsson (2017). 
173 
 
 
 
 
this account is sufficient for an examination of its suitability for justifying requirements 
of rationality. 
I think that rationality as coherence is unable to suitably justify the requirements of 
rationality as they have been presented at the start of this section. Specifically, 
coherence cannot account for the clauses that make requirements conditional upon 
whether an agent cares about some proposition and those that make requirements 
conditional upon whether something is up to an agent. I will explain the former first. 
The modus ponens and the persistence of belief requirements each have clauses that 
make them contingent on whether it matters to an agent that something is (putatively) 
the case. Here are the requirements again; notice clause (3) of each requirement. 
Modus ponens. Rationality requires of N that, if 
(1) N believes at t that p, and 
(2) N believes at t that if p then q, and if 
(3) N cares at t whether q, then 
(4) N believes at t that q. 
Persistence of belief. If t1 is earlier than t2, rationality requires of N that, if 
(1) N believes at t1 that p, and  
(2) no cancelling event occurs between t1 and t2, and if 
(3) N cares at t2 whether p, then 
(4) either 
(a) N believes at t2 that p, or 
(b) N considers at t2 whether p. 
In both the cases of modus ponens and persistence of belief, the caring clause is a 
necessary qualification. Rationality does not require us to waste our time or clutter our 
minds with trivial logic chopping; Mike would not be irrational for failing to make 
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inferences whose putative truth is of no consequence to him. But according to mental 
coherence, Mike is required to believe the propositions that his attitudes entail 
regardless of whether or not he cares about them.  
Rationality as coherence similarly does not account for the clause in enkrasia that an 
agent only intends to do what is up to the agent. Recall that enkrasia goes as follows, 
with the qualification that an agent is not required to form an intention if it is not up to 
her (the conjunction of clauses 3 and 4). 
Enkrasia. Rationality requires of N that, if 
(1) N believes at t that she herself ought that p, and if 
(2) N believes at t that, if she herself were then to intend that p, because of that, p 
would be so, and if 
(3) N believes at t that, if she herself were not then to intend that p, because of 
that, p would not be so, then 
(4) N intends at t that p. 
Coherence is able to account for the requirement that an agent intends to do what she 
believes she ought to do; the content of an intention is coherent with a normative belief 
when that intention accords with the content of that belief. But there are two problems 
with justifying clauses (2) and (3) of enkrasia on the basis of coherence. 
First, the fact that an agent expects that p is overdetermined by her intention to p does 
not violate coherence, although it is generally not required by rationality.55 Eugene 
 
 
55 I discuss cases in the following section (5.4.2) in which it may be rational for an agent to 
overdeterministically intend something. However, generally you are required by rationality not to intend 
to do what you believe will occur were you not to intend it. 
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believes that he will learn Fijian without intending to learn Fijian, and therefore he is 
not rationally required to intend to learn Fijian. But Eugene does not violate mental 
coherence for intending to learn Fijian even in light of his expectation that it will happen 
without his intending so. Mental coherence therefore does not account for the 
condition of enkrasia that an agent does not believe that p will be so were she not to 
intend that p. 
Second, coherence may not require an agent to intend something she believes is 
highly improbable. It would not be coherent for an agent to intend to p when she 
believes that she ought to p and believes that p is extremely improbable. Say that 
Glenn McGrath is up to bat and is facing the final ball of the game. Australia need six 
runs to win the game. McGrath believes that he ought to score a Six off the next ball. 
Unfortunately, the chances of McGrath scoring one run is low when he isn’t under 
pressure, and even lower now due to the stress of the situation. The chance of him 
scoring a Six is barely imaginable. Although the content of McGrath’s normative belief 
would be coherent with him intending to score a Six, the probability makes it incoherent 
for McGrath to intend this. Mental coherence therefore places a condition on enkrasia 
that is too strict for what we would ordinarily consider to be rational. 
Apart from the caring clause and up-to-you clauses, mental coherence provides a 
basis for justifying the other relevant clauses of rational requirements. I therefore think 
that there is promise in developing a coherence-like account of structural rationality 
that, I hope, is capable of justifying the two problematic conditions. 
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5.4. Harmony: The Goal of Rationality 
I demonstrated in section 5.2 above that, in order to provide a description of the 
appropriate goal of a rational agent, it is necessary to provide an account of the kind 
of state of mind such a capacity gives rise to, namely structural rationality. But what 
account is able to provide a ground for structural rationality? I argued in section 5.3 
against three candidates – expected correctness, consistency, and coherence. None 
of these accounts is able to provide justification for paradigmatic requirements of 
rationality. 
In this section, I present my account of attitudinal harmony as the ground on which to 
justify requirements as requirements of rationality. I then demonstrate the ability of 
attitudinal harmony to justify as requirements of rationality enkrasia, modus ponens, 
persistence of belief, and persistence of intention, as well as its ability to distinguish 
between rational and irrational cases of overdetermination of intention. Finally, I show 
how attitudinal harmony is the proper intellectual goal of rationality, and therefore the 
appropriate aim by which a rational agent is motivated. 
5.4.1. Attitudinal harmony 
I submit that the ground for justifying structural rationality is that of attitudinal harmony. 
To satisfy requirements of rationality is to ensure that your state of mind is harmonious, 
while violating requirements of rationality is a guarantee of mental discord. The notion 
of harmony that I have in mind is a kind of ‘global’ mental coherence among a wide 
range of our mind’s population, rather than the more localised version of coherence I 
considered above whose scope is limited to specific relations among a limited set of 
attitudes. 
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The global nature of my proposed concept, along with its cognate with coherence, is 
why I opt to use the term ‘harmony.’ Just as items of music and parts of narratives 
have localised instances of concord – a discernible melody or an event in a story – so 
can minds have localised instances of order or coherence, say, when an intention is 
adopted in accord with a relevant normative belief. But the (partial) of a symphony or 
a narrative is not local instances of concord but harmony from start to finish, just as 
property of structural rationality, I propose, is grounded in a well-ordered mind as a 
whole. 
I propose the following conception of attitudinal harmony. 
Attitudinal harmony: Necessarily, an agent’s mind is in an attitudinally 
harmonious state if its attitudes and the content thereof cohere with each other 
and with the agent’s persistent goals, interests, and values over time. 
But as this definition is not particularly informative, let me elucidate three ‘areas’ over 
which attitudinal harmony extends – local, regional, and global areas of the mind. 
These areas are not strictly demarcated and may overlap. The ‘local’ area pertains to 
the primary scope of the authority of attitudinal harmony, which extends over relations 
among certain propositional attitudes. This involves intra-attitudinal coherence; 
harmony among attitudes of the same kind such as belief-belief and intention-intention 
coherence. And it involves inter-attitudinal coherence; harmony between attitudes of 
different kinds. For instance, it is intra-attitudinally incoherent for an agent to hope that 
p but intend that not-p. 
The ‘regional’ extent of attitudinal harmony pertains to coherence among the content 
of attitudes and other attitudes, including those attitudes implied by premise-attitudes. 
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The content of some attitude or set of attitudes might harmonise with holding a further 
attitude, perhaps by virtue of deduction, sufficient evidence or reason, or some other 
kind of coherence. For instance, the propositional content of a normative belief is in 
attitudinal harmony with an intention to do what you believe you should do. 
Finally, ‘global’ attitudinal harmony is the extent to which attitudes cohere with an 
agent’s persistent goals, interests, and values. These might have to do, for example, 
with an agent’s culture, gender, personal ambitions, religion, and so forth. Such goals, 
interests, and values inform an agent’s view of her place in the world and take into 
account her understanding of the processes and mechanisms, whether causal or 
social, of her world. Global harmony is the extent to which an agent’s attitudes cohere 
with her ‘worldview’, to employ a thoroughly overused term. 
To attempt a clarification, consider one use of the term that I do not mean to employ, 
what I will call ‘perceptive worldview’. An agent’s perceptive worldview could refer to 
her primordial experience of the world and her place in it; how the world most 
immediately appears to the agent along with its colours of significance, connotations, 
and positive/negative value.56 For example, a stranger approaches you and extends 
his hand. It is your ‘worldview’ in the former sense that presents this experience to you 
in such a way as you understand this gesture to mean that the stranger wants to greet 
you and cooperate with you. Other indicators of the situation might evoke a negative 
 
 
56 Perceptive worldview is most in line with a literal understanding of Weltanschauung as a kind of ‘world 
perception’ or ‘intuition of the world’. 
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emotional response like apprehension, given that the man appears to be a banker and 
you implicitly do not trust bankers. This is not quite what I mean by the term, although 
aspects may overlap with my use. 
Rather, I take ‘worldview’ in the sense of what I call a ‘presuppositional worldview’. 
According to the latter, to put it roughly, an agent’s worldview covers her most 
fundamental attitudes and values about the world and its relations and mechanisms, 
including her place in it. These attitudes and values are fundamental in the sense that 
they either support, are built upon, or are implicit in many of the agent’s other attitudes 
and values in a way that may confer meaning or sense to them. For example, whether 
an agent values people with familial relations, whether she believes in the existence 
of some god, or whether she thinks that whether some god exists is important are all 
fundamental attitudes and values that support certain concerns over others. The fact 
that you value family members over others might support your decisions about where 
to live, who should benefit from your actions, and so forth. And the fact that you believe 
that whether Atman is Brahman is important is the foundation for the focus of much of 
your intellectual and spiritual inquiry, as well as the significance of many further beliefs 
that you hold.  
I do not mean to make much of a precise notion of ‘worldview’ apart from picking out 
a set of an agent’s fundamental attitudes, goals, interests, and values that fall within 
the scope of attitudinal harmony. Rationality plays a role in helping to sustain the 
structural integrity of an agent’s attitudes with her worldview. By including fundamental 
worldview-attitudes within the scope of rational requirements, worldview-attitudes are 
themselves then subject to what rationality requires of you. The general wide-scope 
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structure of rational requirements implies that all attitudes within the scope of a 
requirement are governed by rationality. This is not an undesirable consequence of 
my view, I think. Even an agent’s most fundamental attitudes and values should be 
subject to the conditions of attitudinal harmony; an incoherent worldview is an irrational 
one. In other words, the fact that some attitude is fundamental or part of an agent’s 
worldview does not absolve it from the requirement to cohere with her other mental 
states. 
I think that the above conception of attitudinal harmony suitably fits the bill for the 
ground of structural rationality. If I am on the right track here, then such an account of 
structural rationality’s ground should be capable of grounding particular requirements 
of rationality. 
5.4.2. Grounding requirements of rationality 
My account of attitudinal harmony is well positioned to provide the grounds for rational 
requirements. Since my notion of attitudinal harmony builds upon coherence, I will 
demonstrate the ability of my account to accommodate those clauses that proved 
problematic for the coherence view. Specifically, the coherence view was not able to 
ground the clauses that make rational requirements conditional upon whether some 
proposition matters to the agent, and the clauses that exclude intentions from 
overdetermining. 
Regarding modus ponens, attitudinal harmony grounds the caring clause in a way that 
coherence does not. Attitudinal harmony explicitly includes considerations about an 
agent’s interests and values within rational requirements. If some belief, intention, or 
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other attitude does not feature in an agent’s persistent interests or values, then 
rationality does not subject that agent to certain requirements. For instance, the fact 
that Mike does not care whether Tod gets a warning is tied to whatever interests and 
values Mike has. And it is in virtue of a lack of any concern for Tod’s warnings that 
rationality does not require Mike to make any inferential beliefs based on his other 
beliefs that Tod is late again, and that, if Tod is late again then Tod will get a warning.  
In order to highlight my account’s ability to ground overdetermining intentions, I 
discuss some cases surrounding enkrasia that attitudinal harmony can justify. My 
account of attitudinal harmony can account not merely for straightforward cases of 
why overdetermining intentions are in violation of a rational requirement, but also 
cases in which overdetermining intentions are required by rationality. Consider the 
straightforward case first, that of Broome’s (2013: 171) Fijian traveller. 
Eugene is travelling to Fiji and believes that he should learn the language. But he also 
believes that, were he not to intend to learn the language, he would nevertheless still 
learn Fijian. In this case, he is not required by rationality to intend to learn the language 
given that he expects that learning the language is already determined. My account of 
attitudinal harmony can handle a case like this by appealing to the common value of 
not intending to do what you believe does not require your intention in order to come 
about. This might be rooted in a prudential concern not to waste your time with 
overdetermining intentions, or perhaps in your view of the world, your position in it, 
and the roles appropriate with your position. 
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In this way, attitudinal harmony is capable of accommodating cases in which an agent 
is not required to have an overdetermining intention. But not all cases of 
overdetermination of intention violate a requirement of rationality. Some cases may 
even be required by rationality. My account of attitudinal harmony is also able to 
account for these more nuanced, non-straightforward cases like the following, where 
an agent is subject to enkrasia even when something is not up to her. 
There are cases in which an agent’s intention overdetermines p, but in which she is 
still rationally required to intend that p. For instance, say that you believe that you 
ought to carry the coffin down the aisle. But you also believe that, were you not to carry 
the coffin down the aisle, then it would get carried down the aisle (by the five other pall 
bearers). You are still required by rationality to intend to carry the coffin. This example 
may not be quite satisfactory, since carrying a coffin is more symbolic rather than 
practical, and thus you ought to intend that you yourself carry the coffin, and to believe 
that if you yourself do not intend to carry the coffin, then you yourself will not carry the 
coffin. A better example may be that of an overdetermined nomination. Believing that 
Kerry would be the best candidate, you believe on that basis that you ought to 
nominate Kerry. But you also believe that, should you not intend to nominate Kerry, 
she will be nominated by someone else. Despite the overdetermination of your 
intention to nominate Kerry, you are nevertheless required by rationality to intend to 
nominate her. 
How does attitudinal harmony ground cases of this kind where an agent’s intention is 
overdeterministic? By including considerations about an agent’s interests and values, 
attitudinal harmony prescribes that intending to nominate Kerry would cohere with, 
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say, your interest in having her in office, or the value of showing your belief in her 
ability though a public nomination, or some other consideration that overrides the 
ordinary preclusion of not intending what you believe will nevertheless occur. Similarly, 
despite there not being a need for so many pall bearers, it harmonises with your 
cultural practices and social symbols to assist in carrying the coffin. Thus, my account 
of attitudinal harmony is able to account for both cases in which an overdeterministic 
intention is a violation of a rational requirement and cases in which it is a requirement 
of rationality. 
One of the strengths of my account, I think, is that it demonstrates a connection 
between those attitudes that are governed by rational requirements, such as beliefs 
and intentions, and other residents of our mental life that make up our worldview, such 
as our persistent interests and values, our self-identity, the mechanisms of our world, 
and so forth. Expanding the scope of what rationality considers when subjecting our 
minds to certain requirements provides us with a rich ground on which to ground 
rational requirements by having an expanded notion of global attitudinal coherence or 
harmony.  
5.4.3. Aiming at harmony 
To return to the primary purpose of this chapter, I now offer my account of the rational 
goal that a rational agent is motivated to achieve. In chapter 4 (section 4.4), I argued 
that the rational goal would be best conceived of as a telos (an aim at some overall 
end) at which an agent aims for its own sake. 
The appropriate characteristic telos of rationality is that of attitudinal harmony. (I argue 
for the final value of attitudinal harmony, its value for its own sake, in the following 
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chapter.) A rational agent properly exercises her rational capacity out of her motivation 
for achieving an end goal, for its own sake, of her attitudes and their content cohering 
with each other and with her persistent goals, interests, and values over time. This 
telos is epistemically accessible to the agent, as well as being a goal by which an 
agent is motivated. 
Although an agent need not articulate her goal in quite the way that I offer attitudinal 
harmony, having this sort of end goal is broader than that of particular rational 
requirements, and sufficiently specific for an agent to appeal to it as the motivation for 
her forming her attitudes in a certain order with each other. To repeat my stance on 
epistemic access, this telos is not necessarily occurrent for an agent when some action 
of hers is motivated by it, but it is available to her upon reflection. I would conjecture 
that an agent would most naturally articulate her rational goal in terms of some 
particular incompatibility between two or more of her attitudes, such as, ‘I had to 
choose between paying my taxes or burying my guilty conscious,’ or, ‘It was the best 
thing to do in order to arrive on time.’ 
It is also possible for an agent to be motivated by the goal of an attitudinally 
harmonious state of mind. When an agent’s attitudes violate some requirement of 
rationality that is constitutive of a harmonious state of mind, it is possible for her to 
deliberate on the attitudes within the scope of that requirement on the basis that they 
are attitudinally discordant. I think this is plausible as a minimalistic account of 
motivation, even when it happens at a completely unconscious level. Being faced with 
choosing between two simultaneously held but contradictory beliefs is a disconcerting 
situation to be in, and one to which attitudinal harmony motivates an agent to find a 
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resolution regardless of whether an agent is aware that this is what is motivating her 
to resolve the contradiction.  
Furthermore, having the telos of attitudinal harmony will motivate an agent to ‘act’ in 
ways that will satisfy rational requirements without being immediately motivated by the 
requirements she satisfies and without those particular requirements being accessible 
to her. An agent who is motivated by attitudinal harmony will reflect on her attitudes 
that do not satisfy some requirement and deliberate (whether consciously or not) over 
which attitudes to revise and in what way. The resultant state of mind would ideally 
come to satisfy some requirement of rationality. But the report that an agent might 
articulate upon reflection does not necessarily require any reference to a particular 
requirement of rationality. It is more likely, I think, that an agent would articulate either 
a version of her rational telos, or reference those particular attitudes that were under 
consideration.   
I think that my account of attitudinal harmony is capable of filling the role of the 
appropriate characteristic rational telos. It is a goal that a rational agent can be 
motivated by, and one to which an agent has a degree of access. This goal is most 
appropriately aimed at for its own sake, although I will demonstrate the final value of 
attitudinal harmony in the following chapter. 
One might object that an agent revising her attitudes in ways that satisfy or do not 
violate rational requirements does not amount to aiming at mental order of the kind I 
have described. In response to this, I will point out two aspects of my account. First, a 
rational agent may as a matter of fact be motivated by considerations other than 
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attitudinal harmony when revising her attitudes to conform with rational requirements. 
But my claim is the normative one that part of what makes an agent rationally virtuous 
is the fact that she has some concern for her mental order. Second, my account of the 
final value of attitudinal harmony in the following chapter (6.5) holds that the value of 
attitudinal harmony is extrinsically dependent upon other intellectual and practical 
concerns. In this way, being motivated by attitudinal harmony may often be present 
alongside a motivation to get to the truth or to do the right thing. 
5.5. Conclusion 
While the primary purpose of this chapter was to argue for the appropriate rational 
telos, my account also provides a justification for requirements qua requirements of 
rationality. I argued that the appropriate rational goal that motivates a rational agent is 
the same basis that justifies requirements as requirements of rationality. 
I first gave the case in section 5.2 for why I do not think that the rational goal is that of 
satisfying rational requirements, nor is it intelligibility. I then considered in section 5.3 
whether each of the accounts of expected correctness, consistency, or coherence is 
unable to account for paradigmatic rational requirements. I argued that none of them 
is able to do so. 
I then offered my account of attitudinal harmony in section 5.4 as a basis for grounding 
rational requirements on the basis of cohering an agent’s attitudes and their content 
with each other and with an agent’s worldview over time. This account was able to 
ground paradigmatic rational requirements as well as provide an account of the 
rational telos that is possible to motivate an agent as well as that is accessible. Being 
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motivated by the telos of rationality, I argued, will lead an agent to satisfy what 
rationality requires of her without those requirements being motives or accessible to 
the agent. 
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 The Normativity of Rationality 
 
6.1. Introduction 
In chapter 3 (section 3.5) I included the element of praiseworthiness as a characteristic 
of intellectual virtues. In chapter 4 (section 4.5) I argued for the praiseworthiness of a 
rational agent on the grounds that she exercises her rational capacity out of a 
motivation for the rational goal, and in virtue of the value of the state of mind produced 
by doing so. However, this account was incomplete and required an account of the 
value of the state of mind produced by the proper exercise of an agent’s rational 
capacity. This is the purpose of the present chapter, in which I argue that an 
attitudinally harmonious state of mind has final value. A consequence of this account 
is that it is also able to offer an account of the normativity of rational requirements. 
Although an account of the value of an attitudinally harmonious state of mind is the 
primary objective, I will frame this chapter in terms of the debate over the normativity 
of rational requirements. 
There are two general approaches for accounting for the normativity of rational 
requirements. For reasons-responsivists, rationality consists in responding correctly 
to normative reasons. According to this approach, what rationality requires of an agent 
and what the agent has reason to do (or believe, or intend, and so forth) are 
necessarily coextensive. Those who reject reasons-responsivism, in contrast, take 
rational requirements as stemming from a peculiar source, i.e., rationality, in the same 
way that moral requirements stem from morality. This notion of rational requirements 
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is called ‘reified rationality’. But accounting for the normativity of reified requirements 
of rationality has proven difficult. 
Rejecting reasons-responsivism, I adopt the latter stance toward rational requirements 
and argue for two claims in this chapter. First, each requirement of rationality provides 
a pro tanto reason to satisfy that requirement. This pro tanto reason is not a reason to 
form any particular attitude ɸ, but rather a reason for an agent to see to it that she 
comes to satisfy some wide-scope requirement of rationality that {ɸ; ψ}. My second 
claim is that, while my argument for demonstrating the normativity of rational 
requirements is independent of my account of rationality as an intellectual virtue, my 
account is necessary for explaining necessary features of what makes an agent 
rationally as she should be.. In other words, my account explains what distinguishes 
an agent who satisfies the requirements of rationality and who is rational from an agent 
who satisfies the requirements of rationality and who is not rational. On this account, 
my claim that rationality is an intellectual virtue is also necessary for explaining the 
praiseworthiness of a rational agent. 
I first distinguish in section 6.2 the different meanings of ‘reason’ and discuss how pro 
tanto reasons and requirements differ in strictness and detachability. With these 
distinctions in hand, I then argue in section 6.3 that the concern behind the question 
of whether requirements of rationality are normative should be spelled out in terms of 
whether or not the requirements of rationality provide us with pro tanto reasons, a 
stance Broome calls ‘medium normativity’, although my formulation is different from 
Broome’s.  
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In section 6.4, I then offer an overview of how different approaches to addressing the 
normative question have failed. I first argue that reasons-responsivism is an 
unsatisfactory approach for answering the normative question since it either provides 
too weak an account of rational normativity or it implausibly conflates normativity and 
rationality. Conflating normativity and what rationality requires is implausible since 
instances of satisfying requirements of rationality are not coextensive with responding 
correctly to reasons. The second view I consider is that of formulation rational 
requirements as process-requirements, although I also find problems with this 
approach. Third, I consider two indirect derivative arguments that Broome (2013) 
presents and rejects. Ultimately, I also find these arguments unconvincing. 
In section (6.5) I offer what I take to be a plausible account of the normativity of rational 
requirements, arguing that an agent has a pro tanto reason to satisfy what rationality 
requires of her in virtue of the final value of attitudinal harmony. I respond to a 
challenge by Kolodny that requirements of this kind cannot be normative, arguing that 
Kolodny’s challenge does not pose a threat to my account. Finally, I argue in section 
6.6 that an account of a rational agent is insufficiently explained by an account of 
satisfying requirements of rationality. It is necessary to additionally take into account 
the two elements of a rational capacity and the rational telos in order to explain 
necessary features of a fully rational agent. 
6.2. Requirements and Reasons 
In this section outline different kinds of reasons in order to focus on the kind that is 
relevant for my argument – pro tanto reasons. After describing the notion of a pro tanto 
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reason, I highlight two normative differences between reasons and requirements, 
namely their differences in strictness and detachment. 
 
 
6.2.1. Reasons 
Before outlining the normative differences between pro tanto reasons and 
requirements, it is relevant to note the different senses of ‘reason.’ There are three 
common senses of ‘reason’ that denote a relation between some fact57 and a particular 
agent’s action construed broadly.58 A motivating reason is a reason for which an agent 
does something. For example, a motivating reason is used when saying that the 
reason for which Nina kicked the ball was to score a goal. An explanatory reason for 
an action is that reason that explains why an agent acted in a particular way. This is 
the kind of reason referred to when saying that Nina kicked the ball in that way because 
that’s how she was trained to kick balls. A normative reason for an action is a reason 
that favours or otherwise justifies a particular action (Alvarez, 2016). For example, the 
 
 
57 I assume factualism about reasons, although my position is not committed to any particular ontology 
of reasons. Nor am I committed to a particular account of what constitutes some fact (or whatever) as 
a reason, whether it is evidence that an agent ought to do something, or it is part of a necessary 
explanation of why an agent ought to do something. On this debate, see for example Kearns and Star 
(2013). 
58 In the context of rationality, an agent’s action can include mental events such as forming or revising 
attitudes. 
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reason Nina kicked the ball at the goal was that this is the way to score the winning 
goal. 
Normative reasons are the kind that are relevant here. Of normative reasons there are 
at least two kinds, pro tanto reasons and conclusive reasons. A pro tanto reason is a 
normative reason that favours an action to some extent and can therefore be weighed 
against other pro tanto reasons that either favour the same or contrary actions 
(Alvarez, 2016). For example, the fact that I am hungry is a normative reason to start 
cooking now. And the fact that I have guests arriving in a half-hour is yet another 
normative reason to start cooking now. Each of these reasons individually is a pro 
tanto reason to start cooking, and together provide strong reason that I start cooking. 
Whether I ought to start cooking, say, is determined by the balance of pro tanto 
reasons I may have. 
If the balance of my pro tanto reasons make it the case that I ought to do something, 
then I have conclusive reason to perform that action. This is contrasted with having 
sufficient reason for an action, in which case your pro tanto reasons on balance permit 
some action but fall short of something you ought to do. For example, the fact that my 
guests are arriving in three hours is sufficient reason to start cooking now. This does 
not on balance give me conclusive reason to start cooking now, say, if it will only take 
me one hour to do the cooking. 
In contrast to pro tanto reasons, having a decisive reason means having a normative 
reason that defeats or overrides other pro tanto reasons you have (Alvarez, 2016). For 
example, the fact that a friend in danger has called me and requires my help is a 
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decisive reason not to start cooking and leave immediately, despite the pro tanto 
reasons I have not to leave immediately (and start cooking), such as being hungry and 
having guests arrive soon. Having a decisive reason for some action outweighs any 
other pro tanto reason you have against that action. So, according to my rough outline, 
pro tanto reasons for an action are normative reasons that can be weighed against 
each other. When your pro tanto reasons on balance permit an action, then you have 
sufficient reason for that action. When your reasons on balance make it the case that 
you ought to do that action, then you have conclusive reason for some action. In 
contrast to pro tanto reasons, a decisive reason for some action overrides any pro 
tanto reasons you may against that action. 
6.2.2. Strictness 
In what ways are pro tanto reasons normatively different from requirements? I will 
demonstrate in the present and the following subsections that they are different in 
terms of normative strictness and detachment. Beginning with strictness, consider 
what the differences are between the following claims about some reason (D) and 
some requirement (R). 
(D) Being on a diet is a reason59 not to eat. 
(R) Observing Ramadan requires that you do not eat.60 
 
 
59 For the remainder of this section I use ‘reason’ as shorthand for ‘pro tanto reason.’ 
60 For simplicity I leave out the details of Ramadan, such as the requirement not to eat from dawn to 
dusk. 
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While (D) is a claim about some pro tanto reason not to eat, and (R) a claim about 
some requirement not to eat, each is a normative claim to the extent that both 
prescribe some action, or lack of action in this case.61 What then is different between 
having a reason not to eat and having a requirement not to eat? 
The first difference is that having a pro tanto reason does not make it the case that 
you strictly ought to do something. In contrast, having a requirement (say you intend 
to observe Ramadan), assuming the requirement is normative, does make it the case 
that you strictly ought to do something (Broome, 1999 and Reisner, 2009). Consider 
first (D), that being on a diet is a reason for not eating. The fact that Daniel is on a diet 
is a consideration for him not to eat on any occasion. But Daniel could be subject to a 
requirement to eat on some occasion, which would override his pro tanto reason not 
to eat. Daniel’s reason not to eat, like any pro tanto reason, should be weighed in light 
of other considerations Daniel may have. Therefore, that Daniel has a reason not to 
eat does not imply that Daniel ought not to eat. Rather, one might say that a reason 
for something is a ‘slack’ ought to do that thing (Broome, 1999: 401). 
In contrast, requirements are strict. Consider (R), that Ramadan requires not eating. 
If Rudy would observe Ramadan, part of observing it is not eating at the appropriate 
times. Observing Ramadan does not give Rudy a consideration for not eating that can 
 
 
61 I take it for granted that a normative claim involves an agent for whom the prescribed action is 
normative, although I leave out reference to the agent for the sake of simplicity. I implicitly assume an 
agent for whom each reason or requirement is normative throughout this section. The same goes for 
any other relevant fact to which a reason is related, such as a time and a circumstance. 
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be weighed against other reasons for eating in the same way as Daniel’s diet. Rather, 
the fact that Rudy would observe Ramadan makes it the case that he strictly should 
not eat. Thus, while pro tanto reasons give an agent a slack prescription, requirements 
give agents a strict prescription.62 
Two points of clarification are necessary. First, not all normative reasons are slack. 
Conclusive reasons, as mentioned above, also give you strict oughts. My friend in 
danger gives me a strict ought to leave immediately. Second, as mentioned in chapter 
2 (section 2.4) requirements do not necessarily give us oughts. The requirements of 
Ramadan do not give atheists any oughts, nor do the requirements of Scouts give 
non-Scouts any oughts. The relevant point I hope to make about strictness here is 
that, while pro tanto reasons can be weighed in deliberation, requirements cannot. If 
you have some requirement, whether normative or not, you either satisfy or violate it. 
6.2.3. Detachment 
The second normative difference between pro tanto reasons and requirements is that 
reasons are detachable from the fact that gives you a reason, while requirements are 
non-detachable from the condition for the requirement (Broome, 1999 and Reisner, 
2009). 
Recall that I rejected factual detachment for rational requirements above (2.3.3). 
 
 
62 All requirements are ‘strict’ in this sense, even if they are not normative. For example, the 
requirements of Scouting and seventeenth century European etiquette are strict, although they are not 
normative prescriptions. Strictness is neutral regarding normativity. 
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Factual detachment: (X and (S is required that X→Y)) → S is required that Y. 
The wide scope of rational requirements does not permit detachment. If it did, then the 
requirement that if you believe you ought to pay your taxes then you ought to intend 
to pay your taxes would give you the requirement to intend to pay your taxes. 
In contrast, a pro tanto reason is detachable from the fact that makes something a 
reason. 
If fact F gives S a pro tanto reason to Y, then S has a pro tanto reason to Y. 
For example, consider again (D), which would provide the following conditional:  
If you are on a diet, then you have a reason not to eat. 
Your reason not to eat can be detached from the fact that you are on a diet by modus 
ponens. 
You are on a diet. 
Therefore, you have a reason not to eat. 
The claim that you have a reason not to eat can be validly inferred from the premise 
claims. This is what it means for reasons to be detachable: having a reason to X is 
logically independent of the fact (or whatever) that gives you a reason to X. 
In contrast, detachment does not apply to requirements (Broome, 1999 and Reisner, 
2009). Take requirement (R), which gives us this conditional statement: 
You are required that, if you observe Ramadan, then you do not eat. 
Having a requirement not to eat, in this case, is not detachable from observing 
Ramadan. This is the function of wide-scope requirements. If we were to attempt to 
construct a modus ponens syllogism from the above, we would have to continue thus: 
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You observe Ramadan. 
Therefore, you are required that you do not eat. 
This is clearly invalid given the above requirement.63 Thus, while having a reason is 
detachable from the fact that gives you a reason, wide-scope requirements are not 
detachable from the condition of those requirements. 
6.3. The Normative Question 
Bearing in mind the normative differences between reasons and requirements is 
relevant for understanding the concern behind the question of whether requirements 
of rationality are normative. This will become evident shortly. I argue in this section 
that the question of whether requirements of rationality are normative should be 
understood as a question of whether being subject to a requirement of rationality gives 
you a pro tanto reason on that basis.  
One of the primary concerns surrounding the normativity of rational requirements is 
that, if rational requirements are normative, then how are the prescriptions of rationality 
to be squared with other normative prescriptions? Rationality may require of you that, 
if you to intend to stay healthy, then you intend to pay your dentist a visit. But, given 
your expectation that it will be painful, you have a hedonic reason not to see the 
dentist. Does the fact that rationality requires something of you override any pro tanto 
 
 
63 Another way of expressing the difference in detachment between requirements and pro tanto reasons 
is in terms of scope; reasons have narrow scope while requirements have wide scope. See section 
(2.3.1) in chapter 2 above for my discussion of the distinction between wide-scope and narrow-scope 
requirements. 
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reasons you may have to the contrary? If so, would rational requirements trump any 
pro tanto reasons you may have? What if you have contrary requirements, one from 
rationality and one from, say, morality. Is it possible to adjudicate between conflicts of 
what you ought to do? I will call this the ‘normative concern’ about rationality; if 
rationality is normative, then how could its prescriptions square up against other 
normative reasons and oughts you may have? 
To elaborate the normative concern, consider the following. Assume a rational 
requirement gives you a prescription to X and you also have a contradictory ought, 
say from morality, not to X. If rationality is normative in the sense of issuing us with 
oughts, and granted that morality also gives us oughts, then you would land up in a 
position in which you both ought to X by virtue of rationality and you ought not to X by 
virtue of morality. In a situation with contradictory normative prescriptions, you would 
need to choose between being fully rational and, in this case, fully moral. This is a 
serious position to be in. 
But if the normativity of rational requirements did not give us oughts – say, due to 
requirements of rationality rather giving us pro tanto reason to satisfy them – then 
situations in which you have contradicting normative prescriptions could be resolved. 
If requirements of rationality are normative in the sense of issuing us with pro tanto 
reasons, then in cases of contradictory prescriptions, you would have a clearer method 
of resolving the conflict by weighing your reasons and adopting that course for which 
you have stronger pro tanto reasons. 
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I think that it is uncontroversial that the requirements of rationality are not normative in 
the sense of issuing us with oughts. We can think of scenarios in which an agent would 
rightly elect to violate a requirement of rationality in light of some other consideration 
(Parfit, 1987). For instance, Broome (2013: 192) gives an example of an opportunity 
to prevent a war by believing a contradiction. In such a case, the fact that you can 
prevent a war is a decisive reason for violating the rational requirement not to hold 
contradictory beliefs. Assuming that what rationality requires of us can be weighed in 
deliberation in light of other normative reasons we have, the question of whether 
requirements of rationality are normative is tantamount to asking whether an agent 
being subject to a requirement of rationality entails that she has a pro tanto reason. 
But before we consider candidates for addressing this question, it is necessary to be 
clear about the ways in which a requirement of rationality entails that an agent has a 
reason. Broome (2007b: 163-4 and 2013: 192-3) points out three ways in which being 
subject to a requirement of rationality can be conceived of as normative, which he 
labels ‘strong,’ ‘weak,’ and ‘medium’ normativity. According to strong normativity, 
necessarily, if S is rationally required to ɸ, then S ought to ɸ on that basis. Assume 
that rationality requires of you that, if you believe that you ought to pay your taxes, you 
intend to pay your taxes. According to strong normativity, on the basis of that 
requirement, you strictly ought that, if you believe that you ought to pay your taxes, 
then you intend to pay your taxes. Given that rationality is not ordinarily regarded as 
giving us oughts in this strongly normative sense as I just mentioned, I will not consider 
whether rationality might be strongly normative any further. On weak normativity, 
necessarily, if S is rationally required to ɸ, then S has a pro tanto reason to ɸ (Broome, 
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2013: 193). This entailment is not what is ordinarily meant by a claim that requirements 
of rationality are normative. According to weak normativity, you could have a pro tanto 
reason that coincides with what is rationally required of you, but that is independent of 
what rationality requires of you. In other words, the pro tanto reason you have is not 
necessarily a reason in virtue of the fact that you are subject to a requirement of 
rationality. For example, on weak normativity, if you are rationally required that, if you 
believe that you ought to pay your taxes, then you intend to pay your taxes, then there 
exists some reason for you to see to this requirement. The pro tanto reason to do so 
could be, say, a prudential reason; not paying your taxes would cause you to pay even 
more in fines or to be arrested. Or you might regard it as immoral not to intend to pay 
your taxes, in which case you have a moral reason to intend to pay them if you will not 
change your belief that you ought to pay your taxes. Whatever reason you may have, 
weak normativity holds that, necessarily, the reason coincides with the rational 
requirement. 
Some may think that weak normativity of rational requirements is worth settling for. It 
could be the case that satisfying requirements of rationality often, though not 
necessarily, assists us in achieving what we have pro tanto reasons to achieve. But 
such pro tanto reasons would not be reasons for an agent on the basis of being 
required by rationality. In this way, weak normativity is not quite satisfactory for the 
claim that rationality itself is normative. 
Finally, medium normativity is the claim that, necessarily, if S is rationally required to 
{ɸ→ψ}, then that requirement is a pro tanto reason for S to {ɸ→ψ} (Broome, 2007b: 
164 and Broome, 2013: 192). Medium normativity appears to be what we are after for 
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addressing the normative question. A requirement of rationality is a fact that is a pro 
tanto reason for an agent, rather than merely coinciding with a reason as per weak 
normativity. And the kind of normativity is that of a pro tanto reason, which can be 
deliberated about in light of other pro tanto reasons an agent has, which is not possible 
under strong normativity. For example, according to medium normativity, the rational 
requirement that, if you believe you ought to pay your taxes, then you intend to pay 
your taxes, is a pro tanto reason for you to see to it that, if you believe you ought to 
pay your taxes, then you intend to pay your taxes. It is not a conclusive reason, which 
it is for strong normativity, nor is the reason given from some other source (like 
prudence or morality) as it would be for weak normativity. 
6.4. Attempts at Answering the Normative Question 
I now consider three approaches to addressing the question of whether requirements 
of rationality give us pro tanto reasons: reasons-responsivism, the process-
requirement approach, and two indirect derivative arguments. I find that none of these 
have provided a satisfactory account of rational normativity. I first demonstrate in 
subsection 6.4.1 that reasons-responsivism either provides an account of weak 
normativity or dismisses the question of normativity by equating what you ought to do 
with what rationality requires of you. But my fundamental misgiving about reasons-
responsivism is that not every instance of satisfying what is required of you by 
rationality is an instance of responding correctly to reasons. Thus, although rationality 
often requires that we respond correctly to reasons, there are other requirements that 
cannot be accounted for in this way. Two versions of reified rationality respect the 
difference of extension between responding correctly to reasons and satisfying 
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requirements of rationality, one of which formulates requirements of rationality as 
process-requirements and the other of which as state-requirements. I argue in 
subsection 6.4.2 that it is a mistake to formulate requirements of rationality as process-
requirements, and, thus, that the normativity of process-requirements is not that of 
rationality. Adopting a state-requirement formulation of rational requirements, I then 
consider in subsection 6.4.3 two attempts at deriving normativity of rational 
requirements indirectly from the normativity of rationality in general (as a property or 
a disposition), which are unsuccessful. 
6.4.1. Reasons-responsivism 
I first addressed reasons-responsivism in chapter 2 (2.4.1). Reasons-responsivism 
understands rationality as consisting of responding correctly to reasons. This position 
can be tailored to your preferred account of what kind of reasons you should respond 
to, whether they are external (based on facts) or internal (based on your perspective 
or what you believe to be the case). For reasons-responsivists, what rationality 
requires of you is equivalent to what you have reasons for. 
Whatever the details of the particular brand of reasons-responsivism you adhere to, a 
reasons-responsivist reduces the normativity of rational requirements to the 
normativity of the reasons you possess. There are two ways in which this is articulated, 
although both amount to the claim that rationality is weakly normative. According 
Kolodny’s (2005) formulation, the ‘apparent normativity’ of rational requirements is 
really just the normativity of the reasons you have. Since responding correctly to 
reasons is what you ought to do, and rationality requires that you respond as your 
reasons dictate, satisfying rational requirements coincides with what you have reason 
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to do. On this articulation, since a requirement of rationality necessarily coincides with 
what you have reason for, Kolodny’s ‘apparent normativity’ of rationality is equivalent 
to weak normativity. 
A second way of articulating the normativity of reasons-responsivism is expressed by 
Lord (2017). According to him, what rationality requires of you is just the same as what 
you ought to do. If rationality consists in responding correctly to reasons, and if what 
you ought to do is what on balance you have reason to do, then, necessarily, what 
rationality requires is coextensive with what you ought to do. This articulation, like 
Kolodny’s, is equivalent to weak normativity. Necessarily, having a rational 
requirement coincides with having pro tanto reasons, but the requirement itself does 
not give you a reason. 
Regardless of whether you prefer the former articulation of the normativity of rational 
requirements under reasons-responsivism or the latter, I do not think that a reasons-
responsivist definition of rational requirements is tenable. I offer two objections to 
reasons-responsivism. The first, presented by Littlejohn (2018a), targets the view that 
rationality consists in responding correctly to external (i.e., ‘factive’) reasons.64 The 
second, presented by Broome (2007a), targets the view that rationality consists in 
responding correctly to ‘attitudinal’ (i.e., non-factive) reasons. Littlejohn’s and 
Broome’s arguments undermine reasons-responsivism, since they both demonstrate 
 
 
64 This is an oversimplification. The distinctions between external and internal reasons on the one hand 
and factive and attitudinal reasons on the other do not map quite so neatly onto each other. However, 
the nuances between these distinctions are not relevant for my argument here. 
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that responding correctly to reasons is not coextensive with satisfying what rationality 
requires of you; there are instances of responding correctly to reasons that violate 
what rationality requires of you.  
Before going into these two objections to reasons-responsivism, consider the quick 
objection (mentioned above in 2.4.1) to reasons-responsivism about external reasons, 
first given by Bernard Williams (1981: 102). Williams argues that appealing to an 
external reason is not quite right for explaining actions that can be sufficiently 
explained exclusively in terms of an agent’s mental content. Suppose, says Williams, 
a man believes his glass contains gin when in fact it contains petrol. The fact that it 
contains petrol would be a reason for the man not to drink the liquid in his glass. But, 
were he to drink the contents of his glass, we would be able to explain his drinking 
sufficiently by reference to his belief about what was in his glass rather than the 
external reason of what was, in fact, in his glass.  
Broome (2005) makes a similar point that is more relevant to the question of whether 
rationality consists in responding correctly to reasons with his example of a fish with 
salmonella in front of you. The salmonella is a reason for you not to eat the fish, but 
the fact that you do not know the fish has salmonella does not make it irrational for 
you to eat it. The fact that you are not aware of some external fact does not affect the 
rationality of your intentions. 
There are two possible ways to defend reasons-responsivists from the quick objection. 
One way is to build epistemic constraints into external reasons for what counts as a 
reason for an agent. If only external reasons of which you are aware are the reasons 
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to which you should respond, then reasons-responsivism bypasses the quick 
objection. Preserving externalism about reasons, albeit with an epistemic limitation, is 
attractive for keeping the normative force of reasons in facts independent of the agent. 
Another way to preserve reasons-responsivism is to forego the factive nature of 
external reasons and adopt internalism about reasons (attitudinal theory of reasons). 
On this approach, the fact that there is petrol in your glass or salmonella in your fish 
is not a relevant reason, but rather what you believe about what is in your glass or fish. 
An appeal of the attitudinal theory of reasons is that it takes seriously the thesis that 
rationality supervenes on the mind, and so seems like a natural ally of rationality. 
A problem for reasons-responsivism of either stripe would be that instances of 
responding correctly to reasons are not coextensive with instances of rationality. 
Littlejohn (2018a) argues for this objection to externalism with epistemic constraints, 
and Broome (2007a) argues for it against responding to attitudinal reasons. I first 
present Littlejohn’s objection. 
Littlejohn (2018a) considers whether reasons-responsivism can be preserved if an 
appropriate epistemic constraint is built into external reasons. The precise nature of 
this constraint is not relevant for the part of Littlejohn’s argument I present here. It is 
sufficient to constrain external reasons to which you should respond as only those of 
which you have knowledge. In this way, your lack of knowledge of the contents of your 
glass or fish did not make it the case that you were not responding correctly to reasons. 
But an epistemic constraint such as knowledge of external reasons does not get 
reasons-responsivism out of trouble. The factive nature of external reasons is still hard 
to reconcile with the mental supervenience of rationality. Littlejohn gives an example 
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of an agent, Agnes, whose friend in need has asked to meet her at a diner, and who 
sees a child in danger of drowning in a pond. Agnes has two reasons – one in favour 
of going to the diner and one in favour of jumping in the pond – both of which we are 
assuming are factive and are known by the agent. We are to assume also that these 
reasons are mutually exclusive; acting on one precludes acting on the other. The 
correct response to Agnes’ reasons is to jump into the pond. 
But if satisfying rational requirements supervenes on the mind, then a non-factive 
mental duplicate of Agnes should correctly respond in the same way. Assume that 
there is a near-mental duplicate of Agnes in a nearby world, whose friend in need has 
asked to meet her at a diner and who sees a child in danger of drowning in a pond. 
The only difference is that this Agnes is mistaken about the child in danger. Thus, 
Agnes’ belief that there is a child in danger is false and therefore not a reason to which 
she should respond according to the factive version of reasons-responsivism under 
examination. Despite being mental duplicates, mistaken Agnes responds correctly to 
her known factive reasons by going to the diner, while non-mistaken Agnes responds 
correctly by jumping into the pond. 
I find this argument convincing in highlighting where responding to external reasons 
departs from rational supervenience. But the aim of this argument must be clarified; it 
is only meant to demonstrate that being a factualist about reasons is incompatible with 
rationality supervening on the mind, if you subscribe to reasons-responsivism.65 
 
 
65 Littlejohn and Dutant (MS) argue against the normative force of reasons-responsivism. They claim 
that when we consider an agent’s evidence and relevant values, ‘evidence-relative’ reasons do not add 
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Reasons-responsivists who profess their allegiance to both externalism about reasons 
and internalism about rationality, such as Lord (2017), thus face a fundamental 
tension. And, since I find merit in rational supervenience (see 2.4.2), this is another 
reason for me to reject an externalist brand of reasons-responsivism. 
But what if you do not hold to externalism about reasons? If attitudes are reasons, 
then there is prima facie consistency between rational supervenience and reasons-
responsivism. While there may be consistency on this front, I do not think that 
rationality consists in responding correctly to attitudinal reasons. I will present 
Broome’s (2007a) objection to the claim that rationality consists in responding correctly 
to attitudinal reasons. Attitudinal reasons are attitudes that count as pro tanto reasons. 
For example, on this view, a belief that you ought to pay your taxes is a pro tanto 
reason to intend to pay your taxes. The crux of Broome’s argument is that you can 
respond correctly to attitudinal reasons while violating a requirement of rationality, so 
that you would not be fully rational while satisfying reasons-responsivism. This 
amounts to a demonstration that an instance of responding correctly to attitudinal 
reasons is not necessarily an instance of (structural) rationality. 
Broome’s argument, as I understand it, consists of four steps. These steps 
demonstrate that it is possible that satisfying one attitudinal reason necessarily 
violates another attitudinal reason, and thereby violating a requirement of rationality. 
 
 
to what an agent ought to do. This argument does not undermine reasons-responsivism in the relevant 
way for my argument, although it could be read as an additional argument for reasons-responsivism 
only establishing weak normativity. 
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First step. An attitudinal reason gives an agent a strict ought. 
To begin with, if rationality consists in responding correctly to attitudinal reasons, then 
any attitudinal reason you possess will have a corresponding strict requirement of 
rationality. For example, your intention to pay your taxes is an attitudinal reason for 
you to not to intend to not pay your taxes. Thus, you have a corresponding no 
contradictory intentions requirement of rationality that, if you intend to pay your taxes, 
then you do not intend to not pay your taxes. Another example is that your intention to 
pay your taxes, and your belief that in order to pay your taxes it is necessary to open 
an eFiling account, together constitute an attitudinal reason for you to intend to open 
an eFiling account. This attitudinal reason imposes a corresponding instrumental 
requirement of rationality that, if you intend to pay your taxes and believe that to pay 
your taxes you must open an eFiling account, then you intend to open an eFiling 
account. 
The remaining steps run in the following way, which I will explain together with an 
example. 
Second step. An agent can have conflicting attitudinal reasons. 
Third step. When an agent responds to an attitudinal reason, she necessarily 
fails to respond correctly to a conflicting attitudinal reason. 
Fourth step. By failing to respond to an attitudinal reason, an agent has violated 
what she ought to do and is therefore not rational. 
I will colour in the example given by Broome (2007a: 358) with my own details to 
illustrate this. Say you intend to get fit and believe that in order to get fit it is necessary 
to intend to exercise. According to the first step, this belief and intention constitute an 
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attitudinal reason for you to intend to exercise, and thus you have the corresponding 
instrumental requirement of rationality. But say that you already intend not to exercise. 
This is an attitudinal reason not to intend to exercise, and thus you have the no 
contradictory intentions requirement of rationality not to intend to exercise. You now 
have a rational requirement to intend to exercise (instrumental) and a rational 
requirement not to intend to exercise (no contradictory intentions). Say that, on 
balance, your reasons favour intending  not to exercise and you respond appropriately. 
You have successfully responded correctly to your attitudinal reasons. But, alas, you 
still intend to get fit and believe that in order to get fit it is necessary to intend to 
exercise. And since you do not intend to exercise, you are not fully rational because 
of violating your instrumental requirement. Thus, you have responded correctly to your 
attitudinal reasons but have failed to be fully rational.  
Broome’s argument demonstrates how responding correctly to attitudinal reasons 
cannot be coextensive with being fully rational. If an agent were to satisfy some of her 
rational requirements as given by her attitudinal reasons, it is possible for her to violate 
some others. What rationality requires and what our attitudinal reasons prescribe 
therefore cannot be the same thing. 
I must stress that, although I reject rationality as either responding correctly to 
epistemically restricted reasons or responding correctly to attitudinal reasons, this 
does not imply a rejection of or any commitment to internalism or externalism about 
reasons, nor whether attitudes can be reasons. My concern has been whether we 
should understand rationality and what it requires of us exclusively in terms of reasons. 
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This does not imply that rationality does not involve responding correctly to reasons, 
but rather that rationality is not equivalent to responding correctly to reasons.  
6.4.2. Process-requirements 
An alternative to a reasons-responsivist approach to rationality is regarding rational 
requirements as issuing from an independent source – rationality. According to reified 
rationality, structural rationality is constituted by satisfying certain norms (or 
‘requirements’ as I have been calling them) among sets of your attitudes. I have thus 
far assumed that these requirements are state-requirements, although recall (2.3.2) 
that some (Kolodny, 2007 and Fink, 2012) advocate for structural rationality to be 
understood in terms of process-requirements.66 State-requirements are formulated as 
wide-scope requirements for the proper arrangement of mental states. Process-
requirements, in contrast, are requirements about what a rational agent should do 
going forward in order to revise or maintain her attitudes. This difference will become 
clearer as I explain the differences that motivate state- and process-requirements.  
What motivates formulating requirements of rationality as process-requirements is the 
intuition that a theory of rationality – what counts as a requirement of structural 
rationality – ought to provide guidance on what attitudes to form in a given situation. 
While prima facie plausible, this stands in tension with another intuition that a theory 
of rational requirements must provide conditions for evaluating whether a state of mind 
 
 
66 Recall my earlier discussion of state-requirements and process-requirements in chapter 2 (section 
2.3.2).  
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is rational or not. Andrew Reisner (2009) spells out the tension between expectations 
that favour state-requirements and expectations that favour process-requirements in 
the following way. I will call the former the mental evaluation expectation and the latter 
the attitude guidance expectation. 
Mental evaluation: ‘A theory of rationality must have the resources to evaluate 
whether or not an agent’s mental states, or some relevant proper subset(s) of 
them, are rational or irrational’ (Reisner, 2009: 244). 
Attitude guidance: ‘A theory of rationality must have the resources to be guiding 
over time’ (Reisner, 2009: 245). 
Attitude guidance is appealing for being useful for an agent to know what attitude to 
form given their current mental state.67 Mental evaluation is appealing by virtue of the 
conditions it gives us for making judgments about the rationality of an agent’s state of 
mind. 
Although not logically exclusive, there are two points of tension between these 
expectations that make them difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile. The first is that 
mental evaluation gives us requirements that are indexed to a single point in time, 
while attitude guidance gives us requirements that are indexed across time. The 
second is that mental evaluation requirements are wide-scope, while attitude guidance 
requirements are narrow-scope. State-requirements satisfy the expectations of mental 
 
 
67 Process-requirements are not necessarily based on the expectation of attitude guidance. Fink’s 
(2012) motivation for process-requirements is not based on attitude guidance, but rather on 
explanations of the degree to which an agent satisfies the requirements from a normative source 
(whether that of morality, prudence, or rationality). 
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evaluation, while process-requirements satisfy the expectation of attitude guidance. 
For example, notice the differences in time-indexing and scope between the process-
requirement formulation of enkrasia and the state-requirement formulation of enkrasia. 
To avoid confusion, note that I do not endorse process-enkrasia. 
Process-enkrasia: If you believe at t that you ought to p, then, going forward 
from t, you are required by rationality to intend that p.  
State-enkrasia: You are required by rationality that, if you believe at t that you 
ought to p, then you intend at t that p. 
There is difference among adherents of process-requirements on how exactly they are 
to be formulated. Kolodny (2007), for instance, formulates process-requirements 
roughly along the same lines as process-enkrasia above. 
Necessarily, if you believe at t that you ought to X, but you do not intend at t to 
X, then rationality requires you to form going forward from t, on the basis of the 
content [of] your belief, the intention to X. 
(Kolodny, 2007: 373) 
Notice Kolodny’s inclusion of the condition that your requirement to form the intention 
to X is based on the content of your belief. This will be relevant in my response against 
process-requirement below. In contrast, Fink (2012: 130) takes process-requirements 
to be teleological in the sense that the process you are required to undergo aims at 
forming a resultant attitude. On Fink’s conception, the enkratic requirement should 
rather be formulated as, if you now believe that you ought to pay your taxes, then 
rationality now requires of you that you undergo a process so that you form the 
intention to pay your taxes. According to Fink, undergoing this process is ‘intentional’ 
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or ‘deliberate’ (2012: 134), which implies that you require, in the case of this example, 
an intention to form an intention. 
Although Fink’s formulation seems more plausible than Kolodny’s, I do not take these 
differences to be relevant for my purpose here. Apart from the fact that they are 
narrow-scope and indexed to a period of time, what is distinctive about process-
requirements is that they involve undergoing a process for their satisfaction.  
Before giving my response, I should point out what process-requirements have to do 
with rational normativity. My account of the normativity of rational requirements below 
is committed to a wide-scope formulation of rational requirements. As I will 
demonstrate, having a pro tanto reason to satisfy a wide-scope requirement of 
rationality does not give you a pro tanto reason to form any particular attitude. Rather, 
this is a pro tanto reason to ensure that, one way or another, a set of relevant beliefs 
is suitably harmonised. But if requirements of rationality are process-requirements, 
and therefore narrow-scope, then the putative normativity of, say, the enkratic 
requirement is a pro tanto reason to form a particular attitude. For example, the 
enkratic requirement on a process-requirement formulation would be: 
If you now believe that you ought to pay your taxes, then, going forward, you 
are rationally required to intend to pay your taxes. 
If this requirement of rationality gives you medium normativity, then, on the basis of 
this requirement, you have a pro tanto reason to intend to pay your taxes. This is not 
the kind of normativity that I think rational requirements have. Thus, by demonstrating 
that it is a mistake to formulate rational requirements as process-requirements, I will 
have offered a reason against narrow-scope requirements of rationality. 
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Indeed, I think that it is a mistake to formulate rational requirements as process-
requirements. I have three points to make in response. First, narrow-scope process-
requirements are implausible for disallowing an agent from satisfying a rational 
requirement symmetrically. Second, the appeal of process-requirements in providing 
explanations of poor reasoning can also be found outside of process-requirement 
formulations. And, third, while requirements are generally non-detachable, process-
requirements are formulated in a way that allows for detachment. 
(ii) My first point is that, since process-requirements are narrow-scope, they preclude 
an agent from revising her attitudes in certain ways. Wide-scope requirements have 
the merit of being open-ended in how they are satisfied, which permits other 
considerations to help determine how an agent is to satisfy a requirement of rationality. 
Consider the following example. 
Impressionable Sam. Sam has a strong proclivity toward not intending immoral 
actions. He does not know that his intentions are good indications of morally 
permissible actions. Sam is unfortunately quite impressionable and has been 
influenced by a gang of vandals. The gang convince Sam to go out with them one 
night and throw stones at school windows. Sam is persuaded to join the gang and is 
even persuaded into believing that he ought to throw stones at school windows. That 
night they arrive at the school, Sam’s rational capacity kicks in, and attempts to give 
him the intention to throw a stone. But Sam’s moral proclivity also kicks in and makes 
it psychologically very difficult for him to form the intention to throw a stone, though it 
would satisfy the rational requirement of enkrasia that his rational disposition is 
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attempting to satisfy. This psychological difficulty causes Sam to reflect on whether he 
should, in fact, intend to throw a stone and on his belief that he ought to throw a stone. 
What is Sam to do? Process-requirement would say that he should intend to throw the 
stone. But state-requirement leaves it open-ended. Assuming Sam’s control over his 
attitudes, could he not through deliberation both come to satisfy enkrasia and drop a 
belief that he realises is immoral? Requirements of rationality do not necessarily 
govern states that have a bearing on your moral status. Just so, we should not expect 
that it is rational for Sam to revise his immoral belief. But we should also not expect 
that an agent should have to choose between satisfying a requirement of rationality 
and, in this case, revising an immoral belief. 
Sam’s case is meant to highlight that it is not the case that rationality only gives us a 
single avenue for satisfying its requirements. Although in this case it is a moral intuition 
of some kind that causes the agent to consider his options, there could be any number 
of considerations that an agent takes into account when going about satisfying a 
requirement of rationality. But if process-requirements are all an agent has to go by, 
then he is required by rationality to intend to throw a stone. I think this is a serious 
problem for process-requirement accounts; there is not a single way for your attitudes 
to cohere or harmonise but many, although process-requirements only give us one 
way out of an irrational state. 
The second point against process-requirements is that what makes them initially 
appealing is not unique to process-requirements. One appeal of process-requirements 
is that they explain why we intuitively take cases of rationalisation to be bad. 
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Rationalisation, as described by Mark Schroeder (2009: 227) and Jonathan Way 
(2011: 231-ff), is the act of changing your belief about what you ought to do on the 
basis of not intending to do what you believe you ought to. Since changing a normative 
belief merely on the basis of not following through is clearly not what an agent should 
do, process-requirements stipulate that this is a violation of what is rationally required 
of an agent. 
But the intuition that rationalising your normative beliefs is wrong does not necessarily 
need to be honoured by appeal to process-requirements only. Rather, a proper basing 
requirement, as suggested by Way (2011) would justify why revising your attitude in 
certain ways, such as by rationalisation, is not a good basis for revising your attitude, 
and why other bases are good for making revisions. Whatever an account of the 
correct basing relation of your attitudes ends up looking like, I do not think that it would 
form part of a theory of rationality. As the example of impressionable Sam illustrates, 
an agent can be justified in changing a normative belief rather than an intention in 
order to satisfy enkrasia, although the considerations that would lead him to do so do 
not stem from rationality. 
For the above two reasons, I do not think that requirements of rationality are process-
requirements. The kind of guidance provided by rational requirements should not be 
for single attitudes given by narrow-scope requirements. Rather, wide-scope state-
requirements are preferable for the symmetry by which they can be satisfied.  
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Since I reject formulating the requirements of rationality as process-requirements, I 
will use ‘requirement of rationality’ to mean ‘state-requirement of rationality’ from this 
point onwards. 
6.4.3. Indirect derivative arguments 
Broome (2013: 199-204) considers and rejects two indirect derivative arguments for 
the normativity of rational requirements. An indirect argument for the normativity of 
rational requirements infers normativity from ‘rationality as a whole’. Rationality as a 
whole can be understood either as an achievement of having the property of structural 
rationality, or as a disposition to satisfy many requirements of rationality under relevant 
stimulus conditions. Taking rationality as a whole in either of these two ways, an 
indirect argument attempts to demonstrate that the normativity of rationality as a whole 
transmits to particular requirements of rationality. Furthermore, these arguments are 
derivative arguments for normativity insofar as they show that the normativity of 
rationality as whole gets its normativity from some normative source other than 
rationality. The merit of a derivative account is that, if successful, it demonstrates that 
there is some robustly normative source, such as morality or prudence, that gives 
rational requirements their normativity. 
I reproduce Broome’s two indirect derivative arguments – one from rationality as a 
property and one from rationality as a disposition – and his objections to them here, 
indicating why I find Broome’s objections for the argument from a rational property 
convincing. I then consider Nicholas Shackel’s response to Broome’s objection to the 
argument from a rational disposition. While I do not find his response as a whole 
ultimately convincing, I think that there is merit in an important part of Shackel’s 
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argument for transmitting normativity. Specifically, I find his argument for transmitting 
normativity via the principle of necessary inheritance convincing.  
The normativity of the property of rationality and of the disposition of rationality are 
both assumed to derive from the claim that they are part of the best means of achieving 
what you ought to achieve according to a normative source such as morality or 
prudence (Broome, 2013: 199-200). This is most plausibly true in cases where there 
is a coincidence between satisfying rational requirements and satisfying what, say, 
morality requires of you. For example, if you believe that you ought to keep your 
promises, and if it is true by virtue of morality that you ought to keep your promises, 
then satisfying enkrasia is part of the best means of achieving what morality requires 
of you. Of course, this comes undone when, say, your normative beliefs are false. 
Nevertheless, Broome (2013: 200 states that this is the most plausible way of deriving 
the normativity of rationality as a property or a disposition. 
Both indirect derivative arguments considered by Broome operate on the same 
schema. 
1. You ought to have rationality as a whole (either as a property or a disposition). 
2. If you have rationality as a whole, then you satisfy requirements of rationality. 
3. Therefore, you have pro tanto reason to satisfy each particular requirement of 
rationality. 
Where the two indirect arguments differ is in the relation by which normativity is 
transmitted from possessing rationality as a whole to satisfying requirements of 
rationality. On Broome’s (2013: 199-200) definitions, having the property of rationality 
necessarily means that, necessarily, you satisfy all requirements of rationality to which 
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you are subject. The relation between you having the property of rationality and 
satisfying requirements of rationality is, in this case, a logical one. Having the 
disposition of rationality, though, causes you to satisfy many68 of the requirements of 
rationality. As such, the relation between a rational disposition and satisfying 
requirements of rationality is causal. 
I first consider Broome’s argument from, and objection to, transmitting normativity to 
rational requirements from having the property of rationality. According to this version 
of transmission, the fact that you ought to have the property of rationality, and the fact 
that having this property logically necessitates that you satisfy all the requirements of 
rationality, entails that you therefore have a pro tanto reason to satisfy requirements 
of rationality.  
Broome points out two problems with this argument. The first is that this pattern of 
deduction is suspicious; we do not ordinarily transmit normativity or reasons through 
necessary inheritance. 
Necessary inheritance. ((S ought that p) & necessarily (p→q))→(S ought that 
q).69 
This is how the argument at hand uses necessary inheritance: You ought to have the 
property of rationality and, necessarily, having the property of rationality implies 
 
 
68 Broome (2013: 200) qualifies the rational disposition to only cause you to satisfy many rational 
requirements rather than all of them in order to distinguish it from the logical relation that obtains 
between the property of rationality and satisfying requirements of rationality. By qualifying the rational 
disposition in this way, the causal relationship is isolated between a disposition and its manifestations. 
69 Adapted from Broome’s (2013: 126) formulation of necessary inheritance of requirements. 
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satisfying each requirement of rationality. This implies that you ought to satisfy each 
requirement of rationality. 
Broome illustrates the problem of transmission of normativity by necessary inheritance 
with an example of you believing that you ought to buy some paint and decorate your 
kitchen. Let this conjunction be (p). And let the proposition ‘that you buy paint’ be (q). 
If the above argument’s mode of inference is correct, then it would follow with necessity 
that you therefore ought to buy some paint (p→q). But if you do not intend to decorate 
your kitchen, nor will you, then it is not the case that you ought to buy some paint. 
Transmission of normativity by necessary inheritance therefore doesn’t work. 
Although this line of reasoning is suspicious, Broome acknowledges that there may be 
ways of plausibly defending this kind of inference, or a version of it. I think that Shackel 
provides a satisfactory account for normative transmission by necessary inheritance. 
It is relevant for me to spell out Shackel’s solution here as I use a weaker form of 
necessary inheritance to argue for the normativity of rational requirements from the 
value of attitudinal harmony in the following section. 
Let (B) be equivalent to the conjunction (p), ‘that you buy paint and decorate the 
kitchen’, and let (A) be equivalent to (q), ‘that you buy paint’. The problem that Broome 
identifies with normative transmission is that necessary inheritance flies in the face of 
the obvious fact that, if you will not decorate the kitchen, then it is not the case that 
you ought to buy paint (¬B→¬O(A)). However, necessary inheritance still makes it the 
case that you ought to buy paint (O(A)) even though the conjunction that you buy paint 
and decorate the kitchen is false (¬B): 
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Necessary inheritance. ((O(B) & ◻(B→A))→O(A) 
In order for Shackel to solve this problem, he needs to demonstrate that necessary 
inheritance is consistent with the abovementioned obvious fact: 
Obvious. ¬B→¬O(A) 
To resolve this issue, Shackel (2015) demonstrates that all three of the following can 
simultaneously be the case:  
O(B), and  
O(B)→O(A) by necessary inheritance, and  
¬O(A) given that ¬B.  
I will attempt to present Shackel’s already succinct demonstration as briefly as I can. 
Shackel (2015: 179) first assumes that moral choices must be made from among the 
best worlds available to our actual, often imperfect, world W(t). Morally proper worlds 
are chosen on a ‘teleological principle’, according to which a morally accessible world 
in which (A & B) is true is best, one in which (¬A & ¬B) is true is next best, and one in 
which (A & ¬B) is true is worst. 
Using deontic logic, if A is true in every morally proper world accessible from our 
current world W(t), then at W(t) it is true that O(A). And if O(A & B) is true at W(t), then 
in every morally proper world accessible from W(t) it is true that O(A) and O(B). 
Shackel (2015: 180) continues that every world accessible from W(t) in which ¬B is 
true is not a morally proper world. These are ‘fallen’ worlds, W(t)|¬B. Given the above 
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teleological principle, the morally best choice among worlds in which ¬B is true are 
worlds in which ¬A is true. Thus, given the circumstances from W(t)|¬B, every morally 
proper world given the are worlds in which ¬A is true, which makes it true at W(t)|¬B 
that ¬O(A).70 This can be expressed equivalently as ¬O(A)|¬B. 
Thus, from W(t), given the teleological principle, O(A) is true, O(B) is true, and 
¬O(A)|¬B. This provides an agent with two bases from which to decide her action. On 
the first base of decision, if you know that ¬B will be true and whether B is true is not 
under your control, then your moral decision is based on W(t)|¬B, in which case it is 
unconditionally true that ¬O(A). On the second decision bases, though, if you know 
that ¬B will be true but whether B is true is under your control, then your moral decision 
is based on W(t), in which case O(A) is true conditionally. 
Shackel’s demonstration explains that, if you will not decorate the kitchen, that is, if 
the conjunction B is false (it is false that you buy paint and decorate the kitchen), and 
it is not up to you whether or not you will decorate, then, given that, that makes it false 
that you ought to buy paint (¬O(A)). But that should not concern us given that your 
inability to do something precludes it from being the case that you ought to do it. What 
is more pertinent to Broome’s example is that if buying the paint and decorating the 
kitchen is under your control, but you nevertheless will not decorate, it is still true that 
you ought to buy paint, although that is conditional upon whether you in fact will 
 
 
70 Since ¬A is true in all morally proper worlds accessible from W(t)|¬B, it is true that O(¬A). But since 
O(¬A)→O(¬A) I skip this step and state that ¬O(A) for the sake of brevity. 
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decorate. But it is still true that you have this ought; merely not doing what you ought 
in this case does not absolve you from other things you ought to do. 
By this demonstration, Shackel shows how the teleological principle of choosing the 
best available moral world from our morally imperfect conditions shows that necessary 
inheritance is consistent with the fact that certain conditions affect what you ought to 
do. Shackel’s argument convincingly demonstrates that the principle of necessary 
inheritance can be used to transmit normativity. Thus, the principle can be used to 
transmit the normativity of having the property of rationality to satisfying requirements 
of rationality, given that the property of rationality logically necessarily entails satisfying 
the requirements of rationality. 
Unfortunately, Shackel’s response does not entirely save the argument as a whole for 
arguing for transmitting normativity from rationality to its requirements. Broome (2013: 
202) points out that the claim that you ought to have the property of rationality for some 
normative reason other than rationality is itself problematic. And if we cannot establish 
the normativity of rationality as a whole, then there is no normativity to transmit via 
necessary inheritance to rational requirements. Broome gives two reasons. First, he 
points out that it is not psychologically possible for a human agent to ever be fully 
rational in the property sense. Since you cannot ever be fully rational, it cannot follow 
that you ought to be rational in this way. Second, Broome notes that being fully rational 
cannot be part of the best means of achieving much of what you ought to do, and 
therefore that we cannot derive its normativity on that basis. By satisfying enkrasia, for 
instance, you can just as well intend to do something you ought not to do as something 
224 
 
 
 
 
that you ought to do. For both of these reasons, property rationality has no normativity 
to transmit to requirements of rationality. 
I find this second objection conclusive for rejecting indirect normative transmission. 
But what about an argument for the normativity of rational requirements from a 
putatively normative disposition of rationality? If you have a normative rational 
disposition, and that disposition causes you to satisfy many of the requirements of 
rationality, does that then give you pro tanto reason to satisfy particular requirements 
of rationality? Broome argues that it does not, and I agree. 
Broome (2013: 201) argues that normativity does not transmit from cause to effect. He 
provides an example of a drug that you have pro tanto reason to take, and that causes 
you to feel drowsy. The normativity of the drug, i.e., the pro tanto reason to take it, 
does not transmit to the effects that it causes, as a pro tanto reason to feel drowsy. 
While this example may seem to illustrate Broome’s point that normativity does not 
transmit across causal relations, Shackel (2015) argues that it is not analogous to the 
case of a rational disposition causing you to satisfy requirements of rationality. He 
claims that normativity does transmit from disposition to manifestation in cases where 
the disposition is essentially dependent upon its manifestations. However, I will argue 
that Shackel’s defence of normative transmission is ultimately unconvincing.  
Shackel’s (2015) account of normative transmission, as I understand it, runs as 
follows. 
1. You have a pro tanto reason to have a rational disposition. 
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This is assumed to be derived from Broome’s account that having a rational disposition 
is part of the best means available to an agent to do what she ought to do. I will not 
address this assumption. 
2. A rational disposition causes you to satisfy many rational requirements. 
This is true, at least on the account of ‘disposition’ that Broome and Shackel assume. 
The term ‘disposition’ is less important than the causal power of the property for 
bringing about the effect of satisfying rational requirements. It makes no difference to 
Shackel’s or Broome’s arguments what this property is called. ‘Capacity’, ‘power’, or 
some other suitable property name can be used just as well. What is relevant is that 
there is some distinct feature of the mind that causes you to satisfy rational 
requirements. 
3. A rational disposition is essentially dependent upon satisfying rational 
requirements. 
Shackel does not provide a definition of the kind of essential dependence he has in 
mind here, except for saying that, in virtue of a rational disposition being essentially 
dependent upon satisfying rational requirements, ‘…were you not to instantiate 
enough [requirements]…you would not have the [rational] disposition’ (Shackel, 2015: 
178). I assume that Shackel means something like the following definition of identity 
dependence (ID).71 
(ID) x depends for its identity upon y =df there is a relation “R” such that it is part 
of the essence of x that x is related by R to y. (Tahko and Lowe, 2020) 
 
 
71 By ‘identity’ here is meant type-identity, that in virtue of which something is an object of a particular 
kind, rather than token-identity by which an object is individuated. 
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This seems to hold in the case of a rational disposition (as x) and satisfying 
requirements of rationality (as y), where the relation R between the disposition and the 
rational requirements is that of ‘a cause of satisfying rational requirements’. Thus, 
there is a relation of a cause of satisfying rational requirements such that it is part of 
the essence of a rational disposition that it is related to rational requirements as a 
cause of satisfying rational requirements to rational requirements. 
The tricky premise is that being a cause and being essentially dependent upon an 
effect is grounds for transmitting normativity. 
4. If x is both the cause of y and essentially dependent upon y, then the normativity 
of x transmits to y. 
Since it is plausible that a rational disposition has both antecedent properties (2 and 
3), Shackel concludes that a pro tanto reason to have a rational disposition transmits 
to requirements of rationality. 
It is difficult to imagine how (4) could be true in general. What other cases might exist 
in which x is normative, and x is causally responsible for y, and x is essentially 
dependent upon y? And, if we can imagine other cases like this, does normativity 
transmit in those cases from x to y? Analogous cases would be useful for 
understanding the logic of this inference, although I cannot think of any. Nevertheless, 
this argument qualifies causal transmission of normativity to cases in which the effect 
is essentially responsible for the cause. For Shackel, although neither a causal relation 
nor a relation of essential dependence is sufficient on its own, together they constitute 
sufficient ground for normative transmission. 
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I think that this argument is problematic on two fronts. First, it is doubly odd. The first 
count of oddity comes from transmitting reasons (or any other property, for that matter) 
via a conjunction of causation and essential dependence. Until it is made more evident 
that (4) is a true, or even a plausible, conditional, I am unpersuaded. 
But it is also odd on a second count when we consider the genesis of the pro tanto 
reason that eventually comes to be attached to the rational requirement if this 
argument is valid. Assume that you now have a prudential pro tanto reason to pay 
your taxes, and that you also now have a rational requirement not to believe CNN 
reports. Recall that, following Broome, Shackel assumes that having a rational 
disposition is part of the best means of achieving what you ought to, and that you 
thereby have a pro tanto reason to have a rational disposition. So, your prudential pro 
tanto reason to pay your taxes, along with your other pro tanto reasons and oughts, 
partly gives you a pro tanto reason to have a rational disposition. Part of the essence 
of this rational disposition is causing you to satisfy requirements of rationality, and thus 
you now have a pro tanto reason to satisfy rational requirements. Thus, you now have 
a pro tanto reason to satisfy the rational requirement not to believe CNN reports. 
Surprising conclusions are not rare in philosophy, but this is quite odd indeed. 
If oddity were the only problem, I would be inclined to seek further evidence for the 
plausibility of (4). But even if we assume that it is a plausible conditional and that the 
argument is valid, there is a second problem. This argument does not demonstrate 
that requirements of rationality provide us with medium normativity, which is the kind 
of normativity we are after. In other words, it does not demonstrate that you have pro 
tanto reason to ɸ based on your having a rational requirement to ɸ. This argument 
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demonstrates that the normativity of rational requirements is contingent upon their 
being caused by a rational disposition. In cases where you satisfy a rational 
requirement by some means other than your rational disposition, say, by mistake, you 
do not thereby have a reason to satisfy that requirement. Thus, according to Shackel’s 
argument, having a rational requirement to ɸ is not itself a pro tanto reason to ɸ. 
Paradoxically, you would only have a pro tanto reason to ɸ when you are rationally 
required to ɸ after your rational disposition already caused you to ɸ. I therefore do not 
find compelling Shackel’s response to Broome’s objection against transmitting 
normativity from a rational disposition to rational requirements. I should pause to 
highlight that these problems with arguments from rationality as a disposition are 
problems for deriving the normativity of rational requirements from a rational 
disposition. My argument for rational normativity below does not trade on any kind of 
derivation from a rational disposition. Thus the failure of the above argument does not 
threaten my argument for rational normativity, nor my account of rationality as a virtue, 
according to which rationality is a kind of disposition. 
I have argued in this section against a number of approaches that attempt to account 
for the normativity of rational requirements. Derivative arguments from rationality as a 
property or a disposition for the normativity of rational requirements fail. Reasons-
responsivism is too narrow as a comprehensive account of what rationality requires of 
us, and if it weren’t it only establishes weak normativity of rational requirements. And 
requirements of rationality are not process requirements. I now offer my own account 
of the normativity of rational requirements.  
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6.5. The Normativity of Rational Requirements 
With the question still open of whether requirements of rationality provide us with pro 
tanto reason, I now offer my account of rational normativity. On my view, having a 
requirement of rationality gives you a pro tanto reason to see to it that you satisfy that 
requirement. The pro tanto reason for satisfying a requirement of rationality is based 
on the non-instrumental value of attitudinal harmony that these requirements 
constitute. After arguing for this view, I respond to a challenge by Kolodny that 
requirements of rationality do not feature in an agent’s considerations, and therefore 
cannot be pro tanto reasons. 
6.5.1. Pro tanto reason to satisfy a rational requirement 
I offer the following account of the normativity of rational requirements. 
Necessarily, if S is subject at t1 to some rational requirement R{ɸ; ψ}, that is a 
pro tanto reason at t1 for S to satisfy R{ɸ; ψ}. 
I think that this is a plausible and promising notion of normativity to explore for rational 
requirements. A negative reason for this is the problems that strong and weak 
normativity run into, as I mentioned earlier in this chapter. And a positive reason in 
favour of medium normativity was also given earlier: it would be less prone to conflicts 
with other sources of normativity like morality. 
A further merit of this account is that it provides a normative reason for an agent to 
attempt to resolve attitudinal conflicts and inconsistencies for which she may have 
sufficient reason but against which she does not have reason to resolve independently 
of rationality. In other words, having a reason to satisfy some rational requirement will 
make a difference. I will illustrate this with an example. Assume that being subject to 
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a requirement of rationality does not entail having a reason. Tim believes that he ought 
to pay his taxes, and he has sufficient pro tanto reason for believing so. Tim also has 
sufficient pro tanto reason to intend not to pay his taxes, and he so intends on that 
basis. Assume further that the relative strength of these reasons is exactly equal such 
that neither side can properly be favoured in deliberation. In virtue of the reasons 
available to Tim and their equal weight in his deliberation, he is not swayed either to 
change his belief or his intention. Although Tim is not rationally as he should be, we 
have assumed here that being required by rationality (in this case, to intend what Tim 
believes he ought to do) does not give Tim any pro tanto reason on its own to revise 
or adjust his attitudes. 
Assume now that my normative claim about rational requirements is correct. What 
difference would this make to the balance of reasons for Tim’s attitudes? Granted, the 
normativity of a wide-scope requirement does not provide a pro tanto reason for any 
particular attitude, and thus does not ‘tip the balance’ of reasons one way or another. 
But now the fact that Tim violates the enkratic requirement makes a difference to him 
– he has a pro tanto reason to get out of this situation. Having this reason could give 
Tim cause to, say, reflect on his belief about paying taxes or his intention not to pay 
them. He could begin an inquiry, seek out evidence for or against his belief or intention. 
How he goes about coming to a state of mind that satisfies this requirement is not 
prescribed by that requirement, but the normativity of such a requirement would make 
a difference for Tim. 
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6.5.2. Final value of attitudinal harmony 
But how could you have a pro tanto reason to satisfy a requirement on the basis of 
being subject to that requirement? This can be explained by the value of the state of 
mind constituted by satisfying that requirement of rationality. I take it for granted that 
it is plausible that if some state is valuable, and if it is within your control that such a 
state obtains, then that is a pro tanto reason to see to it that such a state obtains. It 
would be valuable for Pratchett not to have Alzheimer’s Disease, but you have no pro 
tanto reason to see to it that Pratchett is cured since that is not within your control. But 
there are other valuable states that are within your control, and therefore states for 
which you have pro tanto reasons, like cheering up your friend, giving to charity, and 
finishing up your oil painting. I do not need to say what makes it within your control to 
realise a certain state; I will leave that idea to whatever seems most plausible. But I 
do stipulate that I take it to be within an agent’s control, at least to some minimally 
relevant degree, that she satisfies requirements of rationality. 
The main part of my argument for the claim that you have a pro tanto reason to satisfy 
rational requirements thus lies in my claim that those requirements are constitutive of 
a valuable state over whose realisation you have a relevant degree of control. This, in 
a way, is a version of an ‘indirect’ argument for the normativity of rational requirements 
like those discussed earlier in the chapter (6.4.3).72 In virtue of the value of rationality 
 
 
72 I am immensely grateful to John Broome for pointing this out to me and for his help in making this 
part of my argument more consistent with my agreements with his objections to indirect argument for 
the normativity of rational requirements.  
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as a whole, you have a pro tanto reason to be rational. And the pro tanto reason you 
have for being rational as a whole transmits to its necessary constituents – i.e., 
satisfying particular rational requirements. Where my argument differs from the first 
derivative argument that I dismissed in light of Broome’s objection is that I think that I 
have a plausible account of the direct, rather than indirect, normativity of being rational 
as a whole. 
In chapter 5, I argued that rational requirements are constitutive of attitudinal harmony. 
Thus, I will argue here that attitudinal harmony is a valuable state of mind to have, and 
thus an agent has pro tanto reason to satisfy its constituent requirements. Specifically, 
I take it that a (more) harmonious state of mind has final value.  
Building on Korsgaard’s (1983) account of final value, Francesco Orsi (2015: 31-35) 
distinguishes between, on the one hand, intrinsic and extrinsic value, and, on the other 
hand, final and instrumental value. While ‘final value’ and ‘intrinsic value’ are 
sometimes used equivalently, there is an important different between them. The 
‘intrinsic value’ of some object or state refers to the internal properties that make it 
valuable. Pleasure, for instance, is valuable for its intrinsic properties. This is generally 
contrasted with ‘extrinsic value’, which refers to the fact that what makes some object 
or state valuable is its relational properties to other things. In contrast to the intrinsic-
extrinsic value distinction, final and instrumental value refer to how an object or state 
is to be valued, whether for its own sake (finally valuable) of for the sake of something 
further (instrumentally valuable). 
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Differentiating between these two distinctions in this way allows us to see that an 
object or state that is valuable for its own sake – that has final value – can be valued 
as such in virtue of its extrinsic properties. Orsi notes that an object can have final 
value in virtue of its relations to other objects in at least three ways (Orsi, 2015: 33-
34). For ease of reference, I will label these three ways in which final value can be 
related to extrinsic relations ‘extrinsic dependence’, ‘extrinsic enhancement’, and 
‘extrinsic grounding’. In the case of final value from extrinsic dependence, the final 
value of some object, like friendship, depends on the value of an object to which it is 
related, like the happiness of a friend. Final value from extrinsic enhancement refers 
to cases of final value in which an object’s value can be enhanced by certain relational 
properties, like the fact that some piece of art, already valuable for its beauty, say, has 
greater final value in virtue of the fact that it is unique in its genre. Or, when final value 
is extrinsically grounded, an object’s final value exhaustively grounded in its relation 
to something else, such as in the case of unique objects like Napoleon’s hat or Stone 
Henge. Since objects can have final value in virtue of their relations to other things, 
final value is therefore not equivalent to intrinsic value. Of course, it is possible for an 
object can have final value for its intrinsically valuable properties. 
Does attitudinal harmony have final value – is it a valuable state of mind for its own 
sake – and if so, in what way? I think that there are a rich variety of ways in which the 
final value of attitudinal harmony can be accounted for. I will discuss some 
considerations for accounting for the final value of this state of mind in terms of its 
extrinsic dependence. I think this account of final value is the most convincing. 
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However, I think there may be other accounts of the final value of attitudinal harmony 
besides this that I have not sufficiently developed. 
I think that there are at least three ways in which attitudinal harmony has final value 
from its extrinsic dependence on other valuable states or object. First, attitudinal 
harmony has final value in virtue of its extrinsic dependence on a good human life. 
Given the scope of attitudes, interests, and values that form part of an attitudinally 
harmonious state of mind, such a state of mind contributes towards the coherence 
among an agent’s more immediate comportment toward the world (what she now 
believes and intends) and those longstanding, underlying interests and values that 
form part of the meaningful pretext for those immediate beliefs and intentions. The 
final value of having a meaningfully coherent understanding of an agent’s social and 
intellectual context, her role within it, what features of that world are most highly 
esteemed, and what projects are worth pursuing is a state that attitudinal harmony 
necessarily contributes towards in a way that provides harmony itself with a desirability 
constitutive of final value.  
Second, attitudinal harmony typically contributes in a distinctive way towards achieving 
an array of other intellectual and practical goods of value. This relation of contributing 
towards valuable intellectual and practical goods gives attitudinal harmony a final 
value that depends in part on the value of those goods. Having globally coherent 
attitudes contributes towards achieving intellectual goods like understanding and 
wisdom. And certain requirements of rationality that constitute theoretical components 
of attitudinal harmony, such as modus ponens and apportioning belief to the evidence, 
positively contribute towards epistemic goals. Zagzebski (2003) argues that certain 
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epistemic motives are hallmarks of crediting an agent with knowledge. Attitudinal 
harmony can be viewed as playing an analogous motivational role in a rationally 
virtuous agent for ordering her attitudes in a way that makes her praiseworthy. 
On the point of valuable practical goods, coherence among an agent’s attitudes in the 
way I have defined attitudinal harmony is characteristically a positive contributing 
factor in achieving those practical goods. This is especially true in the case of 
phronesis, in which an agent’s intellectual reflection, affections, and intentions are 
harmonised in a particularly admirable manner. While phronesis involves more than 
the mental coherence of attitudinal harmony – for example, it requires success and 
excellence in one’s practical outworking of wisdom – such harmony is a necessary 
part of and a contributing factor towards practical wisdom. 
Finally, a third way in which attitudinal harmony has final value is in its relation to a 
fundamental psychological drive. David Velleman (2000), citing psychologist Prescott 
Lecky, argues that the drive for ‘self-consistency’ is fundamental to all other drives of 
your personality. My argument in this chapter is not that self-consistency – or, in my 
case, attitudinal harmony – is constitutive of being rational (this is the argument of 
chapter 5). Rather, if all ‘[b]ehavior expresses the effort to maintain the integrity and 
unity of the organisation’ (Lecky, 1945: 82, quoted in Velleman, 2000: 349) of the self, 
and if we take this psychological unity as being partially constituted by a harmoniously 
coherent relation among our mental states, then we have an additional reason for 
thinking that attitudinal harmony has final value in virtue of its extrinsic dependence on 
a fundamental psychological drive. 
236 
 
 
 
 
In light of these three considerations, I think there is good reason to think that 
attitudinal harmony has final value in virtue of its external dependence on other goods 
states and objects. But I would like to point out an important way in which a lack of 
attitudinal harmony is related to a state of final disvalue. While this does not directly 
contribute towards the claim that attitudinal harmony has final value, it does shed light 
on the importance for a state like attitudinal harmony in avoiding states of final 
disvalue. 
I think that it is plausible to claim that a sufficient lack of attitudinal harmony has final 
disvalue for the discordant, chaotic, or unintelligible state of mind that such a lack 
allows to emerge. Imagine, to begin with, having intentions or beliefs that are not 
harmonised, for example, by not satisfying diachronic persistence requirements of 
rationality. Having intentions that change arbitrarily, or no longer holding important 
beliefs like those on which many other beliefs are founded without an appropriate 
cause, is a nightmarish and almost inconceivable state of mind. But even less radical 
cases of a lack of attitudinal harmony are disconcerting to imagine, such as having a 
set of normative beliefs without any corresponding intentions. Such a state of mind 
would arguably over time make any normative belief completely unintelligible. The 
chaos and unintelligibility of a state of mind that is sufficiently discordant, I think, is a 
state of final disvalue in the same ballpark as physical pain. Again, while this does not 
imply anything about the final value of attitudinal harmony, it points to an important 
instrumental role some degree of attitudinal harmony must play in our mental lives for 
the purpose of avoiding such a nightmarish mental state. 
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If a sufficient lack or absence of attitudinal harmony has final disvalue, this may 
constitute a kind of argument to think that we have pro tanto reason to satisfy rational 
requirements. If we expect that failing to satisfy a critical degree of rational 
requirements will result in an unintelligible or chaotic state of mind, and we place strong 
disvalue on such a state, then we may have pro tanto reason to satisfy at least a 
minimal amount of rational requirements. I do not think that this is a particularly strong 
argument, but it is interesting enough to warrant a mention.  
On my account of the normativity of rational requirements, such requirements are not 
merely instrumentally valuable insofar as they are the best means of achieving what 
you already ought to achieve, nor are they even instrumentally valuable for producing 
a harmonious state of mind (though they can be). Rather, requirements of rationality 
are themselves constitutive of a harmonious state of mind, and such a state has final 
value in virtue of its extrinsic dependence on a good human life, pursuing valuable 
intellectual and practical goods, and forming part of satisfying the fundamental 
psychological drive of self-consistency. This in conjunction with the fact that having a 
harmonious state of mind is within the control of an agent to a relevant degree 
constitutes a pro tanto reason for her to have a harmonious state of mind. 
From the fact that we have pro tanto reason to have attitudinal harmony we can infer 
that we thereby have pro tanto reason to satisfy its logical constituents, rational 
requirements. Shackel’s demonstration of this by necessary inheritance is useful here, 
although, since my normative claim has to do with pro tanto reasons rather than what 
you strictly ought to do, the principle of inheritance by which the pro tanto reason to 
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be attitudinally harmonious transmits to rational requirements is weaker than that 
defended by Shackel. 
As a final step in this section, I will discuss two examples that help to illustrate how a 
pro tanto reason to satisfy a requirement of rationality might play out. It shows that 
such a pro tanto reason to satisfy a rational requirement plausibly can be weighed in 
deliberation against other pro tanto reasons an agent might have.73 
Two citizens, one a stingy Utopian and the other a generous Kickerian (see below), 
are in the same irrational state of violating the enkratic requirement. The Stingy 
Utopian believes that she ought to pay her taxes but does not intend to, and the 
Generous Kickerian believes that she ought not to pay her taxes yet intends to. Ex 
hypothesi, both have a pro tanto reason to satisfy the enkratic requirement of 
rationality and revise either one of their relevant attitudes. 
Stingy Utopian (SU). SU believes that she lives in Utopia, a social democracy in which 
tax money is put to use providing education, healthcare, and public infrastructure that 
benefits the whole population. SU thus has a strong pro tanto reason to believe that 
she ought to pay her taxes. She knows that she has this reason. But she strongly 
prefers having more money than less of it, and intending to pay her taxes would mean 
that she ultimately would have less money than if she did not intend to pay her taxes. 
This constitutes a pro tanto reason for her not to intend to pay her taxes. She knows 
 
 
73 These examples are not meant to assume or demonstrate anything about the process of deliberation 
or reasoning. As I have mentioned, this is beyond the scope of my project. 
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that she has this reason. SU thus has a pro tanto reason to believe that she ought to 
pay her taxes (and she so believes) and a pro tanto reason not to intend to pay her 
taxes (and she so does not intend). 
Generous Kickerian (GK). GK believes that she lives in Kickeria, a tyrannical state in 
which all tax money is harnessed only for the kicking of stray cats. GK thus has a pro 
tanto reason not to believe that she ought to pay her taxes and knows that she has 
this reason. But GK is a generous person and is always on the lookout for any avenue 
for giving away her money. Intending to pay her taxes is an excellent means of giving 
away her money, and is therefore a pro tanto reason for her to intend to pay her taxes. 
She knows that she has this reason. GK thus has a pro tanto reason to believe that 
she ought not to pay her taxes (and she believes so) and a pro tanto reason to intend 
to pay her taxes (and she so intends). 
In both cases, SU and GK hold attitudes for which they have reasons. Responding to 
their available pro tanto reasons will not get them out of violating enkrasia. But, on my 
account, the fact that SU and GK are both in violation of a requirement of rationality is 
a reason for both to find a way in which to satisfy that requirement, which they would 
not have had were it not the case that rational requirements give us pro tanto reasons 
to satisfy them. That requirements of rationality are pro tanto reasons to satisfy them 
explains why an agent would deliberate in light of her other pro tanto reasons in order 
to come to be in a state that satisfies the relevant requirements of rationality. 
These examples are difficult for proponents of process-requirements of rationality and 
reasons-responsivism to account for. Regarding the former, in neither case is SU’s or 
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GK’s revised attitude given by the rational requirement. I think that this is a merit of my 
account. In SU’s case we would think that the correct course of reasoning should lead 
her to adopt an intention to pay her taxes, and in GK’s case to refrain from believing 
that she ought to pay her taxes. If rationality gave us process-requirements such that 
adopting a particular attitude is the only way to satisfy a requirement, then either SU 
or GK would have a rational requirement to form an attitude that we would not think is 
ideal given their mental situations.  
On the reasons-responsivist view, in both cases, SU and GK currently have pro tanto 
reasons to hold attitudes that violate the enkratic requirement of rationality. In a limited 
way – ‘limited’ due to our suspending consideration of other reasons they might have 
– SU has reasons to believe she ought to pay taxes and not intend to pay taxes, and 
GK has reasons to believe that she ought not to pay taxes and to intend to pay taxes.  
Contrary to the process-requirement view, my account does not prescribe which 
attitude SU or GK should revise or adopt. And contrary to reasons-responsivism, my 
account does not recount what the balance of reasons prescribes. Rather, on my 
account, an agent has a pro tanto reason to resolve a violation of whatever 
requirement of rationality in which she finds herself. How an agent accomplishes this, 
through reasoning, deliberation, or some other means, is unfortunately beyond the 
scope of my thesis.74 My account does not prescribe which attitudes should be revised, 
 
 
74 Although discussions on deliberation and reasoning are beyond my scope, Way (2011) suggests that 
it is possible to provide an account of guidance without appealing to reasons-responsivism or process-
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only that attitudes should be revised. It is possible for an agent to have sufficient 
reason for some attitude ɸ and sufficient reason for attitude ψ and no reason (apart 
from rationality) to revise either ψ or ψ. My account of rationality gives the agent a 
reason to consider, deliberate, or think in light of a violation of a requirement of 
rationality that precludes {ɸ; ψ}. 
6.6. Normativity and Rationality as an Intellectual Virtue 
In this section, I briefly present an overview of the components of my account of 
rationality as an intellectual virtue in order to demonstrate that, for an agent to be both 
(i) rationally as she should be and (ii) praiseworthy for her rationality, it is necessary 
to invoke the elements of rationality as an intellectual virtue that I have developed. My 
account of the normativity of rational requirements above runs independently of any 
commitment to the claim that rationality is an intellectual virtue. However, my account 
of rationality as an intellectual virtue is necessary for explaining whether an agent is 
rationally as she should be. I first position the claim about what it is for an agent to be 
rationally as she should be alongside the normative concern discussed above (in 
section 6.3). I then argue for the necessity of accounting for an agent’s motivation and 
the exercise of her rational capacity, both of which are elements of my conception of 
rationality as an intellectual virtue.  
 
 
requirement formulations. A reified account of rational requirements, such as the one I adopt, can be 
used to develop an account of a proper basing relation between a rational requirement and an attitude. 
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I mentioned above (section 6.3) that a fundamental concern behind the question of 
whether requirements of rationality are normative is whether considerations about 
what is rationally required of an agent can be weighed in deliberation against other 
normative reasons and oughts an agent has. I then argued that this concern is best 
addressed by showing whether requirements of rationality give us medium normativity. 
This version of normativity is that, necessarily, if S is subject to some rational 
requirement {ɸ; ψ}, that is a pro tanto reason for S to satisfy {ɸ; ψ}. I attempted to 
provide such an account on the basis of the final value of attitudinal harmony. 
My account of the normativity of rational requirements is not logically dependent on 
my account of rationality as an intellectual virtue. One can accept my account of 
rational normativity without any commitment to my views on rational virtue. But this 
raises the question of whether my account of rationality as an intellectual virtue is 
needed, in that case. 
While my account of rational normativity is independent of my claims about rationality 
as in intellectual, my account of rationality as a virtue is necessary for explaining 
whether an agent is rationally as she should be, and thus whether she is praiseworthy 
for satisfying what rationality requires of her. Specifically, an agent is rationally as she 
should be only if she satisfies what rationality requires of her, does so by exercising 
her rational capacity, and does so out of a motivation for the telos of attitudinal 
harmony. This should be unsurprising to the reader; this is just the culmination of the 
account that I have been developing since chapter 4. 
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To begin with, it should be uncontroversial that an agent who merely satisfies the 
requirements of rationality is not thereby completely rationally as she should be. She 
may have formed her attitudes without any concern for their order, coherence, or 
harmony, and that by accident they fortunately fit together in such a way as to satisfy 
all that rationality requires of her. However, this component is necessary, since an 
agent who does not satisfy what rationality requires of her is not rationally as she 
should be. 
 In order to illustrate the necessity of an agent being motivated by the rational telos, 
consider three agents who have differing degrees of structural rationality. Xandi 
accidentally satisfies 100% of the requirements of rationality applicable to her, and 
Yolanda accidentally satisfies 50% of the requirements of rationality applicable to her. 
Neither of them is dissatisfied or upset by whether or not their mental states are in 
harmony or not. Like Yolanda, Zeta also accidentally satisfies 50% of the requirements 
of rationality applicable to her, but all of which she satisfied out of a motivation for 
having a harmonious state of mind. Although Zeta is equally structurally rational as 
Yolanda, Zeta is rationally better than both Yolanda and  Xandi. What distinguishes 
Zeta in this case is that, although she satisfies what rationality requires of her 
accidentally, she is motivated by achieving a harmonious state of mind.  
To recall section 5.4.3, my account of motivation for the rational telos is very 
minimalistic. An agent need not be occurrently aware of this motivation when she goes 
about exercising her rational capacity to satisfy rational requirements, although I do 
think that attitudinal harmony is at least reflectively accessible to the rational agent, 
even if she does not articulate it in the way that I do.  
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Although Zeta is rationally better than Xandi and Yolanda who satisfy either a higher 
or the same degree of rational requirements, Zeta is still not completely rationally as 
she should be. Zeta would be even better rationally were she to satisfy what rationality 
requires of her by properly exercising her rational capacity out of her motivation for 
attitudinal harmony. Were Zeta to do this, she would not only be rationally as she 
should be, but she would also be praiseworthy to some degree for the fact that she 
exercises her capacity out of this motivation and satisfies some requirements of 
rationality, thereby having a less-than-fully valuable, somewhat attitudinally 
harmonious state of mind. By satisfying many more requirements of rationality, Zeta 
would have an increasingly valuable state of mind and a proportionate degree of 
praiseworthiness.  
Thus, while my argument for the normativity of rational requirements provides an 
account of normativity independent of my conception of rationality as an intellectual 
virtue, my conception of rationality as an intellectual virtue is necessary for explaining 
whether an agent is rationally as she should be. My argument for the normativity of 
rational requirements is one part of an account of rational praiseworthiness; in order 
to explain whether an agent is rationally as she ought to be – rather than merely 
explaining whether that agent’s mental states satisfy the normative requirements of 
rationality – and whether she is rationally praiseworthy, it is necessary to take into 
account the full conception of rationality as an intellectual virtue, including a conception 
of a rational capacity, motivation for the rational goal, and the value of an attitudinally 
harmonious state of mind. 
245 
 
 
 
 
6.7. Conclusion 
In this chapter, aimed to complete my account of rational praiseworthiness by 
accounting for the value of the states of mind produced by an agent’s exercise of her 
rational capacity out of her motivation for the telos of attitudinal harmony. I argued that 
an attitudinally harmonious state of mind has final value, and thus completed my 
account of rational praiseworthiness. 
I first demonstrated the normative differences between requirements and pro tanto 
reasons; the former are strict and non-detachable while the latter are slack and 
detachable. This raised the question of whether strict, non-detachable norms like 
rational requirements could be weighed alongside other normative reasons and oughts 
you might have. The most satisfactory way of doing this, I argued, would be to show 
that rational requirements give an agent pro tanto reasons on the basis of having those 
requirements. 
I then considered and rejected three attempts at providing an account of the 
normativity of rational requirements. I argued for an account of the normativity of 
rational requirements on the basis of the final value of attitudinal harmony that rational 
requirements constitute. This final value in combination with the fact that it is within the 
agent’s control to some degree to hold attitudinally harmonious states of mind gave 
plausibility to the account of the normativity of rational requirements. Finally, I returned 
to my account of rationality as an intellectual virtue and its praiseworthiness, and 
demonstrated that an agent must necessarily have the components of rationality as 
an intellectual virtue as I have accounted for them in order to be rationally as she 
should be, as well as rationally praiseworthy. 
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 Conclusion 
 
7.1. Introduction 
I hope to have demonstrated that an account of rationality as an intellectual virtue, 
such as that which I have developed, is a plausible and fruitful way of conceiving of 
rationality. To conclude my project, in this chapter I will provide a synopsis of how I 
have developed this account (7.2.), discuss how my account may be strengthened 
(7.3), and gesture at further work beyond the scope of this thesis that my account will 
need to do (7.4). 
7.2. Synopsis of My Argument 
I have argued that my account of rationality as an intellectual virtue is both plausible 
and fruitful. Chapter 1 introduced my project of offering an initial account of rationality 
as an intellectual virtue.  To provide such an account, I began by outlining general 
accounts of rationality and intellectual virtue in chapters 2 and 3 respectively. In 
chapter 4 I used these general accounts to outline my theory of rationality as an 
intellectual virtue. In a sentence, my view is that an agent is rationally virtuous only if 
she possesses a rational capacity to reliably satisfy requirements of rationality in 
appropriate environments and conditions, exercises her rational capacity out of a 
motivation for achieving the rational goal, and is praiseworthy for the conjunction of 
exercising her capacity in this way and the value of satisfying requirements of 
rationality. This account was incomplete as it required both an account of the goal by 
which a rational agent is motivated and an account of the value of satisfying 
requirements of rationality. I argued in chapter 5 that the rational goal is equivalent to 
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the ground on which requirements of rationality are justified, and that this ground is 
attitudinal harmony. A rational agent, thus, is motivated by the telos of an attitudinally 
harmonious state of mind. In chapter 6 I argued for the value of satisfying rational 
requirements, claiming that they have non-instrumental value in constituting 
attitudinally harmonious mental states. The normative upshot of this value of rational 
requirements is that, when an agent has some requirement of rationality to have her 
attitudes relate in a certain way, that is a pro tanto reason for her to see to it that she 
satisfies that requirement. 
Here is a more detailed recapitulation of how I demonstrated this. 
In chapter 1, I posed the question of whether it might be plausible and fruitful to 
conceive of rationality along the lines of intellectual virtue theory. While some theorists 
have developed conceptions of rationality as a virtue (Sylvan, MS, Svarsdottir, 2008, 
and Wedgwood, 2017), there has largely been a neglect in whether a virtue-approach 
to rationality can solve problems such as the normativity of rational requirements. The 
prima facie motivation for attempting to develop an account of rationality as an 
intellectual virtue comes from the normatively rich concept of a virtue. If rationality 
turned out to be a virtue, then we would have access to many of the normative 
resources inherent in virtue theory. Furthermore, there was also prima facie reason 
from the side of rationality for considering whether it could be conceived of as an 
intellectual virtue. Rationality is often understood as a disposition, and one that 
produces the valuable effect of rational mental states. This has intuitive parallels with 
virtue conceptions of faculties. 
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As is appropriate for developing an initial plausible account of rationality as an 
intellectual virtue, I adopted a method of siding with theories and account that seemed 
best suited as a ‘fit’ for my project. However, in doing so, I tempered this method with 
also providing independent reasons for the positions I adopt. 
To develop an account of rationality as an intellectual virtue, it was necessary to first 
outline general accounts of both rationality and intellectual virtue in order to highlight 
their most salient features. Chapters 2 and 3 respectively provided these outlines. In 
chapter 2, first I distinguished between various senses of ‘rationality’ and identify three 
senses of the term on which my project focuses. ‘Mental rationality’ is a capacity of an 
agent, the proper exercise of which produces a structurally rational state of mind. This 
state of mind that results from the proper exercise of mental rationality is labelled 
‘structural rationality’ and is constituted by satisfying the ‘requirements of rationality’.  
In order to analyse requirements of rationality in greater detail, I considered what 
structure or form rational requirements have. In general, requirements of rationality 
have wide scope except where particular attitudes are themselves irrational, such as 
a belief in contradictory propositions. Certain requirements obtain with a single time-
index, in which case they are state-requirements. Other requirements are diachronic, 
obtaining over a period of time. While some, like Kolodny, regard rational requirements 
to be process-requirements – narrow-scope and diachronic – I was suspicious of this 
view. I was able to reject this view only at a later stage in chapter 6. I also argued that, 
although there is counterintuitively no difference between the conditions that violate 
wide-scope requirements and those that violate narrow-scope requirements, the 
significance of the distinction in scope is one of normative detachment. 
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I then offered an overview of three related issues pertaining to rationality. The first and 
most prominent among the three issues was the claim of reasons-responsivists, that 
rationality is equivalent to responding correctly to reasons. Second, I discussed the 
view of rational supervenience, according to which requirements of rationality 
supervene on the mind. While I found this position to have much intuitive appeal, there 
are difficulties in reconciling it with reasons-responsivism. Third, I gave an overview of 
recent debates on the normativity of rationality. For reasons-responsivists, the 
normativity of what rationality requires consists in the normativity of the reasons to 
which one should respond. Other accounts of the normativity of rationality attempt to 
demonstrate that, when you have a requirement of rationality to form some attitude, 
that requirement gives you a pro tanto reason to form that attitude. These issues 
brought to the surface some tentative considerations against adopting the view that 
rationality is equivalent to responding correctly to reasons. Again, I was able to more 
definitively reject reasons-responsivism only in chapter 6.  
With this general account of rationality pocketed, I outlined my general account of 
intellectual virtue in chapter 3. I attempted to give a general account of intellectual 
virtue that incorporates as much as possible from reliabilist and responsibilist 
accounts. The reliabilist’s view is that a mental faculty is an intellectual virtue only if it 
operates reliably in relevant environments and conditions, and if it produces an 
intellectually valuable effect (such as true belief). In contrast, the responsibilist’s view 
is that an acquired trait of character is an intellectual virtue if the agent is responsible 
for it and she is praiseworthy for it. These approaches together lead me to develop an 
account of three elements generally characteristic of intellectual virtues. 
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The first element was a character disposition with a weakly reliable success condition 
for forming or abstaining from forming intellectual attitudes. Character dispositions 
differ from static dispositions insofar as the former involve a relevant degree of an 
agent’s volition in their manifestation. The reliability of this disposition is weak insofar 
as it is indexed to environments and conditions appropriate for its reliable function. 
Furthermore, the reliability of an agent’s capacity is evaluated based on her track 
record of being maximally or increasingly successful, rather than based on a possible-
worlds scenario. 
Second, intellectual virtues are characterised by aiming at intellectual goods. A 
virtuous agent is one who is motivated by this aim; she has as her goal an appropriate 
intellectual good. Intellectual virtues have either an immediate aim or effect (skopos), 
an overall aim or end (telos), or both. It is characteristic of a virtuous goal that it 
motivates the agent to exercise her appropriate capacities and dispositions in such a 
way as to achieve some skopos or telos.  
The third element characteristic among intellectual virtues is some kind of goodness, 
praiseworthiness, or value. For reliabilists, the value of an intellectual virtue is 
accounted for by the value of the intellectual product of your capacity, such as 
knowledge-worthy or true belief. At best, this makes reliably successful faculties 
instrumentally valuable. But this account struggles to provide an explanation of why 
an agent is praiseworthy for having some intellectual virtue; an agent with reliably 
successful faculties is neutral with regard to praise. The reliabilist approach is better 
suited for this kind of account by virtue of its emphasis on the agent’s responsibility 
and motivation. Still, this aspect of responsibilism is complemented by the reliabilist’s 
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insight of the value of a capacity’s effect. Thus, I regard a virtuous agent to be 
praiseworthy necessarily for possessing, exercising, and being appropriately 
motivated in exercising some intellectual capacity that is non-instrumentally valuable 
to possess or results in a valuable action or effect. 
In chapter 4 I began to develop my account of rationality as an intellectual virtue, as I 
took ‘rationality’ and ‘intellectual virtue’ from the preceding chapters. I first sought to 
demonstrate that, while an agent’s rationality may depend on all the elements of an 
intellectual virtue outlined (capacity, goal, and praiseworthiness), the focal point is on 
her rational capacity – whether she exercises it correctly in appropriate conditions, 
whether she exercises it out of motivation for the appropriate goal, and whether she is 
praiseworthy for possessing or exercising that capacity. As such, the focal point of 
which property counts as an intellectual virtue is an agent’s mental rationality. 
Nevertheless, an account of the effects of exercising rationality (structural rationality 
as satisfying requirements of rationality) and an agent’s appropriate motivation for 
doing so (her rational goal) also need to be accounted for. 
The rest of chapter 4 provides an outline of a rational agent as one who, first, has a 
kind of rational capacity, second, who is motivated by an appropriate rational goal, 
and, third, who is praiseworthy for the proper exercise of their rational capacity. 
I demonstrated that a rational capacity is a character disposition whose proper 
exercise in appropriate environments and conditions reliably produces a state of mind 
that satisfies the requirements of rationality. Although requirements of rationality 
supervene on the mind, this does not preclude their satisfaction from being success-
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conditions for an intellectual virtue; virtues like courage (conceived of as overcoming 
fear) similarly have success-conditions dependent upon an agent’s mental states. A 
rational capacity is a character disposition, since its manifestation depends on a 
certain degree of voluntary control by the agent. This capacity is also only suited for 
exercise in certain conditions and environments; enabling conditions, both positive and 
negative, allow an agent to properly exercise this capacity. 
Second, a rational agent is motivated by an appropriate intellectual goal. A rational 
agent’s goal is what distinguishes the appropriate and the inappropriate exercise of 
her rational capacity. Although my general account of rationality did not include the 
element of an agent’s motivation or goal, including this addresses the concern that, if 
requirements of rationality are wide-scope, then an agent may inappropriately satisfy 
those requirements. My account distinguishes between these cases without changing 
the scope of rational requirements. I did not specify in this chapter what I take the 
appropriate rational goal to be, and I developed this in the following chapter. 
Third, a rational agent is plausibly regarded as praiseworthy partly for correctly 
exercising her rational capacity out of her motivation for the rational goal. The 
remainder of a plausible account of rational praiseworthiness resides in the value of 
exercising your rational capacity in accordance with a rational goal. I regard satisfying 
requirements of rationality as non-instrumentally valuable, although I provide this 
account in chapter 6. 
Chapter 5 picked up on my incomplete account of a rational goal. I first argued that an 
account of grounding requirements qua requirements of rationality maps onto the 
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problem of identifying the appropriate intellectual goal of a rational agent. Since 
grounding requirements of rationality through the concept of structural rationality is 
unsatisfactory, I sought an independent basis for their justification  
Before developing my theory of attitudinal harmony as a satisfactory ground, I argued 
that three other possible accounts are unsatisfactory. First, Wedgwood’s account of 
expected correctness fails to justify paradigmatic rational requirements such as 
enkrasia. Moreover, it justifies bizarre requirements, such as ones that would 
bootstrap intentions based on your predictions of what you expect you will do. Second, 
I argued that consistency is also unsuccessful in grounding requirements of rationality. 
Although I took consistency as noncontradiction as my target, similar problems would 
be inherent to other principles of thought like that of identity and excluded middle. 
Consistency as noncontradiction fails to ground any prescription that an agent with 
certain attitudes is required to hold additional attitudes, either as inferences from the 
agent’s premise-attitudes or as attitudes that are otherwise rational to hold in 
conjunction with her current attitudes. Third, I argued that mental consistency is also 
unsatisfactory. Although it is closer to the mark than the two preceding accounts, 
mental coherence ultimately fails to ground rational requirements due to its inability to 
account for clauses that index rational requirements to what an agent cares about or 
what is up to the agent. 
My account of attitudinal harmony built upon the notion of attitudinal coherence. 
According to my view, an agent’s mind is attitudinally harmonious if and only if its 
attitudes and their content cohere with each other and with the agent’s persistent 
goals, interests, and values over time. This is a more globalised notion of coherence 
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than the candidate I rejected, accounting for a wider mental population that is subject 
to rationality. I argued that my account is able to ground paradigmatic requirements of 
rationality, taking into consideration what an agent cares about and what is up to the 
agent. I also demonstrated that it is even able to distinguish between general cases in 
which an overdetermining intention is prohibited by rationality and cases in which an 
overdetermining intention may be required by rationality. 
I concluded chapter 5 by completing my account of the appropriate rational goal by 
which a rational agent is motivated. The telos, i.e., the overall aim, of rationality is that 
of having an attitudinally harmonious state of mind. Possessing this telos is reflectively 
accessible to the agent. Given that attitudinal harmony grounds rational requirements, 
having this telos results in an agent exercising her rational capacity in order to satisfy 
rational requirements. In this way, a rational agent need not have any particular 
requirement of rationality accessible to her in order to appropriately satisfy that 
requirement. 
Chapter 6 completes my account of the praiseworthiness of a rational agent by arguing 
for the normativity of rational requirements. Before developing my account, I first 
discussed the normative differences between requirements and pro tanto reasons, 
clarified the normative question, and outlined problems with some existing accounts 
of rational normativity. 
First, I demonstrated that the normative differences between requirements and pro 
tanto reasons is that the former are strict and non-detachable, while pro tanto reasons 
are slack and detachable. Next, I clarified that the normative question is whether being 
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subject to a requirement of rationality gives you a pro tanto reason on that basis. While 
this is the most intuitive way for requirements of rationality to be normative, there are 
weaker and stronger versions of rational normativity. 
I then provided an overview of three approaches that are unsuccessful in accounting 
for the normativity of rational requirements; reasons-responsivism, process-
requirements, and derivative arguments. I argued that the first approach, reasons-
responsivism, only provides weak normativity, and, depending on the version, might 
collapse rational requirements with what you ought to do. I provided two arguments 
against the reasons-responsivist claim that responding correctly to reasons is 
equivalent to what rationality requires of you; one argument against an externalist view 
of reasons, and one against an internalist view of reasons. 
I argued that the view of the second approach, that rational requirements are process-
requirements,75 is also mistaken on at least two counts. First, process-requirements 
neglect the symmetry of satisfaction; it should be open to an agent how she should 
revise her attitudes in order to satisfy a requirement of rationality. Second, the 
normativity of process-requirements is detachable, whereas requirements (at least 
requirements of rationality) are properly understood as non-detachable. 
The third approach that I considered was whether there are derivative pro tanto 
reasons for satisfying requirement of rationality, assuming that rationality as a whole 
 
 
75 Recall that, if requirements of rationality are process-requirements, then the normativity of rational 
requirements would be a pro tanto reason to form a particular attitude. 
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(as a property or a disposition) is normative. If property-rationality were normative, it 
does not follow that what is necessarily true from this property is also normative or 
also something for which you thereby have a pro tanto reason. But even if this does 
follow, having the property of rationality cannot be something that you ought to have. 
It is psychologically impossible, and it is not necessarily part of the best means of 
achieving what you ought to achieve. If a rational disposition were normative, it does 
not follow that what this disposition causes (i.e., your satisfying rational requirements) 
is likewise normative or what you have a pro tanto reason to do. Normativity, and pro 
tanto reasons in particular, do not transmit from a normative cause to its effects. While 
Shackel defends normative transmission of certain causes when they are essentially 
dependent upon their effects, I argue that his argument is unconvincing. 
As an alternative to these attempts, I offer my account of the normativity of rational 
requirements. According to my view, having a requirement of rationality to {ɸ; ψ} is 
itself a pro tanto reason to see to it that you satisfy {ɸ; ψ}. Your reason to satisfy what 
rationality requires of you consists in the final value of those states of mind that rational 
requirements constitute, i.e., the final value of attitudinal harmony. 
Finally, although my account of the normativity of rational requirements is independent 
of my theory of rationality as an intellectual virtue, I argued that my theory is necessary 
for two things. First, it is necessary for distinguishing between agents who satisfy 
requirements of rationality and those whose states of mind merely accord with rational 
requirements. And second, it is necessary for completing my account in chapter 4 of 
the praiseworthiness of a rational agent. My argument for the former claim 
demonstrated that my account of a rational capacity that is properly exercised, as well 
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my account of possessing the rational goal of attitudinal harmony, are both necessary 
for explaining what goes right (or wrong) when an agent satisfies (or fails to satisfy) a 
requirement of rationality. An additional merit of my account of rational normativity is 
that it explains how rationality can be consistent with considerations that may prescribe 
that you violate a requirement of rationality. 
I have argued, therefore, that an agent is rationally virtuous only if she possesses a 
rational capacity to reliably satisfy requirements of rationality in appropriate 
environments and conditions, exercises this capacity out of a motivation for achieving 
the goal of attitudinal harmony, and is praiseworthy for the conjunction of exercising 
her capacity in this way and for bringing about attitudinally harmonious state of mind 
that is of final value. I hope to have demonstrated throughout the thesis that there is 
plausible ground for this account, and that it has shown promise in being 
philosophically fruitful in its ability to account for both the justification of rational 
requirements and the normativity of rational requirements. 
I would like to make two final comments on this theory. First, an interesting result of 
my account is that, if plausible, there is remarkable continuity between the justification 
of rational requirements and the normativity of rational requirements. Attitudinal 
harmony is both the basis of justification and the source of normativity for requirements 
of rationality. In my view, this highlights the central role that the concept of attitudinal 
harmony can play in theories of rationality. Second, again assuming the plausibility of 
my account, my account provides an agent-centric theory of rationality that is 
consistent with and incorporates non-agent-centric views. For instance, I have 
adopted theses in my virtue account such as rational supervenience and an account 
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of structural rationality that are meant as theories pertaining to a mind’s attitudes. This 
consistency – between my agent-centric account and non-agent-centric theories – 
allows for an inclusion of, and encourages engagement with, work that has been done 
on rationality that has not had an agent-centric focus with the kind of intellectual virtue 
theory I have developed here.  
7.3. Strengthening My Account 
The development of my conception of rationality as an intellectual virtue in this thesis 
was a first attempt at a more comprehensive and detailed account than what is 
currently available. Still, as a first attempt, my account has treated most issues in broad 
brushstrokes rather than fine-grained detail. As such, there may be inconsistencies or 
tensions that need to be resolved. I will turn to discuss how my account would be 
strengthened, first, by treating in greater detail its commitments to certain claims or 
theories, second, by highlighting some apparent tensions that emerge, and, third, what 
further work my account may need to do in order to be more exhaustive.  
7.3.1. Providing detailed treatments 
I first discuss two arguments or claims that would benefit from a more detailed 
treatment. I have tried as far as possible to allay any initial concerns about claims or 
theories that may threaten my positions on the following points. However, since my 
method was to find plausible rather than conclusive or convincing ground for adopting 
the positions that I have, further work is needed in order to entrench my position. I 
briefly discuss two points from my account that would benefit from a more detailed 
treatment. I offer some initial thoughts on available routes for me to respond; these 
are not developed replies by any means. 
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The first way in which I could strengthen my account of justifying rational requirements 
in chapter 5 is to provide a stronger argument for justifying requirements of rationality 
on the basis of attitudinal harmony. For one thing, my definition of attitudinal harmony 
(subsection 5.4.1) requires development in order to more clearly demarcate between 
rational and non-rational requirements. As it stands, I think that it is useful for 
grounding certain paradigmatic rational requirements as belonging under rationality. 
But it is too vague of a definition, and I suspect that it may permit certain requirements 
to be classified as rational requirements which we would not in fact endorse as rational 
requirements. 
A second aspect of my thesis that could do with a more detailed treatment is to provide 
a more comprehensive reply to reasons-responsivism as an exhaustive account of 
what rationality requires. My treatment of reasons-responsivism was sufficient for 
highlighting fundamental problems with internalist and externalist versions of this 
approach. However, I did not present a systematic or thoroughgoing critique of 
reasons-responsivism. Recently, Sylvan (MS) advocates for an internalist reasons-
responsivism, and Kiesewetter (2017) endorses a kind of externalist reasons-
responsivism. Although there are many ways in which I could further engage with 
reasons-responsivism, developing my critique would further solidify my reified stance 
on rational requirements against a widely held and well-developed position. 
A third front on which my account would benefit from a more detailed treatment, and 
the last point that I offer here, is my argument for the normativity of rational 
requirements. It rests on two claims: the final value of an attitudinally harmonious state 
of mind that is constituted by satisfying rational requirements, and the fact that it is up 
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to an agent to see to it whether she has an attitudinally harmonious state of mind, i.e., 
whether she satisfies rational requirements. But if it is not up to the agent to satisfy 
rational requirements, this would pose a problem for my account. Wooram Lee (2020) 
argues that it is not up to the agent, hence threatening my second claim. An agent’s 
occurrent attitudes will never violate rational requirements, he claims. Thus, it is not 
up to the agent whether her occurrent mental states satisfy rational requirements. 
Since your occurrent beliefs cannot violate rational requirements, it does not follow 
that you have a pro tanto reason to satisfy them (since ‘can’ is a necessary condition 
for ‘ought’). 
I have not provided any basis for arguing that Lee is mistaken, or any ground on which 
to defend the possibility of it being up to the agent how she forms, revises, or drops 
occurrent attitudes. I have assumed that rational requirements govern both occurrent 
and dispositional attitudes. I am unsure how I might address Lee’s claim directly. 
But if we assume that Lee’s claim is correct, or at least plausible, then a plausible 
response for me might be the following. It could be the case that rational requirements 
only govern dispositional attitudes, and that the reasons they give an agent are to 
make her dispositional attitudes occurrent. If they are occurrent, according to Lee, they 
will necessarily satisfy rational requirements. This does not seem like a particularly 
appealing response, but it is one that is available to me that is consistent with the 
account that I have developed. 
I think that it is strange to claim that requirements of rationality are inviolable for our 
occurrent attitudes. Many of us violate enkrasia or modus ponens from time to time. 
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Perhaps Lee’s response is that, in the event that you do not intend to do what you 
putatively believe you ought to do, it is because you do not genuinely have a full-blown 
belief. But if so, I think we are using the term ‘belief’ for different kinds of mental states. 
In any event, Lee’s position requires a response in order to strengthen my account, 
although I think that the above response is at my disposal. 
7.3.2. Resolving apparent tensions 
I now discuss two apparent tensions that emerge from my account and some possible 
ways of addressing them. First, my general account of intellectual virtue attempts to 
incorporate the intuitions behind both reliabilism and responsibilism. A prominent 
intuition behind responsibilism is that, in order for a capacity to be a virtue of your 
mind, the relevant intellectual goods that it produces (such as beliefs) ought to be 
valuable. I included this element in my account of the praiseworthiness of rationality; 
part of what makes a rational agent praiseworthy is that she manifests her rational 
disposition in a way that produces a state of mind that has final value in virtue of its 
attitudinal harmony. 
One of the primary intuitions behind responsibilism, though, is that a virtue should 
include considerations about the agent’s volition and her motivations in order for her 
to be praiseworthy for the kinds of intellectual actions she performs. I also incorporated 
this intuition into my account of praiseworthiness, where a rational agent is 
praiseworthy for exercising her capacity in a certain way. 
There may be a genuine tension between these two approaches. Reliabilist accounts 
generally discount an agent’s volition or responsibility in the reliable manifestation of 
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a virtue, while responsibilists take an agent’s responsibility as necessary.76 I have 
attempted to provide an account of praiseworthiness and volition that allows both 
responsibilist character-virtues as well as reliabilist faculty-virtues to be conceived of 
as praiseworthy virtues. However, I have not fully developed this account and there 
may be contradictions that need to be resolved. 
A second tension that arises from my account is as follows. Part of my account of 
rationality as a virtue is that an agent has the capacity to reliably form or abstain from 
forming relevant attitudes. But what counts as a relevant attitude on my account? 
According to my arguments in chapter 5 and chapter 6, such an attitude would be any 
state of mind that promotes attitudinal harmony. On this view, pretty much any attitude 
could count as a relevant attitude, not only beliefs and intentions, but even desires, 
suspicions, and wishes. Thus, if a rational capacity is the capacity to form any attitude, 
and structural rationality is defined as a state of mind that arises from the proper 
exercise of your rational capacity, then structural rationality consists in any kind of 
attitude being well-ordered in your mind. This does not seem right; surely there are 
certain kinds of mental states that structural rationality is not concerned with. This is a 
completely unintended result from my formulation of the rational capacity, and one that 
I think needs to be refined.  
 
 
76 See Axtell’s (1997) account of this difference. 
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7.3.3. Further work 
My account of rationality as an intellectual virtue not only needs to be strengthened in 
the above ways, among others. There is additional work that needs to be done in order 
to make my conception of rationality more comprehensive or exhaustive as an account 
of the conditions for a rational agent. I here briefly touch on three directions in which 
this may be done: in reasoning and in virtue-theoretic approaches to knowledge and 
justification. 
The most prominent direction in which my project can be developed further is that 
which was explicitly stated as beyond the scope of my thesis – reasoning, or the 
process by which an agent deliberates on, and thereby revises or sustains, her 
attitudes. I have adopted Broome’s account of proper reasoning, which is largely 
consistent with my account of exercising an agent’s rational capacity.  
But having a developed account of the process of deliberation or reasoning would be 
necessary for a fuller account of how an agent exercises her rational capacity out of a 
motivation for the rational goal. Most importantly, this account would be informative for 
understanding the kinds of intellectual (mental) actions of a virtuously rational agent 
would do as part of exercising her rational capacity. 
A second direction in which further work can be done on my account is to develop its 
connections with virtue-theoretic approaches to knowledge and justification. I have 
distinguished my understanding of structural rationality from epistemic justification. If 
epistemic justification is necessary for knowledge, it would be a mistake to conceive 
of it along the lines of rationality that I have in this thesis. However, virtue epistemology 
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may by more partial towards revisiting the notion of the relations between knowledge 
and rationality if rationality is a kind of intellectual virtue. There is thus work to be done 
in examining to what extent my account of rationality as an intellectual virtue fits within 
a broader virtue-theoretic framework for understanding epistemic concepts such as 
knowledge and justification. 
To offer a point on which my account can be put into conversation with work further 
afield in epistemology, consider Littlejohn’s (2018b) discussion of theoretic rationality. 
Littlejohn offer’s what he argues to be an attractive account of theoretic rationality. 
‘Necessarily, it’s rational to ɸ iff it’s possible that a non-factive mental duplicate of yours 
ɸ’d without failing to conform to the norm-reasons’ (Littlejohn, 2018b: 546). The field 
to which Littlejohn’s account is pitched is that of ‘theoretic rationality’, which is 
concerned with the conditions under which a belief is epistemically rational. This differs 
from my focus of rationality as a state of mind, the attitudes of which are ordered in a 
way that satisfies requirements of rationality. 
Littlejohn offers this account as an alternative to evidentialism, according to which you 
are rational only when responding to available evidence. But since there are rational 
beliefs that are not the result of any response to evidence, he argues, an alternative 
account may be needed according to which, for example, a rational belief is one 
comparable to that ‘of an epistemically virtuous subject, one that assumes 
responsibility for her beliefs and understands how to handle the demands that reasons 
place upon her’ (Littlejohn, 2018b: 547). 
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While my virtue-theoretic account of rationality is not an account of how an agent is to 
‘handle the demands that reasons place upon her’, it does provide an account of how 
an agent’s non-factive state of mind is to respond to having a rational requirement. 
There may therefore be ways of building upon or reconciling my account of an 
intellectually virtuous rational agent with an account of theoretical rationality in some 
way. 
Finally, what can also be viewed as a tension in my account is that I only consider 
non-virtue accounts of rational requirements. It may well be fruitful to explore what a 
distinctively virtue-theoretic account of rational ‘requirements’ would involve. As a 
starting point, there may be a tension between speaking about the conditions under 
which an agent has structural rationality as ‘requirements’, given the quasi-
deontological connotation of the word.77 
I should note that the purpose of my project of exploring the plausibility of an account 
of rationality as an intellectual virtue presupposed adopting a sufficiently accepted 
notion of ‘rationality’ and ‘rational requirements’ from the current literature on 
rationality. Due to this constraint, developing a novel virtue-theoretic account of 
structural rationality and its requirements would have gone beyond my scope. 
Nonetheless, I think that some of the resources that my account has developed or 
brought to the surface, especially the concept of attitudinal harmony, could feature in 
developing a novel virtue-theoretic account of rational requirements. 
 
 
77 I am grateful to Guy Axtell for pointing out this tension in my account. 
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7.4. Conclusion 
I have argued for an account of rationality as an intellectual virtue that unifies under a 
single theory the capacity of rationality, the goal to which a rational agent is motivated 
(and, as a consequence, the grounds on which rational requirements are justified), 
and the praiseworthiness of a rational agent (and, as a consequence, the normativity 
of rational requirements). Despite the breadth of this account, it holds promise as a 
plausible and fruitful account of rationality. However, since this thesis was a first step 
towards developing such an account, I have not conclusively demonstrated all the 
claims to which my account is committed, nor have I resolved all the tensions that may 
emerge from it. That requires further work. 
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